| People v Babcock |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 05763 [152 AD3d 962] |
[*1](July 20, 2017)
| 1 The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v GeraldBabcock, Appellant. |
Neal D. Futerfas, White Plains, for appellant.
D. Holley Carnright, District Attorney, Kingston (Joan Gudesblatt Lamb of counsel), forrespondent.
Peters, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster County (Williams, J.),rendered December 20, 2013, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of manslaughterin the first degree.
At approximately 8:40 a.m. on March 6, 2013, defendant called 911 to report that the victim,his fiancée, had fallen down the front stairs of her residence and injured herself. Thevictim was thereafter transported to the hospital where she underwent surgery and died thefollowing day. Defendant was arrested and subsequently charged by indictment withmanslaughter in the first degree. County Court ordered an examination pursuant to CPL article730 to determine defendant's competence to stand trial and, following a hearing, found defendantfit to proceed to trial. A jury trial ensued, at the conclusion of which defendant was convicted ascharged. Sentenced to the maximum prison term of 25 years followed by five years of postreleasesupervision, defendant appeals.
We reject defendant's contention that County Court erred in finding him competent toproceed to trial. "The key inquiry in determining whether a criminal defendant is fit for trial iswhether he or she has sufficient present ability to consult with his or her lawyer with a reasonabledegree of rational understanding—and whether he or she has a rational as well as factualunderstanding of the proceedings against him or her" (People v Phillips, 16 NY3d 510, 516 [2011] [internal quotationmarks, brackets and citation omitted]; accord People v Hadfield, 119 [*2]AD3d 1217, 1218-1219 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 989[2015]; People v Kendall, 91 AD3d1191, 1192 [2012]; see CPL 730.10 [1]). "In making this determination, a court maytake into account the findings of any competency examination as well as its own observations ofthe defendant" (People v Kendall, 91 AD3d at 1192 [internal quotation marks, bracketsand citations omitted]; see People v Phillips, 16 NY3d at 517; People v Mendez, 1 NY3d 15, 20[2003]). Notably, "trial fitness is a legal, judicial determination, and not a medical one"(People v Phillips, 16 NY3d at 517; see People v Campbell, 279 AD2d 797, 798[2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 826 [2001]), and we accord considerable deference to a trialcourt's determination in this regard, particularly where, as here, it was presented with conflictingtestimony as to the defendant's competence (see People v Surdis, 77 AD3d 1018, 1018-1019 [2010], lvdenied 16 NY3d 800 [2011]; Peoplev Johnson, 52 AD3d 1040, 1042 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 833 [2008];People v Campbell, 279 AD2d at 798).
Defendant was examined by three psychiatrists. Two psychiatrists, who testified on behalf ofdefendant, concluded that defendant was incompetent to stand trial, whereas the psychiatristretained by the People found defendant competent to stand trial and concluded that defendant hadfeigned psychiatric symptoms to meet his personal needs. The People's psychiatrist, who hadextensive experience in conducting CPL article 730 examinations, interviewed defendant forapproximately one hour, reviewed relevant documents and reached his conclusion based upon hisobjective observations and independent documentary review. By contrast, the two psychiatristsretained by defendant based their opinions exclusively upon defendant's own statements made tothem during interviews, without providing any objective proof of defendant's alleged incapacity.Indeed, defendant's psychiatrists openly acknowledged that they did not personally observe anyof the diagnosed symptoms during the interviews, and one of the psychiatrists acknowledged thatadditional information would have been useful for her to perform a complete evaluation ofdefendant's competency. County Court credited the opinions of the People's psychiatrist overthose of defendant's, citing to the failure of defendant's psychiatrists to provide sufficient supportfor their diagnoses and their lack of experience and understanding regarding competencyexaminations. Having observed and interacted with defendant during the course of theproceedings, the court further found conduct and responses on the part of defendant that evincedhis understanding of the proceedings and ability to assist in his own defense. Accordingdeference to County Court's credibility determinations concerning the conflicting evaluations,and upon our review of the record, we find no basis upon which to disturb the court's ruling thatdefendant was fit to stand trial (see People v Phillips, 16 NY3d at 517-518; People vKendall, 91 AD3d at 1192-1193; People v Passaro, 86 AD3d 717, 718-719 [2011]; People vCampbell, 279 AD2d at 798).
We turn next to defendant's challenge to County Court's Molineux rulings, whichpermitted the People to introduce evidence of defendant's prior acts of domestic violence againstthe victim. "Evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts may be admissible when it is relevant to amaterial issue in the case other than defendant's criminal propensity. Where there is a propernonpropensity purpose, the decision whether to admit such evidence rests upon the trial court'sdiscretionary balancing of probative value and unfair prejudice" (People v Leeson, 12 NY3d 823,826-827 [2009] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipses and citations omitted]; see People v Westerling, 48 AD3d965, 966 [2008]; People vMiles, 36 AD3d 1021, 1022-1023 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 988 [2007]). Here,County Court properly found that evidence regarding prior instances of defendant's abusive andcontrolling behavior toward the victim were relevant and material to the issues of intent, motiveand the absence of accident and provided necessary background information concerning thetumultuous relationship between defendant and the victim (see People v Womack, 143 AD3d 1171, 1173 [2016], lvdenied 28 NY3d 1151 [2017]; People v Pham, 118 AD3d 1159, 1161 [2014], lv denied 24NY3d 1087 [2014]; People v [*3]Lubrano, 117 AD3d 1239, 1241 [2014], lv denied25 NY3d 990 [2015]; People vBurkett, 101 AD3d 1468, 1470-1471 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1096 [2013]).The court also engaged in a proper balancing of the probative value of the evidence against itsprejudicial effect (see People v Lubrano, 117 AD3d at 1241; People v Thibeault, 73 AD3d1237, 1241 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 810 [2010], cert denied 562 US 1293[2011]; compare People v Elmy,117 AD3d 1183, 1187 [2014]), and its determination that the probative value far outweighedany prejudice to defendant does not constitute an abuse of discretion in view of "thecircumstantial nature of the case and the temporal proximity between the victim's death and thesubject incidents" (People vMorgan, 149 AD3d 1148, 1149 [2017]; see People v Doyle, 48 AD3d 961, 964 [2008], lv denied 10NY3d 862 [2008]; People vWilliams, 29 AD3d 1217, 1219 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 797 [2006]).Furthermore, County Court instructed the jury as to the permissible uses of the subject evidenceat the time of the relevant testimony and again during its final charge, thereby limiting theprejudicial effect of such proof (see People v Morgan, 149 AD3d at 1149; People vWomack, 143 AD3d at 1174; People v Burkett, 101 AD3d at 1471). Therefore, wediscern no error in County Court's Molineux rulings.
Defendant also asserts that his conviction is against the weight of the evidence. If, inconducting a weight of the evidence review, we conclude that an acquittal would not have beenunreasonable, we "must, like the trier of fact below, weigh the relative probative force ofconflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn fromthe testimony" in order to decide whether the jury was justified in finding the defendant guiltybeyond a reasonable doubt (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987] [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Kancharla, 23 NY3d 294, 302-303 [2014]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342,348 [2007]). As relevant here, "a person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when he orshe, with intent to cause serious physical injury to the victim, causes the victim's death" (People v Kenyon, 108 AD3d 933,937 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1075 [2013]; see Penal Law§ 125.20 [1]). A defendant's intent to cause serious physical injury "may be inferredfrom his or her conduct and from the surrounding circumstances" (People v Cole, 150 AD3d 1476,1481 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Gordon, 23 NY3d 643, 650 [2014]; People v Rogers, 94 AD3d 1246,1250 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 977 [2012]).
At trial, the People presented evidence that defendant claimed during a police interview that,while he was assisting the victim—who suffered from multiple sclerosis—descenda four-step staircase to leave the house, she slipped and fell forward into the snow at the bottomof the stairs. According to defendant, he then called 911 and thereafter removed some plywoodsheets from a truck parked nearby and built a shelter around the victim to shield her from theelements. Defendant's account of the events, however, was at odds with the testimony of a firstresponder to the incident and a paramedic who treated the victim while en route to the hospital.The first responder testified that, when she arrived at the scene, she observed that the victim waslying face down in the snow with her head pointing toward the house and was not appropriatelydressed for the cold weather, wearing only a pair of sneakers, spandex pants, a T-shirt and sportsbra. The first responder also testified that the victim's T-shirt and bra were rolled up above herbreasts and almost to her neck line and that the victim had sustained scratches on her back thatappeared inconsistent with having fallen down the stairs. The paramedic testified that heobserved injuries to the victim's head, face, neck and body and that the victim appeared to havesustained "pretty severe trauma." Defendant's account was further undermined by the testimonyof the victim's neighbors, who testified that they saw sheets of plywood leaning against the frontsteps of the victim's house at around 8:00 a.m.—approximately 40 minutes before the 911call was made.
[*4] With regard to the victim's injuries,the pathologist who conducted an autopsy on the victim testified that the victim died from"multiple blunt force injuries and strangulation with bilateral subdural hemorrhages. . . and cerebral edema." The pathologist explained that there were two separateinjuries to the victim's brain that were inflicted by blunt force trauma and that the injuries bothcontributed to the victim's death and could not have resulted from a single fall. The pathologisttestified further that the victim's neck area bore injuries that were consistent with having beenstrangulated, and that the bruises on the victim's arms were indicative of her being grabbedtightly by her arms during a fight. The pathologist also opined that the scratches on the victim'sback, hemorrhaging on her ankles and the fact that the victim's shirt and bra were rolled up overher chest supported an inference that the victim had been held by her ankles and dragged acertain distance.
With respect to the element of intent, the People called three witnesses who testified todefendant's previous abusive and controlling behavior toward the victim. The victim's sontestified to a prolonged and escalating argument between the victim and defendant in December2012, during which defendant called the victim derogatory names such as an "F'ing bitch and anF'ing whore" and was thereafter removed from the victim's residence by the police. The Peoplealso presented evidence that, approximately two months before the incident, a police officer wasdispatched to the victim's home to check on her welfare and, upon arriving there, encountereddefendant, observed bruises on the victim's face and then removed defendant from the victim'sresidence. Lastly, the fiancée of the victim's brother testified that, about three days beforethe incident, the victim sent her a photo depicting extensive bruises on the victim's face. In ourview, although it would not have been unreasonable for the jury to have accepted the defense'stheory that the victim had died from an accidental fall, viewing the evidence in a neutral light andaccording due deference to the jury's credibility assessments (see People v Poulos, 144 AD3d 1389, 1390-1391 [2016]; People v Morris, 140 AD3d 1472,1475 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1074 [2016]), we find that defendant's conviction wasamply supported by the weight of the evidence (see People v Burkett, 101 AD3d at1469-1470; People v Rogers, 94 AD3d at 1250-1251; People v Thompson, 92 AD3d 1139, 1140-1141 [2012],affd 21 NY3d 555 [2013]; People v Wlasiuk, 90 AD3d 1405, 1406-1407 [2011]).
Nor are we persuaded that County Court erred in failing to instruct five spectators in thecourtroom who were wearing purple ribbons that signified their opposition to domestic violenceto remove the ribbons. The Court of Appeals recently addressed spectator conduct in People v Nelson (27 NY3d 361[2016], cert denied 580 US &mdash, 137 S Ct 175 [2016]), wherein the Court instructedthat "[w]hether [a] trial court should intervene, and what intervention is appropriate, must dependupon the facts and circumstances of each particular case" (id. at 369). In deciding whetherand how to intervene in spectator conduct, a trial court may consider a number of factors,including, but not limited to, "the particular nature of the spectator conduct at issue; how manyspectators are involved; the duration of the conduct; whether the involved spectators have calledattention to themselves in some way; where the spectators are seated in the courtroom; whetherthe jury can see or did see the spectator conduct; . . . [and] whether the spectatorconduct is the result of some intentional effort to influence the jury or merely an unintendeddisplay of emotion" (id.). Given the trial court's superior ability to view all of thesurrounding circumstances and fashion an appropriate intervention, we review that court's actionor inaction for an abuse of discretion (see id. at 370).
Here, in refusing to prohibit the five spectators from wearing purple ribbons, County Courtproperly considered the relevant factors and found that, while the spectators frequently appearedin the courtroom, they sat away from and never interrupted the jury and their ribbons were notconspicuous. Further, upon being advised by defendant that the spectators had greeted certainjurors in the courthouse elevator by nodding or saying "good morning," County Court [*5]admonished the spectators to avoid any contact with the jurors andstay away from the areas where the jurors were present, while noting that no jurors had everclaimed that anyone attempted to converse with them or influence their decisions. Given that theribbons at issue were not conspicuous and the absence of any record evidence indicating that thespectators had ever attempted to draw attention to themselves at trial or engage in any egregiousbehavior, County Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to prohibit the conduct (see People v Holiday, 142 AD3d625, 626 [2016]; People vJones, 139 AD3d 1189, 1191 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 932 [2016]).
As a final matter, we reject defendant's contention that the maximum sentence imposed washarsh and excessive. While County Court's remarks at sentencing regarding the punishment thatdefendant would receive outside of the judicial system were better left unsaid, we do not findthem to be "so 'intemperate' that modification of the sentence is required" (People v Pimentel, 108 AD3d 861,863-864 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1076 [2013]; see People v Lopez, 51 AD3d 1210, 1211 [2008]; compare People v Theodore, 113 AD3d703, 704 [2014]). Considering the violent nature of the offense, defendant's lack of remorseand his extensive criminal history, which includes an incident wherein he assaulted his pregnantex-girlfriend with a baseball bat, we discern neither an abuse of discretion nor extraordinarycircumstances warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice (see People v Coley, 129 AD3d1327, 1330 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 927 [2015]; People v Burkett, 101AD3d at 1473; People v Morey, 304 AD2d 855, 856 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d564 [2003]).
Garry, Rose, Clark and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.