| Smero v City of Saratoga Springs |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 02521 [160 AD3d 1169] |
| April 12, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| Lori Smero, Individually and as Parent and Guardian of RachelSmero, an Infant, et al., Respondents, v City of Saratoga Springs et al.,Appellants. |
Law Offices of Theresa J. Puleo, Albany (Norah M. Murphy of counsel), for City of SaratogaSprings, appellant.
Roemer Wallens Gold & Mineaux LLP, Albany (Matthew J. Kelly of counsel), forSaratoga Youth Hockey, Inc., appellant.
DeGraff, Foy & Kunz, LLP, Albany (George J. Szary of counsel), for respondents.
Clark, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Nolan Jr., J.), entered March 24, 2017in Saratoga County, which denied defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint.
In 2014, plaintiffs' 10-year-old daughter (hereinafter the child) sustained injuries to her headwhen she was struck by an errant hockey puck that left the ice while she was spectating a youthhockey practice at Vernon Rink in Saratoga County. As a result of this incident, plaintiffscommenced this negligence action against defendants, the City of Saratoga Springs and SaratogaYouth Hockey, Inc., to recover for the child's injuries.[FN1] In their complaint, plaintiffs allege thatdefendants were [*2]negligent by failing, among other things, toinstall proper safety netting or barriers in the area where the child was injured, to construct ormaintain the rink in a safe manner, and to supervise, control and maintain the activities occurringon the ice. After issue was joined and discovery was completed, defendants each moved forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint against them, arguing that, as a spectator at thehockey practice, the child had assumed the risk of being injured by an errant hockey puck.Finding that there were triable issues of fact, Supreme Court denied defendants' motions forsummary judgment. Defendants now appeal. We affirm.
"On a motion for summary judgment, the movant must establish its prima facie entitlementto judgment as a matter of law by presenting competent evidence that demonstrates the absenceof any material issue of fact. Only when the movant satisfies its obligation does the burden shiftto the nonmovant to present evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact. Inconsidering applications of this nature, courts must focus on issue finding rather than issuedetermination, and deny the drastic remedy of summary judgment if there is any doubt as towhether a material factual issue exists or if such an issue is even arguable" (Lacasse v Sorbello, 121 AD3d1241, 1241-1242 [2014] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26NY3d 742, 763 [2016]; McFaddenv State of New York, 138 AD3d 1167, 1167 [2016], appeal dismissed 28 NY3d947 [2016]). When we conduct this analysis, "the facts must be viewed in the light mostfavorable to the nonmoving party" (Justinian Capital SPC v WestLB AG, N.Y. Branch, 28 NY3d 160,172 [2016]; see Red Zone LLC vCadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 27 NY3d 1048, 1049 [2016]).
It is well-settled that an owner or operator of an athletic field or facility "is not an insurer ofthe safety of its spectators" (Akins v Glens Falls City School Dist., 53 NY2d 325, 329[1981]; see Procopio v Town ofSaugerties, 20 AD3d 860, 861 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 716 [2005]; Rosa vCounty of Nassau, 153 AD2d 618, 619 [1989]) and that, under the assumption of riskdoctrine, consenting "[s]pectators and bystanders . . . assume risks associated with asporting event or activity, even at times when they are not actively watching the event" (Newcomb v Guptill Holding Corp., 31AD3d 875, 876 [2006]; seeBukowski v Clarkson Univ., 19 NY3d 353, 356 [2012]; Procopio v Town ofSaugerties, 20 AD3d at 861). However, "a plaintiff will not be deemed to have assumed therisks of reckless or intentional conduct, or concealed or unreasonably increased risks" (Hope v Holiday Mtn. Corp., 123 AD3d1274, 1275 [2014]; see Newcomb v Guptill Holding Corp., 31 AD3d at 876).Notwithstanding a spectator's assumption of risk, an owner or occupier of land remains under aduty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent injury to those who arepresent on the property (see Akins v Glens Falls City School Dist., 53 NY2d at 329;Stern v Madison Sq. Garden Corp., 226 AD2d 444, 445 [1996]; Rosa v County ofNassau, 153 AD2d at 619; Gilchrist v City of Troy, 113 AD2d 271, 273 [1985],affd 67 NY2d 1034 [1986]). In the context of hockey rinks, "the owner's duty owed tospectators is discharged by providing screening around the area behind the hockey goals, wherethe danger of being struck by a puck is the greatest, as long as the screening is of sufficient extentto provide adequate protection for as many spectators as may reasonably be expected to desire toview the game from behind such screening" (Gilchrist v City of Troy, 113 AD2d at273-274; Stern v Madison Sq. Garden Corp., 226 AD2d at 445).[FN2]
[*3] In support of their motions for summary judgment, defendants submitted, among otherphotographic and documentary evidence, deposition testimony describing the ice rink's safetyfeatures, as well as the details of the incident. The deposition testimony of the board president ofSaratoga Youth Hockey reflects that, at the time of the incident, two separate hockey practiceswere ongoing, and, to accommodate this, the hockey goals were set up in a cross-rink fashion toallow both practices to use the hockey rink at the same time. Thus, the goals were repositionedacross the width of the ice rink instead of at the ends of the rink where they are normally situated.He stated that the goal in question was three or four feet away from the dasher board door areaand that the area where the hockey puck left the ice did not have safety netting. He explained,however, that Vernon Rink is entirely surrounded by four-foot, seven-inch dasher boards inaddition to plexiglass panels atop the dasher boards. On the sides of the rink, lower three-footplexiglass panels are atop the dasher boards, and higher six-foot plexiglass panels are atop thedasher boards at the ends of the rink where the hockey goals are normally positioned.
The administrative director of recreation for the City of Saratoga Springs testified that,although there was no protective netting along the sides of the rink, there was protective nettingin place behind both ends of the ice where the hockey goals are normally located. As to theincident, a collegiate hockey player who was volunteering at the practice at the time of theincident testified that he struck a hockey puck with his stick to perform a wrist shot toward oneof the goals positioned along the side of the rink, which resulted in the puck accidentally sailingover the goal and plexiglass where the door to get on the ice is located and striking the child. Justprior to the puck striking the child in the head, she had been a spectator at the practice and, at themoment of the incident, she was walking down a ramp on the side of the rink behind the areawhere the at-issue goal was located. The volunteer explained that, although the goals wererepositioned in a cross-ice manner spanning the width of the rink, no one instructed him not totake shots at the goals. Inasmuch as the foregoing evidence establishes that the child had assumedthe risks of being a spectator at the hockey practice and that protective screening was in placearound the area where the goals are typically located at the ends of the ice rink, we find thatdefendants' proof was sufficient to meet their burden of establishing prima facie entitlement tosummary judgment (see Bukowski v Clarkson Univ., 19 NY3d at 356; Procopio vTown of Saugerties, 20 AD3d at 861; Gilchrist v City of Troy, 113 AD2d at 274;see also Sciarrotta v Global Spectrum, 194 NJ 345, 355-360, 944 A2d 630, 636-639[2008]).
In opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs submitted, among otherthings, an affidavit from plaintiffs' expert, an engineer with extensive experience in ice rinkdesign, construction and management. Citing to various publications and Canadian safetystandards for ice rink arenas, the engineer attested that the barrier system at Vernon Rink failedto comply with industry standards utilized to protect spectators and nonparticipants. In particular,the engineer opined that placement of the hockey goals in a cross-ice fashion on the sides of therink and "directly in front of an area of the rink with a significant gap in the protective screening[] created the significant likelihood that a puck traveling at high velocity would leave the playingsurface, placing spectators . . . in danger of injury." The engineer opined that, byrepositioning the goals along the sides of the rink, defendants created a potential trajectory forhockey pucks not reasonably expected into the area where the child used the ramp to exit thespectators' seating, and that spectators, including the child, were unreasonably exposed to errantshots in the area behind where the goals were placed. In our view, plaintiffs' proof demonstratingthat defendants' repositioning of the hockey goals along the less protected sides of therink—"where the danger of being struck by a puck is the greatest" (Gilchrist v City ofTroy, 113 AD2d at 274; see Akins v Glens Falls City School Dist., 53 NY2d at 331;see also Schneider v American Hockey & Ice Skating Ctr., Inc., 342 NJ Super 527,534, 777 A2d 380, 384 [2001] [recognizing that the prevailing rule is that a sports facilityoperator's duty of care includes providing "protection [*4]forspectators in the most dangerous section of the stands" and that this "duty ordinarily may besatisfied by the operator providing screened seats . . . behind the goals in hockey"(internal quotation marks omitted)], cert denied 170 NJ 387, 788 A2d 772[2001])—was sufficient to show the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whetherdefendants satisfied their reasonable duty of care owed to the child walking down the rampbehind the repositioned goal. Accordingly, Supreme Court properly denied defendants' motionsfor summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendants' remaining contentions have beenexamined and found to be without merit.
Egan Jr., J.P., Mulvey, Aarons and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,with costs.
Footnote 1:The City of Saratoga Springsowns and operates Vernon Rink, and Saratoga Youth Hockey, Inc. rented Vernon Rink at thetime of the incident.
Footnote 2:The Court of Appeals has notspecifically addressed whether the scope of an owner's reasonable duty of care owed to spectatorsat a hockey rink requires additional netting or shielding around the entire perimeter of the rink(compare Gilchrist v City of Troy, 67 NY2d 1034, 1035 [1986], with Sciarrotta vGlobal Spectrum, 194 NJ 345, 355-360, 944 A2d 630, 636-639 [2008]).