Delphi Hospitalist Servs. LLC v Patrick
2018 NY Slip Op 05100 [163 AD3d 1441]
July 6, 2018
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 29, 2018


[*1]
  Delphi Hospitalist Services LLC, Appellant,
v
EdwardL. Patrick, Respondent.

Lippes Mathias Wexler Friedman LLP, Buffalo (James P. Blenk of counsel), forplaintiff-appellant.

Bond Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Buffalo (Bradley A. Hoppe of counsel), fordefendant-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Matthew A. Rosenbaum, J.),entered November 28, 2017. The order denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminaryinjunction.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff, a staffing agency that provides a range of emergency medical andhospitalist services to small community hospitals, commenced this action seeking to enforce arestrictive covenant in an employment agreement signed by defendant, a licensed physicianassistant. Pursuant to the terms of the covenant, defendant was precluded from providing anymedical services to any hospital at which he had provided services through his employment withplaintiff for a certain period of time after defendant's employment contract was terminated orplaintiff's contract with the particular hospital was terminated. From 2013 through 2017,defendant worked at Ira Davenport Hospital (Ira Davenport) in Bath, New York, which hadcontracted with plaintiff for the provision of medical and hospitalist services. After Ira Davenportterminated its contract with plaintiff and contracted with a competing medical staffing company,defendant terminated his contract with plaintiff and continued to work at Ira Davenport byaccepting a position with plaintiff's competitor.

Plaintiff thereafter moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from providingservices to Ira Davenport as well as any hospital in New York that had a contract for serviceswith plaintiff at which defendant had provided medical services. Supreme Court denied themotion, and we now affirm.

It is well settled that " '[p]reliminary injunctive relief is a drastic remedy [that] is notroutinely granted' " (SutherlandGlobal Servs., Inc. v Stuewe, 73 AD3d 1473, 1474 [4th Dept 2010]). Moreover, "[i]nreviewing an order denying a motion for [a] preliminary injunction, we should not determinefinally the merits of the action and should not interfere with the exercise of discretion by [thecourt] but should review only the determination of whether that discretion has been abused"(Esi-Data Connections v Proulx, 185 AD2d 705, 705 [4th Dept 1992] [internal quotationmarks omitted]).

"In order to establish its entitlement to a preliminary injunction, the party seeking theinjunction must establish, by clear and convincing evidence[,] . . . three separateelements: '(1) a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits; (2) the prospect of irreparable injuryif the provisional relief is withheld; and (3) a balance of equities tipping in the moving party'sfavor' " (Destiny USA Holdings,LLC v Citigroup Global Mkts. Realty Corp., 69 AD3d 212, 216 [4th Dept 2009],quoting Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750 [1988]).

Here, contrary to plaintiff's contention, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying [*2]plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction inasmuch as plaintifffailed to establish, "through the tender of evidentiary proof" (Esi-Data Connections, 185AD2d at 705), that "the harm to plaintiff from denial of the injunction as against the harm todefendant from granting it" tips in plaintiff's favor (Edgeworth Food Corp. v Stephenson,53 AD2d 588, 588 [1st Dept 1976]). We note that defendant resides in Pennsylvania and that,while working at Ira Davenport over the past five years, his Pennsylvania license to be aphysician assistant "had lapsed," precluding him from working in that state without obtaining anew license. According to defendant, it would take him "months to complete any credentialingprocess" to obtain a new license, during which time he would be out of work.

Although plaintiff offered to place defendant at two hospitals in New York State, one ofthem was 31/2 to 4 hours from his home. The other hospital was closer todefendant's home, but defendant had worked there previously and asked for a transfer after only amonth due to various conditions that made him "extremely uncomfortable."

Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserted in support of its motion for a preliminary injunction thatdefendant's violation of the restrictive covenant "pose[d] an immediate threat of irreparable harmto [plaintiff] in the form of the loss of its investment in its employees and the erosion of itsbusiness model." Plaintiff further asserted that defendant's violation of the restrictive covenantwould set "a dangerous precedent" that would allow plaintiff's competitors "to take away morecontracts from [plaintiff]—without the significant initial recruitment and otherinvestments [that plaintiff] has had to incur." Plaintiff's argument in support of its motion,however, refers to the effect on its business model in the event that the court ultimately rules indefendant's favor concerning the enforceability of the restrictive covenant, not on the effect ofallowing defendant to continue working at Ira Davenport during the pendency of the case. "[T]heharm to plaintiff from denial of the [preliminary] injunction as against the harm to defendantfrom granting it," i.e., defendant's unemployment during the pendency of the case, thus tips indefendant's favor (id.). Indeed, we can see no great harm to plaintiff in maintaining thestatus quo until the case is resolved.

Inasmuch as plaintiff failed to establish one of the three required elements for a preliminaryinjunction, we see no need to address the merits of the other two required elements.

All concur except Curran, J., who dissents and votes to reverse in accordance with thefollowing memorandum.

Curran, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In my view, plaintiff met its burden ofestablishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the restrictive employment covenant isenforceable, plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury to its goodwill if provisional relief is notgranted, and the equities tip strongly in plaintiff's favor. Therefore, I conclude that SupremeCourt abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and wouldreverse the order.

As an initial matter, the majority and I appear to agree that plaintiff possesses a legitimatebusiness interest deserving of consideration in the weighing of the equities between the parties.This conclusion is contrary to the court's determination that plaintiff's legitimate businessinterests are not impaired inasmuch as plaintiff lost its contract with Ira Davenport Hospital (IraDavenport) and, thus, plaintiff does not have any such interest worthy of being weighed. To thatextent, I submit that the majority and I agree that the court erred in that determination.

In balancing the equities between the parties, the majority reaches the conclusion that apreliminary injunction would alter the status quo and render defendant unemployed "during thependency of [this] case." However, the majority overlooks a number of significant facts in therecord. First and foremost, defendant has not said that he would be unemployed during thependency of this case. He argues only that he will not be able to work at Ira Davenport,something he does not deny is in breach of his employment agreement with plaintiff. As the courtnoted, plaintiff limited its request "to restrain[ing] defendant from providing services to IraDavenport only." Thus, defendant is at liberty to seek employment at any other hospital in NewYork State, many of which are undoubtedly closer to his Pennsylvania home. I further submitthat we should not give any weight to the self-inflicted harm defendant asserts in the form of hisdeclining two other positions offered by plaintiff, allowing his Pennsylvania license to lapse andapparently not seeking employment at any other New York hospital. In my view, the majorityweighs too heavily the easier road chosen by defendant.

[*3] Second, the majority fails to appreciate the depth of theharm caused to plaintiff by our Court's refusal to enforce the restrictive covenant by the onlyeffective means available, i.e., a preliminary injunction. It is significant that the remedy of aninjunction was specifically stipulated in the employment agreement as the only remedy availableto plaintiff inasmuch as defendant admitted in that agreement that his breach of the restrictivecovenant would cause "substantial and irreparable injury" to plaintiff.

The "business model" references by the majority do not fully describe plaintiff's legitimatebusiness interests. Plaintiff's entire business is built around establishing mutually-beneficialcontractual arrangements with rural hospitals and nursing homes. Plaintiff's service allows therural hospitals to save the time, effort and expense of finding competent medical professionals topractice at their facilities. Instead, these medical facilities pay to plaintiff a flat rate for its serviceof ensuring that professionals, such as defendant, are willing to practice at a rural facility, and arefully trained, licensed and insured. This is especially so for someone like defendant, who therecord shows "was a highly skilled practitioner, who unlike the vast majority of his peers, couldhandle working alone in an emergency room department without the support of a doctor."

The essential reason I agree with plaintiff that the decision not to enforce the restrictivecovenant through a preliminary injunction is "dangerous precedent" is that plaintiff hasdemonstrated that its business model is its most valuable asset and constitutes its "goodwill"deserving of protection.

Our courts have long recognized the value of goodwill in the business realm and itssuitability for equitable relief. Recently, the Court of Appeals defined goodwill in the followingterms: "Goodwill is an intangible asset of a business, corresponding in this context to what abuyer would pay for the business, over and above its value as a mere sum of tangible assets,because of the patronage and support of regular customers. Goodwill consists in every positiveadvantage . . . that has been acquired by a proprietor in carrying on [a] business,whether connected with the premises in which the business is conducted, or with the name underwhich it is managed, or with any other matter carrying with it the benefit of the business. . . It is, in Judge Cardozo's words, what people will pay for any privilege that givesa reasonable expectancy of preference in the race of competition. Such expectancy may comefrom succession in place or name or otherwise to a business that has won the favor of itscustomers" (Congel v Malfitano, 31NY3d 272, 292-293 [2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

This concept of goodwill is a creature of the English common law as described in the oldEnglish case of Cruttwell v Lye (34 Eng Rep 129, 134, 17 Ves 335, 346 [1810]). There,Lord Eldon wrote that "[t]he goodwill which has been the subject of sale is nothing more than theprobability that the old customers will resort to the old place" (id.). Our Court hassimilarly written that goodwill "represents an elusive concept" but includes value accumulated"in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement, which [the business]receives from constant or habitual customers" (Moore v Johnson, 108 AD3d 1125, 1126 [4th Dept 2013], lvdismissed 22 NY3d 950 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

In a situation similar to this one, the Third Department wrote that "an anticompetitivecovenant may prevent the competitive use of client relationships that the employer assisted theemployee in developing through the employee's performance of services in the course ofemployment" (Scott, Stackrow &Co., C.P.A.'s, P.C. v Skavina, 9 AD3d 805, 806 [3d Dept 2004], lv denied 3NY3d 612 [2004]; see Ippolito v NEEMA Emergency Med. of N.Y., 127 AD2d 821, 822[2d Dept 1987] [enforcing restrictive covenant in nearly identical situation]). Moreover, because"[l]ost goodwill and lost opportunity are damages which are difficult to quantify" (Gundermann & Gundermann Ins. vBrassill, 46 AD3d 615, 617 [2d Dept 2007]), the goodwill of a business is considered avaluable right to which equitable protection is extended (see Nobu Next Door v Fine Arts Hous., 3 AD3d 335, 335 [1st Dept2004], affd 4 NY3d 839 [2005]).

Plaintiff's goodwill is manifested here in the relationship of trust plaintiff establishes with itsclient medical facilities to provide independent contractor relationships with competent, licensedand insured medical professionals willing to serve in a rural community. As the Court of Appealsexplained in BDO Seidman v Hirshberg (93 NY2d 382 [1999]), "[t]he employer has a[*4]legitimate interest in preventing former employees fromexploiting or appropriating the goodwill of a client or customer, which had been created andmaintained at the employer's expense, to the employer's competitive detriment" (id. at392). In failing to grant the injunction here, I submit that we allow plaintiff's valuable asset to bepirated away by another.

In the absence of equitable relief, I submit that, contrary to the majority's conclusion, thestatus quo is dramatically changed. Defendant is now at liberty to work for Ira Davenport, eitheras an agent of plaintiff's competitor or as a direct employee, without having to incur any of thetime, effort or expense of having cultivated the relationship with the hospital, and Ira Davenportlikewise has not had to incur the time, effort or expense of finding a highly-skilled professionallike defendant to work in Bath, New York. The contract with Ira Davenport is not the legitimatebusiness interest plaintiff seeks to protect, but rather, plaintiff seeks to protect its value as aturnkey operation providing highly-capable professionals at a quantified cost with little or noeffort or time invested by the client hospitals. If the medical professionals under contract withplaintiff are now free to violate the restrictive covenants and go to work directly for the medicalfacilities where they presently serve, or contract with one of plaintiff's competitors as defendantdid here, it is obvious that plaintiff's business model is no longer viable. For these reasons, I amunable to agree with the majority that the largely self-inflicted harm to defendant outweighs thelikelihood that plaintiff's business model will not survive. Therefore, I conclude that plaintiff hasestablished that a balancing of the equities favors granting the preliminary injunction.Present—Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Lindley, DeJoseph and Curran, JJ.


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