Matter of Prima Asphalt Concrete, Inc. v New York State Tax AppealsTrib.
2018 NY Slip Op 04411 [162 AD3d 1281]
June 14, 2018
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 1, 2018


[*1]
 In the Matter of Prima Asphalt Concrete, Inc.,Petitioner,
v
New York State Tax Appeals Tribunal et al.,Respondents.

Wickham Bressler & Geasa, PC, Mattituck (Eric J. Bressler of counsel), forpetitioner.

Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General, Albany (Patrick A. Woods of counsel), forCommissioner of Taxation and Finance, respondent.

Lynch, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Court pursuant to TaxLaw § 2016) to review a determination of respondent Tax Appeals Tribunalsustaining sales and use tax assessments imposed under Tax Law articles 28 and 29.

Petitioner manufactures and sells asphalt to customers who pick up the material at its facility.Generally, the asphalt is sold at a posted price and the amount sold is determined by weighing acustomer's truck before and after the asphalt is loaded into the truck. A ticket is generated for thetransaction, stating the customer's name and project, and entered into a computer system togenerate bimonthly invoices for the customer. To promote sales, petitioner offered customers avolume discount that would apply if a customer purchased a defined quantity of material over aspecific period of time, typically one or two years. If the customer met those terms, a retroactivediscount would be applied to its entire order, resulting in a credit to the purchase price and adownward adjustment of the sales tax due. If the customer failed to meet the terms, however, nodiscount would be given.

Following an audit and conciliation conference, the Department of Taxation and Financedetermined that petitioner could not reduce its sales tax liability through the retroactive volumediscount and assessed a sales tax deficiency of $223,185.53. Petitioner filed a petition forredetermination with the Division of Tax Appeals. Following an administrative hearing, anAdministrative Law Judge sustained the tax assessment. Petitioner filed an exception and, [*2]following oral argument, respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal upheldthe Administrative Law Judge's determination. Petitioner then commenced this CPLR article 78proceeding challenging the Tribunal's determination, and we now confirm.

Petitioner essentially maintains that the sales tax should be based on the ultimate pricecharged to the customer, once the volume discount is applied or the time limit for performanceexpires. We are not persuaded. Our scope of review is limited to whether the Tribunal'sdetermination "has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence" (Matter of HDV Manhattan, LLC v TaxAppeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 156 AD3d 963, 965 [2017]). Because "the presentcase involves the specific application of broad statutory language, . . . deference tothe agency that is charged with administering the statute is appropriate" (Matter of Exxon Mobil Corp. v State ofN.Y. Tax Appeals Trib., 126 AD3d 1059, 1060 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 912[2015]).

There is no dispute that the asphalt sale is subject to sales tax. As relevant here, Tax Law§ 1105 (a) imposes a tax on "[t]he receipts from every retail sale of tangiblepersonal property." A "receipt" is defined as "[t]he amount of the sale price of any property. . . without any deduction for . . . early payment discounts" (Tax Law§ 1101 [b] [3]; see 20 NYCRR 526.5 [a], [d] [1]). "By statute, sales taxesare due in full at the time of the taxable transaction, which is completed upon the transfer of titleor possession of the tangible personal property to the customer" (Matter of General Elec. Capital Corp. vNew York State Div. of Tax Appeals, Tax Appeals Trib., 2 NY3d 249, 258-259 [2004],citing Tax Law §§ 1101 [b] [3]; 1105 [a]). As explained in the governingregulations, because "the sales tax is a 'transactions tax,' with the liability for the tax occurring atthe time of the transaction[,] . . . the tax becomes due at the time of transfer of titleto or possession of (or both) the property" (20 NYCRR 525.2 [a] [2]). Here, the customer takespossession at the facility once the truck is loaded. At that point, sales tax is based on the chargedamount, and petitioner consistently issues bimonthly invoices to its customers for that postedamount. This is not a transaction in which the customer is accorded a volume discount at thepoint of sale, as authorized by 20 NYCRR 526.5 (d) (2). To the contrary, whether petitioner'scustomers earn a volume discount depends on future events.

Petitioner urges us to construe the retroactive volume discount as a "continuing transaction"as recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Columbus S. Lumber Co. v Peck (159 OhioSt 564, 568, 113 NE2d 1, 4 [1953]). We decline to do so, for New York law defines sales taxesas transactional and not necessarily tied to the ultimate price paid by the consumer (see20 NYCRR 525.2 [a] [2]; Matter of General Elec. Capital Corp. v New York State Div. ofTax Appeals, Tax Appeals Trib., 2 NY3d at 258-259). Nor does petitioner's proposal fitwithin any of the recognized statutory exemptions (see Tax Law § 1132).Accordingly, we conclude that the Tribunal's determination was rational and supported bysubstantial evidence.

Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Mulvey and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.


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