| Milione v City Univ. of N.Y. |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 06264 [153 AD3d 807] |
| August 23, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Vincenzo Milione, Appellant, v City University of NewYork et al., Respondents. |
Walsh Markus McDougal & DeBellis, LLP, Garden City, NY (John R. Yetman andClaudio DeBellis of counsel), for appellant.
Schoeman Updike & Kaufman, LLP, New York, NY (Beth L. Kaufman of counsel), forrespondents.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile workenvironment in violation of Executive Law § 296 and Administrative Code of theCity of New York § 8-107, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of theSupreme Court, Nassau County (McCormack, J.), entered December 3, 2014, as granted thatbranch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes ofaction alleging violations of Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and denied, as academic, his cross motion fordiscovery pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff is an Italian American employed by the City University of New York(hereinafter CUNY). In 2010, the plaintiff commenced an action in federal court under titles VIand VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law (seeExecutive Law § 296) (hereinafter NYSHRL), and the New York City HumanRights Law (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107) (hereinafterNYCHRL) against CUNY, Matthew Goldstein, as Chancellor of CUNY, Queens College, JamesMuyskens, as President of Queens College, the John D. Calandra Italian American Institute ofthe City University of New York (hereinafter Calandra), and Anthony Tamburri, as the Dean ofCalandra (hereinafter collectively the defendants), alleging that the defendants discriminated andretaliated against him based on his national origin and his advocacy for Italian Americans. Thedefendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The District Court for theSouthern District of New York granted the defendants' motion, dismissed the federal claims, anddeclined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state and local claims. The United StatesCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's order.
The plaintiff then commenced this action against the defendants, inter alia, to recoverdamages for discrimination based upon his national origin and his advocacy on behalf of ItalianAmericans, for retaliation against him for his advocacy on behalf of Italian Americans andopposition to the defendants' alleged continued discrimination of Italian Americans, and forcreating, causing, or contributing to a hostile and abusive work environment, in violation ofNYSHRL and NYCHRL. The defendants moved, among other things, for summary judgmentdismissing the [*2]complaint. The plaintiff cross-moved fordiscovery pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion,determining, inter alia, that the plaintiff's claims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL were barred bythe doctrine of collateral estoppel, and denied, as academic, the plaintiff's cross motion. Theplaintiff appeals, contending that the court erred in granting dismissal of his claims brought underNYCHRL, and in denying his cross motion.
"The doctrine of collateral estoppel, a narrower species of res judicata, precludes a party fromrelitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action orproceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals orcauses of action are the same" (Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500 [1984])."Collateral estoppel comes into play when four conditions are fulfilled: (1) the issues in bothproceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided,(3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issuepreviously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits" (Conason v Megan Holding, LLC, 25NY3d 1, 17 [2015]; see Clifford vCounty of Rockland, 140 AD3d 1108, 1109 [2016]). "The party seeking to invokecollateral estoppel has the burden to show the identity of the issues, while the party trying toavoid application of the doctrine must establish the lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate"(Matter of Dunn, 24 NY3d 699,704 [2015], citing Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 456 [1985]).
Where a federal court declines to exercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state law claims,collateral estoppel may still bar those claims provided that the federal court decided issuesidentical to those raised by the plaintiff's state claims (see Clifford v County of Rockland,140 AD3d at 1110; Ji Sun Jennifer Kimv Goldberg, Weprin, Finkel, Goldstein, LLP, 120 AD3d 18, 23 [2014]).
In the federal action, the District Court determined that the defendants had legitimate,nondiscriminatory reasons for their employment actions, they were not motivated by retaliatoryanimus, their reasons were not a pretext for discrimination, and the plaintiff was not treateddifferently than other employees (see Milione v City Univ. of N.Y., 950 F Supp 2d 704[SD NY 2013]). The Second Circuit affirmed the order of the District Court (see Milione vCity Univ. of N.Y., 567 Fed Appx 38 [2d Cir 2014]). As such, the determinations renderedby the federal courts are dispositive of the plaintiff's claims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL, evenunder the broader standard of NYCHRL (see Simmons-Grant v Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP,116 AD3d 134, 139 [2014]; cf. Ji Sun Jennifer Kim v Goldberg, Weprin, Finkel,Goldstein, LLP, 120 AD3d at 23).
Under the circumstances, the defendants met their burden of demonstrating that the issuesraised in this action are identical to those decided against the plaintiff in the federal action. Inopposition, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he did not have a full and fair opportunity tolitigate those issues. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff'sclaims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel (seeSimmons-Grant v Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 116 AD3d at 139; see also Hudson v Merrill Lynch &Co., Inc., 138 AD3d 511, 517 [2016]).
In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendants' remaining contention.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' motionwhich was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action at issue on this appeal, anddenied, as academic, the plaintiff's cross motion for discovery pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). Dillon,J.P., Austin, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur.