| People v Whitson |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 07464 [166 AD3d 663] |
| November 7, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v John T. Whitson, Appellant. |
Salvatore C. Adamo, New York, NY, for appellant.
Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Elizabeth Miller of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County(Barbara Kahn, J.), rendered November 19, 2015, convicting him of criminal sexual actin the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated criminal contempt,strangulation in the second degree (two counts), criminal contempt in the first degree,criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, criminal mischief in the fourthdegree, criminal contempt in the second degree, unlawful imprisonment in the seconddegree, and harassment in the second degree (three counts), upon a jury verdict, andimposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is preserved forappellate review only to the extent that he contends that the evidence failed to prove thatthe complainant sustained a physical injury (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d484, 492 [2008]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable tothe prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that itwas legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of all the crimes of which he wasconvicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility toconduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunityto view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People vMateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495[1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was notagainst the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court did not err in admittingevidence of certain uncharged bad acts committed by the defendant. The evidence wasrelevant to explain why the complainant, who was the defendant's girlfriend, did notimmediately press charges against the defendant, provided necessary backgroundinformation on the nature of their relationship, and placed the events in question in anunderstandable context (seePeople v Gamble, 18 NY3d 386, 398 [2012]; People v Rabanal, 139 AD3d758, 758 [2016]; People vJean, 127 AD3d 882 [2015]; People v Khan, 88 AD3d 1014 [2011]). The court properlybalanced the probative value of the evidence against the potential prejudice (seePeople v Gamble, 18 NY3d at 398; People v Khan, 88 AD3d at1015).
[*2] The trial court's Sandovalruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]) constituted a providentexercise of discretion, and did not deprive the defendant of the right to testify on his ownbehalf (see People v Smith,18 NY3d 588, 594 [2012]; People v Hayes, 97 NY2d 203, 207-208 [2002];People v Brown, 150 AD3d871 [2017]).
In addition, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in admitting experttestimony on the subject of domestic violence (see People v Carroll, 95 NY2d375, 387 [2000]; People vWalters, 127 AD3d 889, 889 [2015]; People v Thompson, 119 AD3d 966 [2014]; People v Johnson, 22 AD3d600, 601 [2005]). The court did not allow the expert to testify regarding theparticular facts of the case or offer an opinion as to whether the conduct at issueconstituted domestic violence. Instead, the expert described the general behavior patternsof domestic violence perpetrators and victims in order to explain behaviors of a batteredwoman that might be beyond the ken of the average juror (see People v Walters,127 AD3d at 889; People v Thompson, 119 AD3d at 966-967; People vJohnson, 22 AD3d at 601).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80[1982]). Chambers, J.P., Cohen, Duffy and Connolly, JJ., concur.