People v Matteson
2018 NY Slip Op 07976 [166 AD3d 1300]
November 21, 2018
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 2, 2018


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Adam J. Matteson, Appellant.

Lisa A. Burgess, Indian Lake, for appellant.

Andrew J. Wylie, District Attorney, Plattsburgh (Jeffrey C. Kehm of counsel), forrespondent.

McCarthy, J.P. Appeals (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Lawliss, J.),rendered January 25, 2016 in Clinton County, convicting defendant upon his plea ofguilty of the crimes of strangulation in the second degree, aggravated family offense inthe second degree and assault in the third degree, and (2) by permission, from an order ofsaid court, entered November 22, 2017 in Clinton County, which denied defendant'smotion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction, without ahearing.

On September 29, 2014, defendant was charged by felony complaint with severalcrimes arising from an incident the previous day in which he attacked his formergirlfriend. The matter remained pending in Plattsburgh Town Court until March 2015, atwhich point it was removed to Supreme Court. In July 2015, an indictment was handedup charging defendant with crimes related to the September 2014 incident. On August 3,2015, defendant was arraigned on the indictment and the People announced readiness fortrial. Defendant later pleaded guilty to the crimes of strangulation in the second degree,aggravated family offense in the second degree and assault in the third degree. SupremeCourt sentenced him, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of imprisonmentwith an aggregate maximum of seven years, plus five years of postrelease supervision.Defendant subsequently moved to vacate his judgment of conviction, [*2]arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raisea statutory speedy trial claim (see CPL 440.10 [1] [h]). Supreme Court denied themotion, without a hearing. Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction and, bypermission, from the order denying his CPL 440.10 motion.

Supreme Court erred in denying defendant's CPL 440.10 motion without a hearing.Defendant argued that he was deprived of effective assistance because his counsel failedto move to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his statutory speedy trial rights.Failure to make a meritorious speedy trial motion, which would result in dismissal of theindictment, is sufficiently egregious to amount to ineffective assistance (see People v Devino, 110AD3d 1146, 1147 [2013]; People v St. Louis, 41 AD3d 897, 898 [2007]; People v Garcia, 33 AD3d1050, 1052 [2006], lv denied 9 NY3d 844 [2007]). There is ordinarily nostrategic reason for counsel to fail to make a dispositive motion that would result indismissal of the charges with prejudice, so long as it is shown that the motion wouldhave been successful (see People v Johnson, 296 AD2d 594, 594 [2002], lvdenied 99 NY2d 537 [2002]; People v O'Connell, 133 AD2d 970, 971[1987]; compare People vFay, 154 AD3d 1178, 1181 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1115[2018]).

Defendant's motion papers showed, and the People agreed, that there was a delay of308 days between commencement of the criminal action on September 29, 2014 and thePeople's declaration of readiness on August 3, 2015. As defendant only conceded that 28of those days were excludable, the burden on a speedy trial motion would shift to thePeople to establish that other periods should be excluded (see People v Barden, 27 NY3d550, 553 [2016]). "Generally, the burden is on the People to establish theirentitlement to exclude any prereadiness delays from the calculation under a CPL 30.30motion" (People vRobinson, 67 AD3d 1042, 1044 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 910 [2009];see People v Miller, 113AD3d 885, 887 [2014]; People v Pope, 96 AD3d 1231, 1232 [2012], lvdenied 20 NY3d 1064 [2013]), "with no burden being placed on the defendant"(People v Barden, 27 NY3d at 556). The People submitted affirmations and anaffidavit from the Assistant District Attorneys who had represented the People atappearances in Town Court, along with their abbreviated file notes from thoseappearances, asserting that defense counsel requested or consented to numerousadjournments. The prosecutors' averments were based upon information and belief, withthe source of that information being the People's file. According to the People, exclusionof those time periods consented to by defendant would reduce the unexcused delay toless than six months, such that defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated(see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]; [4] [b]). Defendant's reply disputed the propriety of thesuggested exclusions.

Under the speedy trial statute, a court can exclude any "period of delay resulting froma continuance granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendantor his [or her] counsel" (CPL 30.30 [4] [b]; see People v Barden, 27 NY3d at553; People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523, 527 [1985]). The Court of Appeals hasclarified that "[a]djournments consented to by the defense must be clearly expressed torelieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay. Defense counsel'sfailure to object to the adjournment or failure to appear does not constitute consent"(People v Smith, 82 NY2d 676, 678 [1993]; accord People v Barden, 27NY3d at 553). A court may not deny a motion to dismiss for a statutory speedy trialviolation "without a hearing unless '[a]n allegation of fact essential to support the motionis conclusively refuted by unquestionable proof' " (People v Reid, 102AD2d 835, 836 [1984], quoting CPL 210.45 [5] [c]). "Of course, only those periods forwhich the People have not provided 'unquestionable documentary proof'—forexample, a transcript or letter evidencing defendant's consent—need be addressedat any hearing" (People vAllard, 28 NY3d 41, 46 n[*3][2016], quotingCPL 210.45 [5] [c]). At least one court has held that "calendar and file jacket notations"do not constitute unquestionable proof to meet the People's "burden of demonstratingsufficient excludable time" (People v Jackson, 225 AD2d 794, 795 [1996]). Thatconclusion is reasonable because such notations represent simply one person'sinterpretation of the proceedings. Because the People provided some evidence of, but didnot conclusively establish, their entitlement to success on a statutory speedy trial motion,and that issue would be dispositive on defendant's CPL 440.10 motion, a hearing wasnecessary to determine whether defense counsel actually requested or consented to any orall of the numerous adjournments as alleged by the People (see People v Rousaw, 151AD3d 1179, 1180 [2017]). Accordingly, we reverse the order and remit for SupremeCourt to hold a hearing on the motion. As defendant did not make any argumentschallenging the judgment of conviction itself, we affirm that judgment.

Devine, Mulvey, Rumsey and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, and matter remitted to theSupreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.


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