| People v Holz |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 08763 [167 AD3d 1417] |
| December 21, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v David M. Holz, Appellant. |
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Lana M. Ulrich of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Joseph R. Plukas of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Francis A. Affronti, J.),rendered November 24, 2015. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, ofburglary in the second degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty,of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]) as charged in count oneof a two-count indictment. Count one of the indictment alleged that defendant committedburglary in the second degree by unlawfully entering a dwelling on October 1, 2014; count two ofthe indictment alleged that defendant committed a separate act of burglary in the second degreeby unlawfully entering the same dwelling on October 3, 2014. Defendant's plea to count one wasaccepted in full satisfaction of both counts of the indictment.
Defendant now challenges Supreme Court's refusal to suppress jewelry recovered from hisperson during a police stop on October 3. It is undisputed, however, that the aforementionedjewelry relates solely to the October 3 burglary charged in count two, a crime to which defendantdid not plead guilty and of which he does not stand convicted (see generally CPL 220.30[2]; People v Alexander, 160 AD3d1370, 1370-1371 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1001 [2018]). Indeed, the twoburglaries charged in the indictment occurred "on two different dates and were completelyseparate and distinct acts, notwithstanding the fact that they occurred at the same location" (People v Suits, 158 AD3d 949,951 [3d Dept 2018]). Thus, the court's refusal to suppress physical evidence relevant solely tocount two is not reviewable on defendant's appeal from a judgment rendered solely on count one(see CPL 710.70 [2]; People v Dorsey, 122 AD2d 393, 394 [3d Dept 1986];People v Corti, 88 AD2d 345, 350-351 [2d Dept 1982]; People v Rivera, 57 AD2d811, 811 [1st Dept 1977]; cf. People v Brown, 263 AD2d 613, 614 [3d Dept 1999], lvdenied 94 NY2d 877 [2000]).
Our conclusion is rooted in the limits of our appellate jurisdiction. Put simply, "the judgmentof conviction on appeal here did not ensue from the denial of the motion to suppress andthe latter is, therefore, not reviewable" pursuant to CPL 710.70 (2) (Rivera, 57 AD2d at811 [emphasis added]; see Corti, 88 AD2d at 350-351). Unlike the dissent, we agree witha well-established line of cases from the First, Second, and Third Departments that CPL 710.70(2) "should not be read so broadly so as to entitle a defendant who has pleaded guilty in one[count] to appellate review of the denial of a suppression motion in another [count] in which nojudgment was rendered but which was covered by the plea" (Dorsey, 122 AD2d at 394;see Corti, 88 AD2d at 350-351; Rivera, 57 AD2d at 811). AlthoughDorsey and Rivera involved separate indictments rather than separate counts ofthe same indictment, that distinction is inconsequential given the "general rule that 'each count inan indictment is to be treated as if it were a separate indictment' " (Alexander,160 AD3d at 1370, quoting People v Ardito, 86 AD2d 144, 163 [1st Dept 1982], affdfor reasons stated 58 NY2d 842 [1983]).
The dissent conflates reviewability (see CPL 710.70 [2]) with harmlessness(see CPL 470.05 [1]). In this context, the doctrine of reviewability is concerned withwhether the judgment "ensu[ed]" from the suppression determination (CPL 710.70 [2]); thedoctrine of harmlessness, on the other hand, is concerned with whether there is any" 'reasonable possibility' " that a reviewable suppression determination" 'contributed to the plea' " (People v Wells, 21 NY3d 716, 719 [2013], quoting People vGrant, 45 NY2d 366, 379 [1978]). Indeed, the two cases upon which the dissent primarilyrelies, People v Kendrick (128AD3d 1482 [4th Dept 2015]) and People v Carpenter (213 AD2d 747 [3d Dept1995]), address only the potential harmlessness of an undisputedly reviewable suppressiondetermination. Neither Kendrick nor Carpenter examine the threshold question ofwhether the underlying suppression determinations were reviewable in the first instance.
In Kendrick, the defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress various drugs and thenpleaded guilty to a lesser-included charge of criminal possession of a controlled substance in thesecond degree in full satisfaction of a seven-count indictment charging him with, among othercrimes, two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree (128 AD3dat 1483). On appeal, the People "concede[d] that the [motion] court erred in determining thatdefendant lacked standing to contest the search, [but] they nevertheless contend[ed] that the error[was] harmless" because, in the People's view, the defendant would have invariably pleadedguilty to the lesser-included charge given the favorable sentencing promise (id. at1482-1483). We rejected the People's claim of harmless error because "[t]here [was] a reasonablepossibility that, had the court granted defendant a suppression hearing and then granted themotion, defendant would not have pleaded guilty" to the lesser-included charge (id. at1483).
Here, in stark contrast to Kendrick, the issue is not whether the suppression ruling isharmless, but rather whether we have jurisdiction to review that ruling at all given that it isunrelated to the "completely separate and distinct" crime to which defendant pleaded guilty(Suits, 158 AD3d at 951). Kendrick did not consider, much less address, thedispositive jurisdictional issue in this case, namely, whether we can review a suppression rulingthat "bore no relation to the charge to which defendant pleaded guilty" (Dorsey, 122AD2d at 394).
Nor was there any reason to have considered that issue in Kendrick. After all, thedefendant pleaded guilty to a lesser-included drug charge that, as we explicitly noted, was"related to cocaine that was the subject of [his] suppression motion" (128 AD3d at 1483). Here,in contrast, defendant pleaded guilty to one of the two independent and discrete crimes chargedin the indictment, and the crime to which he pleaded guilty was wholly unrelated to thesuppression motion. Thus, unlike this case, it simply cannot be said that the challengedsuppression ruling in Kendrick "bore no relation to the charge to which [the] defendantpleaded guilty" (Dorsey, 122 AD2d at 394).
The dissent's reliance on Carpenter is equally unavailing, and that case does not inany way suggest that the Third Department has "abandoned" the rule of Dorsey. InCarpenter, the defendant, a drug dealer, pleaded guilty to murder after the motion courtrefused to suppress drugs recovered from his residence (213 AD2d at 747-748). According to theThird Department, the murder was an "act of reprisal" stemming from the defendant's belief thatthe victim, a rival dealer, had previously robbed his associates of drugs and money (People vCarpenter, 240 AD2d 863, 863 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 902 [1997]).
Under those circumstances, the drugs at issue in Carpenter were not, as the dissentcharacterizes, "separate" and "unrelated" to the murder charge to which the defendant pleadedguilty. To the contrary, the drugs supplied the context and motive for the murder and, by refusingto suppress those drugs, the court effectively admitted a significant piece of evidence tying thedefendant to the murder. The fact that the defendant did not plead guilty to criminally possessingthe subject drugs does not mean that such drugs were "separate" and "unrelated" to thedrug-related murder to which he did plead guilty. Put simply, the murder plea inCarpenter "ensu[ed]" from the motion court's refusal to suppress the very evidence thatestablished his motive to commit the murder, and that suppression determination was thereforereviewable on appeal from the resultant judgment (CPL 710.70 [2]).
By contrast, there is no suggestion in this case that the jewelry recovered by the police onOctober 3 would or could have been admitted to prove that defendant committed a separate anddiscrete act of burglary on October 1—a point that neither defendant nor the dissentdisputes. Thus, under the applicable precedent of Dorsey, Rivera, andCorti, the court's refusal to suppress that jewelry is not reviewable pursuant to CPL710.70 (2) in connection with this appeal. Without a reviewable determination, the questionaddressed by the dissent—i.e., the potential harmlessness of that determination—isnot properly before us. Indeed, when a defendant pleads guilty, we have no power to review anypart of a suppression determination that does not fall within the ambit of CPL 710.70 (2) (seeCorti, 88 AD2d at 349-351; see generally People v Howe, 56 NY2d 622, 624[1982]). We therefore affirm the judgment on that ground alone.
Finally, we note that the certificate of conviction incorrectly states that count one of theindictment relates to the October 3 burglary, and that count two relates to the October 1 burglary.The certificate must therefore be corrected to indicate that count one relates to the October 1burglary, and that count two relates to the October 3 burglary (see generally People v Credell, 161AD3d 1563, 1565 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1003 [2018]).
All concur except Whalen, P.J., who dissents and votes to reverse in accordance with thefollowing memorandum.
Whalen, P.J. (dissenting). I must respectfully dissent inasmuch as I cannot agree with themajority that we are precluded from reaching the merits of defendant's appeal. The majorityadopts the interpretation of CPL 710.70 (2) stated in People v Dorsey (122 AD2d 393,394 [3d Dept 1986]). Initially, the Third Department has abandoned the restrictive interpretationstated in Dorsey. In its subsequent decision in People v Carpenter (213 AD2d747, 747-748 [3d Dept 1995]), for example, a single indictment charged defendant with, interalia, two counts of murder in the second degree in connection with a 1992 shooting and multiplecounts of criminal possession of a controlled substance as a result of cocaine seized during asearch of defendant's residence. Following the court's denial of that part of his omnibus motionseeking to suppress the cocaine, the defendant pled guilty to a single count of murder in thesecond degree in full satisfaction of the indictment. On appeal, the Third Department addressedthe merits of defendant's contention that the court improperly refused to suppress the cocaineeven though the cocaine related solely to the separate, unrelated crimes of criminal possession ofa controlled substance, to which defendant did not plead guilty. In contrast to Dorsey, theThird Department held in Carpenter that: "Inasmuch as the People did not obtain fromdefendant a concession that denial of his suppression motion did not influence his decision toplead guilty, nor a waiver of his right to appeal that denial, we are not in a position to determinewhether such denial played any part in his decision to plead guilty (see, People vColes, 62 NY2d 908, 910 [1984]). We note that a conviction on the third count of theindictment (charging criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree) wouldhave subjected defendant to the potential of consecutive sentences and mention was made of thatfact by defense counsel during plea discussions. Because it is possible that this factor influenceddefendant in his decision to plead guilty, the judgment must be reversed" (Carpenter, 213AD2d at 748-749). If the Third Department were adhering to its prior holding in Dorseythat it is jurisdictionally precluded from reviewing the propriety of a suppression ruling relatedsolely to a count or indictment to which the defendant did not plead guilty, as the majorityasserts, then it would have been precluded from even considering whether there was anyreasonable possibility that the allegedly erroneous ruling contributed to the defendant's decisionto plead guilty.
The Third Department also reached the merits of a suppression motion related to a separateindictment, not just a separate count, that was satisfied as part of a plea agreement in thesubsequent case of People v Pasco(134 AD3d 1257, 1257-1258 [3d Dept 2015]). Additionally, as defendant argues in hispostargument submission on this appeal, contrary to Dorsey, this Court has previouslyaddressed the propriety of the denial of a suppression motion that related solely to a count of anindictment to which defendant did not plead guilty, but that was nonetheless resolved by the plea(see People v Kendrick, 128 AD3d1482, 1482-1483 [4th Dept 2015]). Notably, in attempting to distinguish the post-Dorseycases cited herein, the majority conducts a factual analysis whether the challengedsuppression ruling bore any relation to the charge to which the defendant pled guilty, an analysisfundamentally indistinguishable from the issue whether there is any " 'reasonablepossibility that the error contributed to the plea' " (People v Wells, 21 NY3d 716, 719 [2013]; see People vGrant, 45 NY2d 366, 379 [1978]). Thus, it is the majority that is conflating the issues ofappellate jurisdiction and harmless error.
In my opinion, the Third Department correctly abandoned Dorsey's restrictiveinterpretation of CPL 710.70 (2). That subdivision states, "An order finally denying a motion tosuppress evidence may be reviewed upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of convictionnotwithstanding the fact that such judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty" (CPL 710.70 [2]).To conclude that defendant's conviction did not ensue from, or "follow as a consequence orresult" of (American Heritage Dictionary 595 [4th ed 2000]), Supreme Court's refusal to suppressthe relevant evidence here ignores both the plain meaning of the statutory language (see generally People v Andujar, 30NY3d 160, 163 [2017]) and the judicial recognition that an improper suppressiondetermination can affect the knowing and voluntary nature of the bargained-for plea agreementwith respect to all counts or indictments encompassed therein, not just the counts or indictmentsto which the determination directly relates (see People v Clark, 45 NY2d 432, 440[1978], rearg denied 45 NY2d 839 [1978]; People v Rosa, 30 AD3d 905, 908 [3d Dept 2006], lvdenied 7 NY3d 851 [2006]; People v Puckett, 270 AD2d 364, 364-365 [2d Dept2000]; see generally Wells, 21 NY3d at 719; Grant, 45 NY2d at 379; People vRamos, 40 NY2d 610, 618-619 [1976]; Kendrick, 128 AD3d at 1483; People vBrinson, 186 AD2d 1063, 1063 [4th Dept 1992]).
Further, defendant's plea of guilty to burglary in the second degree for the October 1, 2014incident satisfied the pending charge of burglary in the second degree for the October 3, 2014incident, as expressly stated in defendant's certificate of conviction. As such, this ensuingjudgment has precedential implications with respect to the separate burglary; it precludes thePeople from prosecuting defendant again for the October 3, 2014 crime (see CPL 40.20[1]; 40.30 [1] [a]; 220.30 [2]) and, in contrast to a mere arrest or an unproven charge, the Peoplemay inquire at trial into the underlying acts of this incident in any future prosecution of defendantbecause it is not a dismissal on the merits (see People v Walker, 66 AD3d 1331, 1332 [4th Dept 2009], lvdenied 13 NY3d 942 [2010]). I therefore reject the narrow interpretation of CPL 710.70 (2)announced in Dorsey and adopted by the majority here.
In rejecting Dorsey, I am not asserting that the fact that a defendant seeks review of asuppression motion that pertains solely to a count or an indictment to which the defendant did notexpressly plead guilty has no relevance. Although an erroneous suppression ruling can influencea defendant's decision whether to plead guilty, "a guilty plea entered after an improper courtruling may be upheld if there is no 'reasonable possibility that the error contributed to theplea' " (Wells, 21 NY3d at 719, quoting Grant, 45 NY2d at 379). Thus,under certain circumstances, the limited nature of a particular suppression ruling may establishthat there was no reasonable possibility that any error with respect thereto contributed to thedefendant's decision to plead guilty (see People v Lloyd, 66 NY2d 964, 965 [1985]; People v Clanton, 151 AD3d 1576,1579 [4th Dept 2017]; People v McLaughlin, 269 AD2d 858, 858-859 [4th Dept 2000],lv denied 95 NY2d 800 [2000]). I cannot agree with the majority, however, that "thelimits of our appellate jurisdiction" preclude this Court from reviewing the suppression rulinghere.
Further, I cannot conclude that there is no reasonable possibility in this case that the denial ofdefendant's suppression motion contributed to his decision to plead guilty (see Wells, 21NY3d at 719). The parties agree that defendant pled guilty to one count of burglary in the seconddegree in exchange for a sentencing promise of six years' imprisonment plus five years'postrelease supervision. If defendant had gone to trial on both counts, he would have faced thepossibility of consecutive sentences totaling at least 12 years' imprisonment for the separateburglaries (see Penal Law §§ 70.06 [3] [c]; 140.25 [2]; People v Suits, 158 AD3d 949,951 [3d Dept 2018]). The transcript of the plea colloquy reveals that neither the court nor theparties were initially clear as to which of the two separate burglaries defendant was to pleadguilty, and he allocuted to facts relevant to both counts. Indeed, as the majority notes, even thecertificate of conviction confused the two counts. I therefore cannot conclude that defendantunderstood that, by pleading guilty to count one rather than count two of the indictment, he waswaiving his right to seek appellate review of the suppression determination. Further, "the Peopledid not obtain from defendant a concession that denial of his suppression motion did notinfluence his decision to plead guilty, nor a waiver of his right to appeal that denial"(Carpenter, 213 AD2d at 748), although such conditions could have been included as partof the offered plea agreement.
Thus, defendant is entitled to review of the merits of the court's refusal to suppress physicalevidence obtained after police officers allegedly stopped and detained him without the requisitereasonable suspicion to do so. At a suppression hearing, two of the four police officers involvedin the stop of defendant testified and their testimony established that, at approximately 4:00 p.m.on October 3, 2014, a police officer was dispatched to an Irondequoit neighborhood in responseto a report of "a suspicious person" wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt and brown pants who"could have possibly been involved in a burglary that occurred a day or so ago." Upon theofficer's arrival at the reported location, a mail carrier pointed down the road and told the officerthat "[h]e's down there," without further elaboration. Although unknown to the officer at thetime, the mail carrier was subsequently identified as the person who reported seeing a suspiciousperson. The officer traveled in the direction indicated by the mail carrier and observed defendantwearing clothing matching the description provided in the dispatch. Upon exiting his patrol car,the officer noticed that defendant was "sweaty and fidgety" and asked defendant to take his handsout of his pockets. When defendant complied, the officer did not "know if [defendant] was tryingto conceal something or what but [the officer] did notice that there was something in one of hishands." When the officer asked what it was, defendant "showed [the officer] a plastic bag, and inthe plastic bag [there] appeared to be jewelry." The officer took possession of the bag ofjewelry.
Three additional officers joined the first officer, one of whom was aware of a burglary in theneighborhood several days prior during which a laptop computer had been stolen. An officer thenasked defendant where he obtained the jewelry, and defendant responded that he had purchased itat a nearby yard sale. An officer next asked defendant whether he would accompany them to theyard sale "to confirm with whoever was running the sale that he indeed purchased the jewelryfrom them." Defendant agreed to do so, and he was placed in the back of a patrol vehicle forapproximately 5 to 10 minutes before the officers transported him to the location provided bydefendant. At that location, while defendant remained in the back of the patrol car, the officersquestioned the woman running the yard sale about the jewelry, and she stated that it had neitherbeen sold by her, nor did she recognize it.
Notably, the People withdrew their CPL 710.30 notice of the intention to offer evidence ofdefendant's statements during that encounter, and the People offered no further evidence at thehearing to establish if or when the officers obtained sufficient information to conclude thatdefendant had stolen the jewelry during a second, separate burglary that occurred at the samelocation as a prior burglary, during which the laptop computer had allegedly been stolen.
I agree with defendant that the court erred in refusing to suppress the jewelry. "It is wellestablished that, in evaluating the legality of police conduct, [a court] 'must determine whetherthe action taken was justified in its inception and at every subsequent stage of theencounter' " (People vBurnett, 126 AD3d 1491, 1492 [4th Dept 2015]; see People v De Bour, 40NY2d 210, 215 [1976]). "In De Bour, the Court of Appeals 'set forth a graduatedfour-level test for evaluating street encounters initiated by the police: level one permits a policeofficer to request information from an individual and merely requires that the request besupported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality; level two,the common-law right of inquiry, permits a somewhat greater intrusion and requires a foundedsuspicion that criminal activity is afoot; level three authorizes an officer to forcibly stop anddetain an individual, and requires a reasonable suspicion that the particular individual wasinvolved in a felony or misdemeanor; [and] level four, arrest, requires probable cause to believethat the person to be arrested has committed a crime' " (Burnett, 126 AD3d at1492, quoting People v Moore, 6NY3d 496, 498-499 [2006]).
In refusing to suppress the physical evidence here, the court concluded that "the informationprovided by the [mail carrier] was deemed to be reliable, coupled with the defendant's physicaldescription and clothing, both of which were previously noted during the earlier dispatch,sufficiently specific and corroborating . . . , [and defendant] was seen in closespatial and temporal proximity to where a crime or crimes had recently occurred." The courttherefore concluded that the first responding officer "possessed a suspicion of criminality whenapproaching and detaining [defendant]." The court further concluded that defendant's detentionwas appropriately based on that officer's "initial reasonable suspicion that a crime had beencommitted and that the defendant was the perpetrator, ultimately leading to his legal arrest, basedupon requisite probable cause. Further, the subsequent search and seizure of physical propertywas supported by probable cause."
Here, given the specificity of the clothing description, the anonymous report of a "suspiciousperson" who "could have possibly been involved in a burglary" is arguably an objectivelycredible reason for the first officer's initial approach of defendant. According to his owntestimony, however, at no point did the officer ask any " 'basic, nonthreatening questionsregarding, for instance, identity, address or destination' " appropriate for a first levelDe Bour inquiry (People vGarcia, 20 NY3d 317, 322 [2012]; cf. Burnett, 126 AD3d at 1492-1493).Instead, the officer directed defendant to remove his hands from his pockets and then beganquestioning defendant regarding the plastic bag of jewelry in defendant's hand. Even assuming,arguendo, that the officer's observation that defendant might have been "trying to concealsomething" warranted the officer's pointed questions regarding the provenance of the jewelry(cf. People v Bordeaux, 182 AD2d 1095, 1095-1096 [4th Dept 1992], appealdismissed 80 NY2d 915 [1992]), it is my position that the court erred in concluding that theofficers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity warrantingthe immediate seizure of the jewelry and warranting the subsequent detention of defendant in theback of a patrol car for approximately 30 minutes while they investigated the provenance of thejewelry.
Contrary to the court's conclusion, the information communicated by the dispatcher to theofficers was insufficient to provide the requisite reasonable suspicion for the seizure of thejewelry and defendant's detention. Initially, "whether a person is 'suspicious' is the ultimatedetermination that is to be reached by the officer on the basis of his or her own observations andexperience" (People v Carney, 58 NY2d 51, 54 [1982]). In this case, the source of thereport of the "suspicious person," although subsequently identified as the mail carrier, was neverdisclosed to the officers involved prior to defendant's detainment. "An anonymous tip cannotprovide reasonable suspicion to justify a seizure, except where that tip contains predictiveinformation—such as information suggestive of criminal behavior—so that thepolice can test the reliability of the tip" (Moore, 6 NY3d at 499). The civilian report herecontained no such predictive information. Further, although the report accurately identified itemsof clothing worn by defendant, "reasonable suspicion 'requires that a tip be reliable in itsassertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person' "(id., quoting Florida v J.L., 529 US 266, 272 [2000]). The hearing testimony alsofails to support the court's conclusion that defendant was found "in close spatial and temporalproximity to where a crime or crimes had recently occurred" inasmuch as the civilian reportindicated no more than the possible involvement of the suspicious person in an unspecifiedburglary days prior.
Thus, "to elevate the right of inquiry to the right to forcibly stop and detain, the police[officers were required to] obtain additional information or make additional observations ofsuspicious conduct sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior" (id. at500-501). Reasonable suspicion is defined as "the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce anordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is athand" (People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 112-113 [1975]). "It may not rest on equivocal or'innocuous behavior' that is susceptible of an innocent as well as a culpable interpretation" (People v Brannon, 16 NY3d 596,602 [2011]). "A stop based on reasonable suspicion will be upheld so long as the intrudingofficer can point to 'specific and articulable facts which, along with any logical deductions,reasonably prompted th[e] intrusion' " (id., quoting Cantor, 36 NY2d at113).
Here, by his own admission, the officer who initially stopped defendant "did nothing toverify or substantiate the information received over the radio" (De Bour, 40 NY2d at222), and he therefore had no personal knowledge that a burglary had in fact occurred in theneighborhood, of how many days prior that crime might have occurred, or of what, if anything,had been stolen during the commission thereof. Neither testifying officer articulated what factshe observed or logical deductions he made that caused him to find defendant's possession of thatparticular jewelry suspicious (see Cantor, 36 NY2d at 113; cf. People v Moore,47 NY2d 911, 912 [1979], revg for reasons stated in dissenting op 62 AD2d 155 [1stDept 1978]). The possession of jewelry is not illegal, and the one officer who did haveknowledge of a recent burglary in the neighborhood conceded that, at the time defendant wasdetained, he was unaware of any missing jewelry. Further, although defendant was observed tobe "sweaty and fidgety," an individual's nervousness upon being questioned by police, even whencombined with additional factors such as inconsistent statements, provides no indication ofcriminality that would justify further detention (see People v Milaski, 62 NY2d 147, 156[1984]). Finally, the fact that defendant's assertion that he purchased the jewelry at a nearby yardsale was later established to be false cannot validate a forcible detention that was not justified atits inception (see Moore, 6 NY3d at 498).
I would therefore reverse the judgment, vacate the plea, grant that part of the omnibus motionseeking to suppress physical evidence seized as a result of the unlawful October 3, 2014detention, and remit the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings (see CPL470.55 [2]). Present—Whalen, P.J., Smith, Carni, NeMoyer and Troutman, JJ.