People v Ortiz
2019 NY Slip Op 00221 [168 AD3d 482]
January 15, 2019
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 6, 2019


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Jose Ortiz, Appellant.

Christina A. Swarns, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Victorien Wu ofcounsel), for appellant.

Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Ryan P. Mansell of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Caesar D. Cirigliano, J.), rendered August 2,2011, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree and two counts ofburglary in the first degree, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, toconcurrent prison terms of 20 years, unanimously reversed, on the law, and the matter remandedfor a new trial.

This case involves allegations that defendant broke into the home of his girlfriend andstabbed her. Defendant was charged with attempted murder in the second degree, and relatedcrimes.

During trial, the court permitted Jennifer Mercedes, a subpoena compliance agent withT-Mobile, to testify that on the date of the attack two calls were made from defendant's cellphone, which were transmitted to a cell tower at 2112 Starling Avenue in the Bronx. Mercedesopined that defendant's phone thus had to be within two miles of that tower, which was located ablock from the victim's apartment. Counsel's objection to her testimony sufficiently preserved theissue, and the court erred in permitting her testimony.

"[T]estimony on how cell phone towers operate must be offered by an expert witness"because an analysis of the possible ranges of cell phone towers and how they operate is beyond ajuror's day-to-day experience and knowledge (United States v Natal, 849 F3d 530, 536and n 5 [2d Cir 2017], cert denied 583 US &mdash, 138 S Ct 276 [2017]). Mercedes wasnot an engineer and was not qualified, without an engineering background, to reach furtherconclusions about why defendant's cell phone hit the Starling Avenue tower, i.e. whether it wasbecause it was closest or strongest (compare People v Littlejohn, 112 AD3d 67, 73 [2d Dept 2013][court providently exercised its discretion in concluding that a T-Mobile radio frequencyengineer with 10 years of experience in the field was qualified to provide expert testimonyregarding "deductions made from cell phone site data"], lv denied 22 NY3d 1140[2014]). Thus, her opinion about the two-mile coverage area of the tower required specializedknowledge she did not have.

The trial court also permitted a police officer to testify twice, over defense objection, that thevictim had identified her attacker as "male Hispanic, bald, by the name of Jose Ortiz." This toowas error. "Testimony by one witness (e.g., a police officer) to a previous identification of thedefendant by another witness (e.g., a victim) is inadmissible" (People v Smith, 22 NY3d 462, 466[2013]; see also People v Owens,127 AD3d 561, 563 [1st Dept 2015] [characterizing testimony of witness that he received aphone call from victim naming defendant as the attacker as hearsay because it was an"out-of-court statement to (the witness) identifying defendant as his assailant—either byname or by an identifying description that allowed (the witness) to name (the defendant)"], lvdenied 27 NY3d 1004 [2016]).

Furthermore, in its charge to the jury, the court improperly highlighted the identificationevidence favorable to the prosecution and told the jury that such testimony "which taken thenalso serves to establish the defendant is the actual perpetrator. In deciding whether the defendantis the . . . actual perpetrator of the charged crimes, you must consider all theevidence you have heard in the case on that issue from whatever source, give particular attentionto and examining with care the testimony of [the victim] regarding all of the circumstancessurrounding the commission of the charged crime."

The court also improperly credited the victim's earlier identification of defendant when it toldthe jury that she had identified defendant when her "memory was fresher than at present."Generally, an unbalanced marshaling of the evidence will not constitute reversible error unless,viewing the charge as a whole, the imbalance results in prejudice to the defendant and depriveshim of a fair trial (People v Culhane, 45 NY2d 757, 758 [1978], cert denied 439US 1047 [1978]; People v Martinez,100 AD3d 537, 538 [1st Dept 2012], affd 22 NY3d 551 [2014]). However, we mustview this in light of the other errors regarding identification.

The court should have given a missing witness charge for two detectives the People hadidentified as its witnesses, and who had knowledge highly material to the case (see People vSavinon, 100 NY2d 192, 196 [2003]). These detectives were the lead detective on the case,who interviewed a witness who said he saw defendant leaving the victim's building, and anotherdetective who interviewed the victim at the hospital.

Nor should the court have referenced defendant's failure to testify to the jury two times. Thisimproperly highlighted defendant's silence, thereby prejudicing defendant.

The cumulative effect of these errors cannot be dismissed as harmless. Defendant's maindefense was that the witnesses were mistaken when they identified him and many of the errorsconcerned his identification. The combined effects of these errors served to deprive defendant ofhis fundamental right to a fair trial and require reversal of the judgment.

Moreover, during trial, a juror revealed that he had an interaction with a court officer that lefthim feeling "really . . . violated, . . . really disrespected," and "upsetabout the whole situation," even after speaking to the officer's superior, and the courtacknowledged that he could see in the juror's face how upset he was. The court offered to adjournproceedings for the rest of the day to give the juror an opportunity to process what happened, andrelax, and to then advise the court the next day whether he could be fair to both parties. Therecord contains no discussion with the juror the following day to ensure that he could payattention and be fair to both parties.

The court's inquiry left unresolved the question of whether the juror was grossly unqualifiedto serve due to any ongoing inability to be fair and focus on the case at hand. Thus it fell short ofa "probing and tactful" inquiry (People v Sanchez, 99 NY2d 622, 623 [2003] [internalquotation marks omitted]; see alsoPeople v Teichman, 66 AD3d 523, 524 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 942[2010]; People v Sipas, 246 AD2d 408 [1st Dept 1998]). Accordingly, reversal iswarranted.

In light of our determination, we find it unnecessary to reach defendant's remainingcontentions. Concur—Richter, J.P., Manzanet-Daniels, Tom, Webber, Gesmer, JJ.


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