| People v Farnsworth |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 05196 [140 AD3d 1538] |
| June 30, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Craig P. Farnsworth, Appellant. |
Matthew C. Hug, Albany, for appellant.
Karen Heggen, District Attorney, Ballston Spa (Gordon W. Eddy of counsel), forrespondent.
Rose, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Saratoga County(Sypniewski, J.), rendered July 14, 2015, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty ofthe crime of criminal possession of marihuana in the second degree.
In March 2015, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant waivedindictment and pleaded guilty as charged in a superior court information to a single countof criminal possession of marihuana in the second degree stemming from the cultivationand possession of marihuana inside the home of defendant and his codefendant wife(see Penal Law § 221.25). In exchange for defendant's guilty plea,the People promised defendant that his wife, in full satisfaction of the charges againsther, would be allowed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor by admitting to allowingmarihuana to be grown on her property without destroying it in violation of the PublicHealth Law (see Public Health Law § 3382). Following his wife'sguilty plea to the misdemeanor, but before his sentencing, defendant filed a motion towithdraw his guilty plea alleging, among other things, that his plea was coerced becausethe People forced him to plead to a reduced charge conditioned on a specific sentence ofjail followed by five years of probation and a promise not to prosecute his wife on felonycharges. The People opposed the motion, and County Court, in a June 2015 order, denieddefendant's motion, finding that defendant's plea was made knowingly and voluntarilyand that there was no element of coerciveness in any aspect of the negotiated pleaagreement. Thereafter, in accordance with the plea agreement, County Court sentenceddefendant to six months in jail with five years of probation. Defendant nowappeals.
[*2] We affirm. While defendant'scontention that County Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw hisguilty plea is not precluded by the appeal waiver and was preserved by his unsuccessfulmotion to withdraw his guilty plea (see People v Burns, 133 AD3d 1045, 1046 [2015]; People v Colon, 122 AD3d956, 957 [2014]), we find his claim to be without merit. " 'Whether to permita defendant to withdraw his or her plea of guilty is left to the sound discretion of CountyCourt, and withdrawal will generally not be permitted absent some evidence ofinnocence, fraud or mistake in its inducement' " (People v Burns, 133AD3d at 1046, quoting People vMassia, 131 AD3d 1280, 1281 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1041 [2015][internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v Riddick, 136AD3d 1124, 1124 [2016]). "[S]o long as the plea agreement is voluntarily,knowingly and intelligently made, the fact that it is linked to the prosecutor's acceptanceof a plea bargain favorable to a third person does not, by itself, make defendant's pleaillegal" (People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536, 544 [1993]; see People vEaddy, 200 AD2d 896, 897 [1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 852 [1994]).
While defendant's wife received a favorable outcome or "third-party benefit" thatwas conditioned upon defendant's guilty plea, her receipt of that benefit "is simply onefactor for a trial court to weigh in making the overall determination whether [defendant's]plea is voluntarily entered" (People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d at 545 [internalquotation marks and brackets omitted]; see People v Brown, 14 NY3d 113, 117-118 [2010]).Defendant indicated that he understood all of the terms of the plea agreement, includingthe agreed-to sentence of six months in jail and five years of probation, and that hereviewed those terms with his attorney. He further acknowledged that acceptance of theplea bargain was in his best interests. Defendant also, while represented by counsel withwhom he had expressed his satisfaction, made an allocution to the crime of which he wasconvicted and stated that his plea was not coerced. Nor did defendant raise or indicateany concerns about the plea agreement or its terms during his plea colloquy.Accordingly, notwithstanding the "connected or wired" nature of defendant's plea(People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d at 544), based upon our review of the entirerecord before us, we are convinced that defendant made a "knowing, voluntary andintelligent choice among alternative courses of action" (People v Conceicao, 26 NY3d375, 382 [2015] [citation omitted]; see People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d at543; People v Pelkey, 63AD3d 1188, 1189-1190 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 748 [2009]; People vEaddy, 200 AD2d at 897).
Inasmuch as the record reveals no legitimate question about the voluntariness ofdefendant's plea (see People vMcKinney, 122 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 1167[2015]; compare People v Brown, 14 NY3d at 116, with People vTinsley, 35 NY2d 926, 927 [1974]), we also reject defendant's contention thatCounty Court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior todenying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea (see People v Riddick, 136AD3d at 1124; People vShurock, 83 AD3d 1342, 1343 [2011]). Furthermore, because the "offer of aplea bargain is not a constitutional right, but a matter of prosecutorial discretion[,]" wefind nothing in the record before us upon which to conclude that defendant'sconstitutional right to due process was infringed by the plea bargain that was offered tohim or that the plea agreement was the product of an unlawful plea bargaining policy(People v Cohen, 186 AD2d 843, 844 [1992]; see Weatherford v Bursey,429 US 545, 561 [1977]; Peoplev Humphrey, 30 AD3d 766, 767 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 813 [2006];cf. People v Jacques, 79AD3d 1812, 1812 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 896 [2011]).
Lahtinen, J.P., Lynch, Clark and Aarons, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.