Matter of Spring v County of Monroe
2016 NY Slip Op 05465 [141 AD3d 1151]
July 8, 2016
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 31, 2016


[*1]
 In the Matter of Todd Spring, Respondent, v County ofMonroe et al., Appellants.

Harris, Chesworth, Johnstone & Welch, LLP, Rochester (Eugene Welch ofcounsel), for respondents-appellants.

Appeal from a judgment (denominated order and judgment) of the Supreme Court,Monroe County (Thomas A. Stander, J.), entered January 7, 2015 in a CPLR article 78proceeding. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, granted in part the petition tocompel disclosure of certain documents pursuant to the Freedom of InformationLaw.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified onthe law by denying the petition insofar as it seeks disclosure of documents contained inthe confidential record at pages 1, 2, 4 through 6, 9 through 21, 46 through 50, 54through 64, 68, 72 through 82, 88 through 99, 104 through 108, 110, 111, and 120, andas modified the judgment is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seekingdisclosure of approximately 200 documents, emails, memoranda, and reports pursuant tothe Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). After conducting an in camera review,Supreme Court directed the disclosure of several documents, and respondentsappeal.

Initially, we note that the court erred in applying the arbitrary and capricious standardof review and instead should have determined whether the Records Appeal Officer'sdetermination " 'was affected by an error of law' " (Mulgrew v Board of Educ. of theCity School Dist. of the City of N.Y., 87 AD3d 506, 507 [2011], lvdenied 18 NY3d 806 [2012]). In any event, we have conducted a de novo reviewapplying the appropriate standard relating to the disputed documents, and we modify thejudgment as discussed herein.

We conclude that the email correspondence between petitioner and "in-house"counsel for respondent County of Monroe (County) found in the confidential record atpages 1, 2, 4 through 6, and 9 through 21 is exempt from FOIL disclosure. Counsel forthe County represented petitioner only in petitioner's capacity as a County employee.Thus, only the County could waive the attorney-client privilege protecting thecorrespondence. Petitioner's "unilateral belief" that he was the client is, by itself, of nomoment (Berry v Utica Natl.Ins. Group, 66 AD3d 1376, 1376 [2009]). Similarly, the email correspondencefound in the confidential record at pages 104 through 108, 110, 111, and 120 between aCounty employee and hired counsel for the County is protected by attorney-clientprivilege.

We also conclude that the draft informal dispute resolution (IDR) request found inthe confidential record at pages 46 through 50 is also exempt from FOIL disclosureinasmuch as it is protected by attorney-client privilege, by attorney work productprivilege, and as interagency material pursuant to Public Officers Law § 87(2) (g). The draft IDR request "does not contain [*2]statistical or factual tabulations or data . . . orfinal agency policies or determinations. It consists solely of . . . evaluations,recommendations and other subjective material and is therefore exempt from disclosure"(Matter of Rome Sentinel Co. v City of Rome, 174 AD2d 1005, 1006 [1991]).Similarly, the documents found in the confidential record at pages 54 through 58,representing a "chronological explanation" of a County Human Resources investigationare exempt from disclosure by attorney-client privilege and under section 87 (2) (g).

We further conclude that the documents found in the confidential record at pages 59through 64, 68, 72 through 74, and 88 through 99 are exempt from disclosure underPublic Officers Law § 87 (2) (g) inasmuch as those documents contain,inter alia, " 'opinions, ideas, or advice exchanged as part of the consultative ordeliberative process of government decision making' " (Matter of Sell v New York CityDept. of Educ., 135 AD3d 594, 595 [2016]). The hearing transcript found in theconfidential record at pages 75 through 82 constitutes predecisional intra-agency materialand is also exempt from FOIL disclosure (see Sinicropi v County of Nassau, 76AD2d 832, 833 [1980], lv denied 51 NY2d 704 [1980]).

With respect to the remaining materials at issue, we conclude that respondents havefailed to show that they are exempt from disclosure.

Finally, respondents are correct that there is an inconsistency between the decisionportion of the "decision, order and judgment" on appeal and the decretal paragraphstherein. In its decision, the court held that emails located in the confidential record atpages 112 through 119 were protected by attorney-client privilege. In the second andthird decretal paragraphs, however, the court included those records as items to bedisclosed to petitioner. We conclude that the second and third decretal paragraphs shouldbe conformed to the decision by excluding the documents found in the confidentialrecord at pages 112 through 119 (see Nicastro v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 117 AD3d1545, 1546 [2014], lv dismissed 24 NY3d 998 [2014]). We further conclude,based on our review of those emails, that they are exempt from FOIL disclosure byattorney-client privilege. Present—Centra, J.P., Peradotto, DeJoseph andNeMoyer, JJ.


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