| Laroche v Laroche |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 04708 [162 AD3d 1000] |
| June 27, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Denise Laroche, Appellant, v Bruce Laroche,Respondent. |
John E. Quinn, Long Beach, NY, for appellant.
Karen L. Lawrence (Sweetbaum & Sweetbaum, Lake Success, NY [Marshall D.Sweetbaum and Joel A. Sweetbaum], of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Queens County (Janice A. Taylor, J.), entered March 1, 2017. The ordergranted the motion of the nonparty Allstate Insurance Company pursuant to CPLR 1021 todismiss the complaint and denied the plaintiff's cross motion pursuant to CPLR 1021 for leave toappoint Karen L. Lawrence as the temporary administrator of the estate of the defendant, and, ineffect, to substitute Karen L. Lawrence as the defendant.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting themotion of the nonparty Allstate Insurance Company pursuant to CPLR 1021 to dismiss thecomplaint and substituting therefor a provision denying that motion; as so modified, the order isaffirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In 2009, the plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries when she tripped and fell on the staircase ofthe entrance to the defendant's property, where both parties resided. The property was insured bythe nonparty Allstate Insurance Company (hereinafter Allstate). In 2012, the plaintiff commencedthis action against the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries. Before an answer wasserved on behalf of the defendant, he died on April 5, 2012. As of June 5, 2012, the plaintiff'scounsel was aware of the defendant's death.
On July 1, 2016, the Law Offices of Karen L. Lawrence, staff counsel for Allstate, moved onAllstate's behalf pursuant to CPLR 1021 to dismiss the complaint due to the plaintiff's failure tosecure a representative of the defendant's estate so that the automatic stay could be lifted. [*2]The plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved to have Karen L.Lawrence appointed as temporary administrator of the defendant's estate solely for the purpose ofdefending the estate in this action and, in effect, have Karen L. Lawrence substituted as thedefendant in the action. In the papers submitted to the Supreme Court on the motion and crossmotion, the plaintiff's counsel stated that the plaintiff would limit her recovery to the limits ofAllstate's policy. The Supreme Court granted Allstate's motion and denied the plaintiff's crossmotion. The plaintiff appeals.
"If a party dies and the claim for or against him [or her] is not thereby extinguished the courtshall order substitution of the proper parties" (CPLR 1015 [a]). "A motion for substitution maybe made by the successors or representatives of a party or by any party" (CPLR 1021). Further,"[i]f the event requiring substitution occurs before final judgment and substitution is not madewithin a reasonable time, the action may be dismissed as to the party for whom substitutionshould have been made" (CPLR 1021). "The Supreme Court is a court of general jurisdictionwith the power to appoint a temporary administrator, and may do so to avoid delay and prejudicein a pending action" (Dieye v RoyalBlue Servs., Inc., 104 AD3d 724, 726 [2013]). The determination whether to exercise itsauthority to appoint a temporary administrator is addressed to the broad discretion of theSupreme Court (see Rosenfeld v Hotel Corp. of Am., 20 NY2d 25, 28 [1967]; Lambert v Estren, 126 AD3d 942,943 [2015]; see e.g. Meczkowski v E.W.Howell Co., Inc., 63 AD3d 803 [2009]). "In most instances the personal representativeof the decedent's estate should be substituted in the action" (Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac¶ 1015.06; see Grillo v Tese, 113 AD2d 871, 873 [1985]).
Here, contrary to Allstate's contention, CPLR 1021 did not give Allstate authority to move todismiss the complaint, but rather only gave permission to "any party" to move for substitution.Further, Allstate did not submit any proof that it gave notice to the persons interested in thedefendant's estate of its motion as required by statute (see CPLR 1021). Moreover, CPLR1021 provides that an action may be dismissed as to the party for whom substitution should havebeen made if substitution is not made within a reasonable time. "The determination ofreasonableness requires consideration of several factors, including the diligence of the partyseeking substitution, the prejudice to the other parties, and whether the party to be substituted hasshown that the action or the defense has potential merit" (Terpis v Regal Hgts. Rehabilitation & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 108AD3d 618, 619 [2013]; seeAlejandro v North Tarrytown Realty Assoc., 129 AD3d 749, 749 [2015]; Riedel v Kapoor, 123 AD3d 996[2014]; Largo-Chicaiza v WestchesterScaffold Equip. Corp., 90 AD3d 716, 717 [2011]). Absent from the record are anydetails regarding the diligence employed in seeking substitution, any demonstration that thedefense would be prejudiced by the substitution, or a showing of the merits of either thecomplaint or the defense (cf. Borruso vNew York Methodist Hosp., 84 AD3d 1293, 1295 [2011]). Accordingly, the SupremeCourt should have denied Allstate's motion pursuant to CPLR 1021 to dismiss thecomplaint.
However, with respect to the cross motion, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any reasonableexcuse for the delay in moving for the appointment and substitution of a representative for thedefendant's estate. The plaintiff only cross-moved for the appointment and substitution inresponse to Allstate's motion to dismiss the complaint, and did not submit an affidavit of merit(see Alejandro v North Tarrytown Realty Assoc., 129 AD3d at 750; Terpis v RegalHgts. Rehabilitation & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 108 AD3d at 619). Moreover, the plaintiffdid not demonstrate the steps taken to secure the appointment of a personal representative orshow that it was necessary for the Supreme Court to appoint a temporary administrator to avoiddelay and prejudice in the pending action where issue had yet to be joined and Karen L.Lawrence had not appeared on behalf of the defendant (see CPLR 1015 [a]; Kastrataj v Blades, 136 AD3d756, 758 [2016]; Lambert v Estren, 126 AD3d [*3]at944). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's denial of the plaintiff's cross motion underthe circumstances presented. Balkin, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur.