| Winklevoss v Steinberg |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 02419 [170 AD3d 618] |
| March 28, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| Cameron Winklevoss et al., Appellants, v ToddSteinberg, an Individual, Respondent. |
Harder LLP, New York (Anthony J. Harwood of counsel), for appellants.
Wechsler & Cohen, LLP, New York (Kim Lauren Michael of counsel), forrespondent.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (David B. Cohen, J.), entered September 19, 2018,which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendant's motion to dismissthe defamation claim, unanimously affirmed, with costs.
Plaintiffs seek relief for alleged defamation related to a stock purchase deal where they wereto purchase defendant's shares in a startup company in the medical cannabis industry. When theywithdrew, defendant commenced suit in Delaware Chancery Court seeking, inter alia, specificperformance of the alleged agreement; shortly thereafter defendant was quoted in a New YorkPost article, among other places, allegedly making false statements defaming plaintiffs.Subsequently, defendant voluntarily withdrew his lawsuit, prior to any determination as to themerits, when he was able to sell the shares to another purchaser.
Plaintiffs are limited purpose public figures. Through their voluntary participation innumerous interviews, in widely-covered conferences and meetings with entrepreneurs, and intheir own radio broadcasts, they have attracted public attention to themselves as investors instart-ups, have voluntarily injected themselves into the world of investing, and have sought toestablish their reputation as authorities in the field (see Perez v Violence Intervention Program, 116 AD3d 601 [1stDept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 915 [2015]; Farber v Jefferys, 103 AD3d 514 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied21 NY3d 858 [2013]). The individual plaintiffs are also general purpose public figures, famousby virtue of their participation in the Olympics, their portrayal in the film "The Social Network,"and routine coverage in popular media, coverage in which they willingly participate (seeGertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 342 [1974]).
Accordingly, to withstand dismissal of their defamation claim, plaintiffs needed to allege thatdefendant published the statements at issue with actual malice, that is, with either knowledge thatthey were false, or reckless disregard for the truth (Huggins v Moore, 94 NY2d 296[1999]; James v Gannett Co., 40 NY2d 415 [1976]; Farber v Jefferys, 103 AD3dat 515; Gross v New York Times Co., 281 AD2d 299 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied96 NY2d 716 [2001]). Inasmuch as they failed to do so as a matter of law, their defamation claimwas properly dismissed.
We have considered plaintiffs' remaining contentions, and find them unavailing.Concur—Renwick, J.P., Richter, Kapnick, Kahn, Oing, JJ. [Prior Case History: 2018NY Slip Op 32304(U).]