| Clifford v County of Rockland |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 05112 [140 AD3d 1108] |
| June 29, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Deirdre A. Clifford, Appellant, v County ofRockland, Respondent. |
Michael D. Diederich, Jr., Stony Point, NY, for appellant.
Catania, Mahon, Milligram & Rider, PLLC, Newburgh, NY (Rebecca BaldwinMantello of counsel), for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract and discriminationon the basis of disability in violation of Executive Law § 296, the plaintiffappeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Berliner, J.), datedJune 16, 2014, which granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) todismiss the complaint as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and (2) a judgmentof the same court dated July 8, 2014, which, upon the order, is in favor of the defendantand against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.
The appeal from the order must be dismissed because the right of direct appealtherefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho,39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought upfor review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR5501 [a] [1]).
The plaintiff, an employee of the County of Rockland, commenced this actionagainst the County to recover damages for, among other things, breach of contract anddiscrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the New York State HumanRights Law (see Executive Law § 296 [hereinafter the NYSHRL]).The County moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint as barred bythe doctrine of collateral estoppel, citing the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against itin a prior federal action in the United States District Court for the Southern District ofNew York (see Clifford v County of Rockland, 2012 WL 2866268, 2012 US DistLEXIS 98783 [SD NY, June 25, 2012, No. 10-CV-9679 (VB)], affd 528 FedAppx 6 [2d Cir 2013]). The plaintiff opposed the motion, noting that, pursuant to 28USC § 1367 (c) (3), the District Court had declined to exercisesupplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. In an order dated June 16, 2014, theSupreme Court granted the County's motion. A judgment dated July 8, 2014 was enteredin favor of the County and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint. The plaintiffappeals from the order and the judgment.
[*2] "The doctrine of collateral estoppel, a narrower species of res judicata,precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearlyraised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity,whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same" (Ryan v New York Tel.Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500 [1984]). "Collateral estoppel comes into play when fourconditions are fulfilled: (1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue inthe prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided, (3) there was a full and fairopportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated wasnecessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits" (Conason v Megan Holding,LLC, 25 NY3d 1, 17 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted])."The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel has the burden to show the identity ofthe issues, while the party trying to avoid application of the doctrine must establish thelack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate" (Matter of Dunn, 24 NY3d 699, 704 [2015]). Where afederal court declines to exercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state law claims, collateralestoppel may still bar those claims provided that the federal court decided issues identicalto those raised by the plaintiff's state claims (see Ji Sun Jennifer Kim v Goldberg, Weprin, Finkel, Goldstein,LLP, 120 AD3d 18, 23 [2014]; Sanders v Grenadier Realty, Inc., 102 AD3d 460, 461[2013]).
Here, with respect to her breach of contract claim, the plaintiff alleges that theCounty breached the terms of an October 2008 stipulation, pursuant to which she settledcertain disciplinary charges against her, by failing to lift her suspension fromemployment for over eight months after she was "not found unfit" for duty, andreassigning her to an inferior position upon her return to work. These specificcontentions, however, were considered and rejected in the federal action (see Cliffordv County of Rockland, 2012 WL 2866268, *7, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 98783,*19).
With respect to the plaintiff's claims under the NYSHRL, "the standards for recoveryunder the New York Human Rights Law are in nearly all instances identical to title VII[of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] and other federal law" (Margerum v City of Buffalo,24 NY3d 721, 731 [2015]). Here, the District Court determined that the County hadlegitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment actions, andthat those reasons were not a pretext for discrimination (see Clifford v County ofRockland, 2012 WL 2866268, *6, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 98783, *15-16). Thisdetermination was dispositive of the plaintiff's NYSHRL claims (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for theBlind, 3 NY3d 295, 313 [2004]; Kulaya v Dunbar Armored, Inc., 110 AD3d 772, 772[2013]; Adeniran v State ofNew York, 106 AD3d 844, 845 [2013]). The United States Court of Appeals forthe Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court (see Clifford v Countyof Rockland, 528 Fed Appx at 8-10).
Under the circumstances, the County met its burden of demonstrating that the issuesraised in this action are identical to those decided against the plaintiff in the federalaction. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she did not have a full andfair opportunity to litigate these issues. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly grantedthe County's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint. Dillon, J.P.,Dickerson, Cohen and Duffy, JJ., concur.