Matter of Young v Village of Gouverneur
2016 NY Slip Op 08412 [145 AD3d 1285]
December 15, 2016
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 1, 2017


[*1]
 In the Matter of Steven M. Young, Petitioner, v Villageof Gouverneur, by Ronald McDougall, as Mayor of the Village of Gouverneur,Respondent.

Campany, McArdle & Randle, PLLC, Lowville (Kevin McArdle of counsel),for petitioner.

Case & Leader, LLP, Gouverneur (Henry J. Leader of counsel), forrespondent.

Mulvey, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by orderof the Supreme Court, entered in St. Lawrence County) to review a determination ofrespondent terminating petitioner's employment.

Petitioner served as a police officer in respondent's police department and was thechief engineer in respondent's fire department. In July 2013, after petitioner wasobserved on a surveillance video pumping gasoline from respondent's fueling system intohis personal vehicle, the State Police conducted an investigation. The investigationrevealed that petitioner possessed two keys that accessed respondent's fueling system, anE2 key and an E6 key. According to respondent's records, the E2 key tracked fuel usagefor the police department and the E6 key, among others, tracked fuel usage for the firedepartment. In the course of the investigation, petitioner told the State Police investigatorthat he filled his personal vehicle using the fire department E6 key and then made asworn written statement describing, among other things, his usage of the keys to accessrespondent's gasoline.

Petitioner was charged with violating the police department's rules of conduct by[*2]wrongfully taking gasoline from the policedepartment's account and by making a false statement under oath. Following a hearing,the Hearing Officer found that the evidence did not substantiate the charges thatpetitioner wrongfully took gasoline from respondent. However, the Hearing Officerfound that the preponderance of the evidence supported six of the charges that petitionermade a false statement under oath to the State Police and, thus, termination of hisemployment was warranted. Respondent adopted the Hearing Officer's findings in theirentirety and terminated petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78proceeding to annul respondent's determination, and the matter was transferred to thisCourt.

Petitioner initially argues that the determination was not supported by substantialevidence. Substantial evidence has been defined "as such relevant proof as a reasonablemind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact, and is less than apreponderance of the evidence, overwhelming evidence or evidence beyond a reasonabledoubt" (Matter of Ridge Rd.Fire Dist. v Schiano, 16 NY3d 494, 499 [2011] [internal quotation marks andcitation omitted]). "[S]ubstantial evidence may be based on inferences drawn fromcompetent proof produced at a hearing that are reasonable and plausible, not necessarilythe most probable" (Matter ofRauschmeier v Village of Johnson City, 91 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2012] [internalquotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 19 NY3d 802 [2012]). Petitionerdid not challenge that he was the person in the surveillance footage taking fuel, buttestified that he was getting fuel in relation to his fire department duties, which permittedthe refueling of personal vehicles from respondent's fueling system when used for firedepartment purposes. Petitioner also acknowledged that in his statement he declared that"[e]ach key usage . . . charges the appropriate department and vehicle forthe fuel usage and this is tracked."

Petitioner's understanding of respondent's fuel system, testimony that the E2 key wasto be used only for police department vehicles, his experience using the E2 key as apolice officer, and the unrefuted evidence that the E6 module had not been used sinceApril 2013 constitute substantial evidence that petitioner knew the difference betweenthe E2 key and the E6 key. The foregoing constitutes substantial evidence that, in asworn written statement, petitioner falsely asserted that he used the E6 key and did notuse the E2 key to fill his personal vehicle (see Matter of Rauschmeier v Village ofJohnson City, 91 AD3d at 1082-1083; compare Matter of Meaney v Village of Johnson City, 95 AD3d1640, 1641 n 1 [2012]). The six charges against petitioner, founded upon his falsestatement to the State Police, should therefore be sustained (see Matter of Rounds v Town ofVestal, 15 AD3d 819, 822 [2005]).

Petitioner next contends that respondent erred by accepting the Hearing Officer'sfindings without explanation. Given the sufficiency of the Hearing Officer's findings,respondent's acceptance was adequate (see Matter of Ernst v Saratoga County,251 AD2d 866, 867 [1998]). We also find no merit to petitioner's contention that he wasdenied due process in that the charges were not sufficiently specific. "The chargedmisconduct . . . need only be reasonably specific, in light of all the relevantcircumstances, so as to apprise the party who is the subject of the hearing and to allowsuch party to prepare an adequate defense" (Matter of Auxier v Town of Laurens, 23 AD3d 912, 913[2005] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Rounds vTown of Vestal, 15 AD3d at 822). Here, the written charges provided to petitioneralleged that petitioner "wrongfully took gasoline from the account specifically reservedfor the [police] for use in [his] personal vehicle" and that he provided a false writtenstatement under oath on September 3, 2013 in the related investigation. The charges alsocontained specific references to rules of conduct that petitioner was alleged to haveviolated (compare Matter of Bigando v Heitzman, 187 AD2d 917, 918-919[1992]). Petitioner received proper written notice of the charges against him and thosecharges were sufficiently specific to allow for an adequate defense (see Matter ofMcKenzie v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of Albany, [*3]100 AD3d 1096, 1098 [2012]; Matter of Auxier vTown of Laurens, 23 AD3d at 913).

Finally, petitioner argues that the penalty of termination is excessive. In evaluatingwhether the penalty is excessive, this Court " 'must consider whether, in light ofall the relevant circumstances, the penalty is so disproportionate to the charged offense[s]as to shock one's sense of fairness' " (Matter of Bottari v Saratoga Springs City School Dist., 3 AD3d832, 833 [2004], quoting Matter of Smith v Board of Educ. of Taconic HillsCent. School Dist., 235 AD2d 912, 914 [1997]; accord Matter of Thornton v Edwards-Knox Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 105 AD3d 1206, 1206-1207 [2013]). "This calculus involvesconsideration of whether the impact of the penalty on the individual is so severe that it isdisproportionate to the misconduct, or to the harm to the agency or the public in general"(Matter of Kelly v Safir, 96 NY2d 32, 38 [2001]). We are mindful of "the highstandard of character to which police officers are held" and the substantiated charges ofproviding a false statement under oath should not go unpunished (Matter of Castell v City of SaratogaSprings, 24 AD3d 1059, 1061 [2005]; see Matter of Lyons v Superintendent of State Police, 129AD3d 1238, 1240 [2015]). As all six charges pertaining to the false statement givento the State Police were sustained by the Hearing Officer, petitioner was subject to thepenalty or punishment provided in Civil Service Law § 75 (3), including "areprimand, a fine not to exceed one hundred dollars . . . , suspensionwithout pay for a period not exceeding two months, demotion in grade and title, ordismissal." Here, without further expansion on the Hearing Officer's findings andrecommendations, respondent adopted the harshest penalty, dismissal. We have sustaineda two-month suspension where a police officer admitted to falsely reporting an incident(see Matter of Close v Hammond, 166 AD2d 845, 846 [1990]) and a two-monthsuspension, letter of reprimand and $100 fine when a police officer was found guilty ofimproperly completing an offense report, refusing to comply with an order and refusingto report to a superior officer (see Matter of Wilson v Sartori, 70 AD2d 959, 960[1979]). We have also sustained a 30-day suspension and six months of probation for aState Trooper charged with misconduct for advising a friend to revoke her consent to thesearch of her residence by other troopers who were conducting a marihuana investigation(see Matter of Mokszycki vMcMahon, 6 AD3d 952, 953 [2004]).

Petitioner's personnel record does not indicate any other disciplinary actions orwarnings. He was a police officer for 14 years and served as chief engineer and amember of the fire department for several years. Given that the charges that hewrongfully took respondent's gasoline for his personal use were not sustained and therewas no financial loss to respondent, we believe, based on the totality of thecircumstances, that the penalty imposed is so disproportionate to the offense as to shockour sense of fairness. We therefore remit the matter to respondent for a redeterminationof the penalty. Petitioner's remaining contentions have been examined and found to belacking in merit.

Peters, P.J., Garry, Egan Jr. and Rose, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination ismodified, without costs, by annulling so much thereof as imposed the penalty oftermination of employment; matter remitted to respondent for further proceedings notinconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as so modified, confirmed.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.