| People v Walker |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 00913 [169 AD3d 723] |
| February 6, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Michael Walker, Appellant. |
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY, for appellant.
Thomas A. Tormey, Jr., Special District Attorney, New York, NY, for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Stephen J.Rooney, J.), rendered March 13, 2015, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a weapon inthe second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant, who had two prior violent felony convictions, was indicted for various weaponpossession and menacing offenses. The top count of the indictment was criminal possession of aweapon in the second degree, a class C violent felony.
Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement between the parties, the defendant pleaded guilty toattempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, a class D violent felony. During theplea allocution, the Supreme Court explained to the defendant that, if he were convicted of the topcount of the indictment, the minimum sentence would be an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 16years to life, and the maximum sentence would be an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 25 years tolife. The defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his plea, and the court denied the motion. He wassentenced, as a persistent violent felony offender, to the agreed-upon indeterminate term ofimprisonment of 12 years to life. The defendant appeals, contending that his plea was not knowing andvoluntary because the court failed to inform him that, if he went to trial, he possibly could be convictedof a nonviolent offense and be sentenced to a determinate term of imprisonment, without a lifetimecomponent.
Contrary to the People's contention, the defendant preserved for appellate review his challenge tothe validity of his plea (cf. People vWilliams, 27 NY3d 212, 214 [2016]; People v Toxey, 86 NY2d 725, 726[1995]).
The determination of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of theSupreme Court (see People v King, 115AD3d 986, 986 [2014]), and that determination generally will not be disturbed absent animprovident exercise of discretion (see Peoplev DeLeon, 40 AD3d 1008, 1009 [2007]). "Generally, a plea of guilty may not be withdrawnabsent some evidence or claim of innocence, fraud, or mistake in its inducement" (id. at 1009)."Whether a plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary is dependent upon a number of factors'including the nature and terms of the agreement, the reasonableness of the bargain, and the age andexperience of the accused' " (People v Garcia, 92 NY2d 869, 870 [1998], quotingPeople v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 736 [1998]). "That the defendant allegedly receivedinaccurate information regarding his possible sentence exposure is another factor which must beconsidered by the court, but it is not, in and of itself, dispositive" (People v Garcia, 92 NY2d at870; see People v Eschenberg, 275 AD2d 719 [2000]).
Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion towithdraw his plea of guilty. The defendant, who was 28 years old when he was arrested for theoffenses charged in this case, had extensive experience in the criminal justice system from his two priorviolent felony convictions. During the plea allocution, he indicated that he had enough time to consultwith his attorney, that he had not been threatened, forced, or pressured into making the plea, and thathe was pleading guilty of his own free will. There is no evidence that the defendant failed to appreciatethat, if he went to trial, he could have been convicted of a lesser charge with a lesser sentence than thecharge to which he pleaded guilty. Moreover, the court did not err in explaining the defendant'ssentencing exposure if he were convicted of the top count of the indictment. Accordingly, contrary tothe defendant's contention, his plea of guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the seconddegree was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered (see People v Manragh, 150 AD3d 762 [2017], affd 32 NY3d1101 [2018]; People v Duart, 144 AD3d1173 [2016]; People v Safran, 113AD3d 878, 879-880 [2014]; People vBravo, 72 AD3d 697, 698 [2010]). Scheinkman, P.J., Mastro, Maltese and Barros, JJ.,concur.