| People v Wright |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 01392 [147 AD3d 1088] |
| February 22, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Troy Wright, Appellant. |
Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, NY (Bryan D. Kreykes of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, Acting District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Keith Dolan, andJulian Joiris of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Del Giudice,J.), rendered September 10, 2013, convicting him of rape in the third degree (two counts),criminal sexual act in the third degree (two counts), and assault in the third degree, upon a juryverdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the Supreme Court improvidently exercisedits discretion in denying his request for new assigned counsel.
"The right of an indigent criminal defendant to the services of a court-appointed lawyer doesnot encompass a right to appointment of successive lawyers at defendant's option" (People v Washington, 25 NY3d1091, 1095 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Sides, 75 NY2d822, 824 [1990]; People v Sawyer, 57 NY2d 12, 18-19 [1982]). "Nevertheless, the rightto be represented by counsel of one's own choosing is a valued one, and a defendant may beentitled to new assigned counsel upon showing good cause for a substitution, such as a conflictof interest or other irreconcilable conflict with counsel" (People v Sides, 75 NY2d at 824[internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Washington, 25 NY3d at 1095). "Suchrequests may not be used merely to delay the orderly administration of justice, and while they arenot to be granted casually[,] the trial court in exercising its discretion to grant or deny mustcarefully evaluate seemingly serious requests in order to ascertain whether there is indeed goodcause for substitution" (People v Sides, 75 NY2d at 824; see People v McClam, 60 AD3d968, 969 [2009]).
Here, the defendant was charged with multiple counts of rape in the first degree, criminalsexual act in the first degree, and other crimes. At a calendar call prior to trial, the defendant toldthe Supreme Court in a conclusory fashion that he was having problems communicating with hisassigned counsel. The court (DiMango, J.) began to summarize the charges against the defendantand obtain a better understanding of his perceived communication problems with assignedcounsel. The defendant provided a vague assertion that he did not know what motions hiscounsel had filed. Further, the defendant tried to end the colloquy and indicated that he wouldprefer not to be present for discussion of the issue. After the defendant left the courtroom, thecourt further discussed the matter with counsel, who supported the defendant's request for newassigned [*2]counsel. The court concluded that current counselwas likely to provide very effective representation, any communication problems resulteddirectly from the defendant's antagonistic attitude, and, even if new counsel were assigned, thedefendant would likely have the same issues. Thereafter, the defendant renewed his request fornew assigned counsel and the court asked him again to explain his problem with his presentattorney. At this juncture, the defendant told the court, "I don't have to answer you." Thereafter,the court denied the request for new counsel, and the case was sent to a different Justice (DelGiudice, J.), who made a separate inquiry into the defendant's alleged issues with his currentcounsel. After expressing concern about preventing the case, which was approximately one yearold, from moving forward, the court once again declined the request to assign new counsel.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court conducted an adequate inquiryinto the reasons for the request to assign new counsel (see generally People v Smith, 18 NY3d 588, 591-593 [2012]). Thedefendant's responses certainly did not suggest the possibility of a genuine conflict of interest (see People v Stevenson, 36 AD3d634, 635 [2007]). Further, there were strong indications that although there was acommunication problem between defense counsel and the defendant, the fault for that difficultylay with the defendant, who demonstrated a biased attitude toward counsel (see People vRua, 198 AD2d 311, 312 [1993]; People v Outlaw, 184 AD2d 665 [1992]). Despitethe defendant's lack of cooperation, however, counsel was willing and able to conduct ameaningful defense (see People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). We note that thedefendant was ultimately acquitted of the top counts of rape in the first degree and criminalsexual act in the first degree.
Accordingly, under all the circumstances present here, we find that the Supreme Courtprovidently exercised its discretion in denying the request to assign new counsel (see People v Garcia, 57 AD3d 918,918 [2008]; People v Rua, 198 AD2d at 312; see also People v Allison, 69 AD3d 740, 740 [2010]). Mastro, J.P.,Dillon, Balkin and Maltese, JJ., concur.