| People v Clark |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 08950 [167 AD3d 1035] |
| December 26, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Jamel Clark, Appellant. |
The Legal Aid Society, New York, NY (Ronald Alfano of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Sholom J. Twersky, andSamuel P. Rothschild of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Michael A.Gary, J.), rendered February 25, 2014, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlledsubstance in the third degree, upon a plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. This appeal brings upfor review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion whichwas to suppress physical evidence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of hisomnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence is without merit. Parole officersreceived a tip that the defendant was present at an unauthorized location, that he kept drugs andweapons at the location, and that he was selling drugs on the street. The defendant's presence atthe unauthorized location confirmed the accuracy of a portion of that tip. Therefore, the search ofthe upstairs bedroom inside the apartment of the defendant's wife, which was where thedefendant's wife told the parole officers that the defendant had been staying, was rationally andreasonably related to the parole officers' duty to detect and prevent parole violations for theprotection of the public from the commission of further crimes and to prevent violations ofparole (see People v Huntley, 43 NY2d 175, 181 [1977]; People v Vann, 92 AD3d 702,702-703 [2012]; People v Johnson,54 AD3d 969 [2008]; People vBurry, 52 AD3d 856, 858 [2008]). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Peoplemet their burden of establishing that consent to the warrantless search was freely and voluntarilygiven by the defendant's wife, a person who possessed the requisite degree of authority andcontrol over the premises (see People v Gonzalez, 39 NY2d 122, 128 [1976]; People v Marcial, 109 AD3d 937,938 [2013]; see also People v Cosme, 48 NY2d 286, 290 [1979]; People v Watson, 101 AD3d 913,914 [2012]). Dillon, J.P., Barros, Iannacci and Christopher, JJ., concur.