| Matter of Beatty v City of New York |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 01628 [148 AD3d 413] |
| March 2, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Amira Beatty, Appellant, v City ofNew York et al., Respondents. |
Glass Krakower LLP, New York (Bryan D. Glass of counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Richard Dearing of counsel), forrespondents.
Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Margaret A. Chan, J.),entered July 20, 2015, which granted respondents' cross motion to deny the petition seeking tovacate a penalty imposed in an arbitration award dated June 30, 2014, and dismissed theproceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 75, reversed, on the facts, without costs, thepetition granted, and the matter is remanded to respondent New York City Department ofEducation (DOE) for imposition of a lesser penalty.
The penalty of termination of employment was imposed by a hearing officer upon petitioner,a special education home instruction teacher, based upon the hearing officer's finding thatpetitioner had submitted time sheets falsely stating that she had provided instruction to a disabledstudent and inaccurately indicating that she had reported to certain DOE schools and librariesover a two-month period. Notwithstanding petitioner's misconduct, under the circumstancespresented here, the penalty of termination shocks our sense of fairness (see Matter of Pell vBoard of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck,Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 233 [1974]).
At the time of the incident in question, petitioner was faced with an extraordinary situation.Both she and the disabled student resided in Far Rockaway, Queens. On October 29, 2012, thatarea was damaged extensively by Hurricane Sandy. The homes of both petitioner and thedisabled student were flooded and had no power or heat for an extended period, and petitionerlost the use of her car. Both petitioner and her student were displaced from their homes. In theaftermath of this unique disaster, DOE provided teachers with no guidance or information as tothe instruction of students displaced by Hurricane Sandy, other than that displaced studentswould not be penalized. Petitioner contacted the disabled student's mother after the storm, butnever provided educational services to the student. In January 2013, the student's social workerinformed petitioner's assistant principal that the student had received no instruction frompetitioner since the hurricane. However, that same month, petitioner had submitteddocumentation saying that she had provided such instruction. A subsequent investigationrevealed that petitioner's time sheets contained the false information.
As the Court of Appeals has explained, and as we have recently reiterated, "a result isshocking to one's sense of fairness if the sanction imposed is so grave in its impact on theindividual subjected to it that it is disproportionate to the misconduct, incompetence, failure orturpitude of the individual, or to the harm or risk of harm to the agency or institution, or to thepublic generally visited or threatened by the derelictions of the individuals. Additional factorswould be the prospect of deterrence of the individual or of others in like situations, and thereforea reasonable prospect of recurrence of derelictions by the individual or persons similarlyemployed. There is also the element that the sanctions reflect the standards of society to beapplied to the offense involved" (Matterof Bolt v New York City Dept. of Educ., 145 AD3d 450, 451 [1st Dept 2016], quotingPell, 34 NY2d at 234).
[*2] Petitionerfilled out the time sheets in question in advance of the dates to which those time sheets pertained.Although she did not, in fact, proceed to provide instruction to the disabled student on the daysset forth in those time sheets, she submitted the time sheets without correction on a subsequentdate. Because petitioner instructed other students on each of the dates in question, she wouldhave received the same salary regardless of how many students she had instructed or how manyhours she had spent with them, and thus derived no benefit from her actions. Petitioner'smisconduct is more a matter of lax bookkeeping than implementation of any venal scheme. Therewas no scheme to defraud or theft of services on petitioner's part, and the harm to the public andto the DOE was mitigated.
Furthermore, before the incident in question, petitioner had an unblemished record over a17-year period as a special education home instruction teacher. At the DOE hearing, the disabledstudent's mother testified that petitioner was a good teacher who worked well with her son andhad served his needs more successfully than had other teachers. Petitioner's principal testifiedthat before this incident, she had never received a complaint about petitioner. And one ofpetitioner's coworkers, another special education teacher in the homebound program, testifiedthat petitioner was a dedicated teacher who did everything she could to help her studentsexcel.
At the hearing, petitioner admitted that she was guilty of submitting reports stating that shehad provided instruction to the disabled student on certain dates when she had not done so andthat she had reported to various schools and libraries on certain dates when she had not done so.As petitioner acknowledges, her misconduct warrants punishment, since the disabled student wasdeprived of the services of a teacher for two months. Petitioner does not seek to set aside thefindings of misconduct contained in the hearing officer's opinion, but only to modify the penaltyimposed on her. She has acknowledged her error in judgment and has pledged to change herpractices and never to repeat the error. There is no evidence that "petitioner could not remedy herbehavior" (see Bolt, 145 AD3d at 451). The penalty of termination, we believe, isdisproportionate to the level of petitioner's misconduct and exceeds the standards that societyrequires to be applied to this offense (see Pell, 34 NY2d at 234).
The cases relied upon by the dissent are distinguishable in that, among other things, none ofthem mention extraordinary mitigating circumstances such as those faced by petitioner (see Matter of Davies v New York CityDept. of Educ., 117 AD3d 446, 447 [1st Dept 2014] [teacher failed to follow proceduresand carry out duties, rendered incompetent service over two-year period and blamed others forher ineffectiveness]; Cipollaro v NewYork City Dept. of Educ., 83 AD3d 543 [1st Dept 2011] [non-resident New York Cityteacher enrolled two of her own children in City public schools, effectively stealing $98,000 inservices from DOE over two-year period]; Matter of Rogers v Sherburne-Earlville Cent. School Dist., 17 AD3d823 [3d Dept 2005] [teacher's aide demonstrated a pattern of repeatedly taking excessivesick and paid leave despite two warnings not to do so and received leave time benefits as a resultof his fraud]; Matter of Hegarty v Boardof Educ. of City of N.Y., 5 AD3d 771 [2d Dept 2004]).
This is not, as respondents would have it, a case of extended, intentional and self-servingmisconduct or repeated and continuous neglect of duty, but rather an isolated instance of neglectoccurring under circumstances of extraordinary personal hardship and involving a teacher whohad an otherwise unblemished and longstanding record. Had Superstorm Sandy not upended herlife, there is no indication that petitioner's wrongdoing would have occurred. As it is highly [*3]unlikely that the extraordinary situation presented in this case willrecur, the factors of general and specific deterrence do not come into play (see Bolt, 145AD3d at 450-451, quoting Pell, 34 NY2d at 234). Concur—Moskowitz, Kapnickand Kahn, JJ.
Friedman, J.P., and Andrias, J., dissent in a memorandum by Andrias, J., as follows:Contrary to the majority's determination, considering all relevant circumstances, including thenature and severity of the misconduct and the mitigating factors raised by petitioner, the penaltyof termination is not so disproportionate to the charged offenses as to shock one's sense offairness (see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns ofScarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 233 [1974]). Therefore,I respectfully dissent.
Petitioner, a special education teacher, worked in the District 75 home instruction program,which provides instruction to children who are unable to attend school due to medical conditions.Home instruction teachers, with some exceptions (e.g., personal days beyond the allottedamount), are paid their full salaries regardless of the number of hours of daily instruction thatthey render to their students. Still, under an honor system, they must prepare a daily log showingthe names of their students and the times they provided instruction to each of them, and amonthly time sheet that corresponds to the daily logs. They are also required to report anyschedule changes to their supervisors and, if a student is unable to receive instruction for fiveconsecutive days, to complete a form stating why the student was not receiving services.
In September 2012, petitioner was assigned to provide instruction for one hour a day, fivedays a week, to Student "A," an eight-year-old boy with cerebral palsy, who lived in theRockaways. After Hurricane Sandy struck on October 29, 2012, Student A's family wastemporarily displaced, and moved to Brooklyn. Petitioner was also displaced by the storm, andschools were closed from October 29 though November 2, 2012.
In January 2013, petitioner's supervisor was informed by Student A's social worker that hehad not received instruction from petitioner since the hurricane. After an investigation wasconducted, disciplinary proceedings were commenced charging that: (1) on 24 days from October15 to December 19, 2012, petitioner submitted false or fraudulent daily logs and time sheetsclaiming that she provided instruction to Student A; (2) on 12 dates in December 2012, petitionersubmitted false or fraudulent daily logs and time sheets that showed her reporting to variousschools and/or libraries; (3) from October through December 2012, petitioner, with intent todefraud, made false representations resulting in financial benefits; (4) as a result of the foregoingactivities, petitioner received her full salary during October, November, and December 2012 forservices she did not perform; and (5) because of petitioner's actions Student A was deprived ofeducational services.
Petitioner did not deny the first two specifications. At the hearing, she claimed that herpaperwork was inaccurate because she completed her time logs before the fact, did not changethem after the hurricane, and was not sure if she rendered services on any particular day.Petitioner also claimed that Student A's mother had asked her to suspend instruction until thefamily returned to the Rockaways.
Student A's mother testified that her son did not receive instruction when they were inBrooklyn or after they returned to the Rockaways in December. Petitioner told her that she couldnot instruct her son in the family's apartment due to her supervisor's safety concerns, and wouldnot agree to provide the services at a library or other place. The mother, who thought petitionerwas an excellent teacher who worked well with her son, never told petitioner to discontinueservices. Petitioner's supervisor testified that he spoke with her after the hurricane and that shedid not report any changes in her daily schedule, as required. Petitioner was never givenpermission to suspend services, and he did not receive petitioner's November and Decembertimekeeping records until January 2013.
[*4] Thehearing officer found that petitioner "failed to provide home instruction to Student A andsubmitted false and fraudulent documentation for services that she did not provide to him andthat she gained a financial benefit by doing so." The hearing officer did not credit petitioner'sexcuses for her actions and found that petitioner offered no plausible reason for not discussingthe situation with her supervisor. The hearing officer also found that petitioner used thedisruption caused by Hurricane Sandy and Student A's dislocation to obtain free time for herself,when she was supposed to be delivering services, and, by taking advantage of the honor systemat the expense of Student A, breached a fundamental tenet of the home instruction program.
Based on these findings, the hearing officer sustained specifications 1, 2, 4, and 5, anddismissed specification 3 as duplicative of 1, 2 and 4. In imposing the penalty of termination, thehearing officer stated that petitioner refused to take responsibility for her actions, sought to blameothers, and failed to recognize how her actions affected Student A. While considering petitioner'slong tenure, unblemished record, and good reputation and the difficulties she faced afterHurricane Sandy, the hearing officer found that these mitigating factors did not "overcome herdishonesty, fraudulent conduct and neglect of duty over an extended period of nearly twomonths."
The majority holds that the penalty of termination shocks its sense of fairness and remandsfor the imposition of a lesser penalty. In support of this determination, the majority finds thatpetitioner's isolated instance of neglect, committed under extraordinary circumstances by ateacher who had an otherwise unblemished record, was "more a matter of lax bookkeeping" thanmisconduct, from which petitioner derived no benefit because she would have received the samesalary regardless of how many students she instructed or how much time she spent with them. Idisagree. The hearing officer carefully considered all of the evidence, and her credibility findingsin favor of respondents' witnesses are entitled to deference (see Matter of Nuchman v Klein, 95 AD3d 645, 646 [1st Dept2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 855 [2013]). There was more than adequate evidence ofpetitioner's fraudulent intent and "[c]onsidering petitioner's lack of remorse and failure to takeresponsibility for her actions, as well as the harm caused by petitioner's actions, the penalty ofdismissal, even if there was an otherwise adequate performance record, cannot be said to shockthe conscience" (Cipollaro v New YorkCity Dept. of Educ., 83 AD3d 543, 544 [1st Dept 2011]).
Although petitioner was considered a good teacher and had an unblemished record over a17-year period, she admittedly submitted false time sheets and continuously failed to provideinstruction to a disabled child over a period of nearly two months (see Matter of Rogers v Sherburne-EarlvilleCent. School Dist., 17 AD3d 823, 824 [3d Dept 2005] [upholding termination forfalsifying time sheets and a pattern of excessive leave time usage and abuse of leave timebenefits despite "a long and previously unblemished record" (internal quotation marks omitted)];Matter of Hegarty v Board of Educ. ofCity of N.Y., 5 AD3d 771, 772 [2d Dept 2004] [upholding termination for a teacher whofraudulently submitted time sheets for educational services he never rendered]). Petitioner'sintentional fraud was far more than "lax bookkeeping." In addition to preparing and submittingrecords that she knew were false, she also failed to advise her supervisor that she had stoppedproviding services to Student A.
Petitioner's intentional failure to keep her supervisor apprised of the child's status preventedthe school district from arranging for instruction by another teacher. As a result, Student A, whowas supposed to receive one hour of instruction per day, missed approximately 40 to 45 hoursduring November and December 2012, and, according to his mother's testimony, becamedepressed and was behind his classmates as a result of the lack of instruction.
Contrary to the view of the majority, petitioner benefitted from her intentional misconduct,which allowed her to devote the time she should have been spending with Student A to otheractivities. If petitioner had notified her supervisor that Student A was no longer in Queens, shewould have been assigned another student. The disruption caused by the storm does not explainpetitioner's failure to notify her supervisor of any hardship she faced or confusion about how toproceed.
The hearing officer's conclusion that petitioner's conduct was intentional, that she took [*5]no responsibility for her actions and continued to blame Student A'smother, and that she failed to recognize the adverse effect of her conduct on a vulnerable andphysically handicapped student further supports the penalty of termination (see Matter of Davies v New York CityDept. of Educ., 117 AD3d 446 [1st Dept 2014]). As the hearing officer found, theft ofservices is a "serious offense," and petitioner's deception, which would not have been discoveredbut for the social worker's call, destroyed the trust that is essential to this field-based programdependent on the honor system.
The majority's reliance on Matter ofBolt v New York City Dept. of Educ. (145 AD3d 450 [1st Dept 2016]) is misplaced. InBolt, in a single lapse in judgment, the teacher pointed out to several students that certainanswers on their exams might be wrong, and suggested they take another look at them. She didnot alter any of her student's answers or advise them what the correct answers were. In contrast,petitioner submitted false time sheets covering a nearly two-month period, during which shecontinuously failed to provide Student A with needed services, which benefitted her to thedetriment of the child, and inflicted harm on the home instruction system. [Prior CaseHistory: 2015 NY Slip Op 31254(U).]