| Metro Enters. Corp. v New York State Dept. of Taxation &Fin. |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 02934 [171 AD3d 1377] |
| April 18, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| Metro Enterprises Corp. et al., Appellants, v New YorkState Department of Taxation and Finance et al., Respondents. |
Hodgson Russ LLP, Albany (Christopher L. Doyle of counsel), for appellants.
Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Robert M. Goldfarb of counsel), forrespondents.
Lynch, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Weinstein, J.), entered August 29,2017 in Albany County, which granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, and (2) froman order of said court, entered May 11, 2018 in Albany County, which, among other things, uponreargument, adhered to its prior decision.
Plaintiff John Scarfi owns and operates plaintiff Metro Enterprises Corp. Metro engages intwo lines of business. First, it owns point of banking machines used to sell "scrip"—orin-house currency—at four adult entertainment clubs in New York. A patron can use thescrip to purchase dances or to tip exotic dancers at the clubs, and the dancers redeem the scrip forcash. Second, Metro provides referral services for exotic dancers who wish to work in one of theclubs. Metro's income from the point of banking machines derives from transaction fees appliedto the sale of scrip. Metro earns income from referral services by taking a percentage of the cashvalue of the scrip that a dancer redeems.
Following a tax audit, defendant Department of Taxation and Finance issued determinationsassessing plaintiffs for sales and use taxes exceeding $3,863,000, plus penalties and interest.Plaintiffs commenced this action pursuant to CPLR 3001 against the Department and defendantCommissioner of Taxation and Finance seeking a declaration that Metro is not a vendor, thatneither Metro nor Scarfi is a person required to collect tax pursuant to the Tax Law and thatdefendants could not hold plaintiffs liable for sales tax obligations incurred by the clubs.Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and thatplaintiffs failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. Supreme Court determined that,although plaintiffs were not required to exhaust available administrative remedies, the complaintfailed to state a cause of action, and it granted defendants' motion on that basis. Plaintiffs thenfiled two motions—one seeking reargument and one seeking renewal and vacatur of theprior order. In one order, Supreme Court granted reargument, but adhered to its prior decision,and it denied the other motion. Plaintiffs now appeal from both orders.
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), "we must afford the pleadings aliberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide the plaintiff thebenefit of every possible inference" (Matter of Dashnaw v Town of Peru, 111 AD3d 1222, 1225 [2013][internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]). Generally, "a motion to dismiss adeclaratory judgment action prior to the service of an answer presents for consideration only theissue of whether a cause of action for declaratory relief is set forth, not the question of whetherthe plaintiff is entitled to a favorable declaration" (North Oyster Bay Baymen's Assn. v Town of Oyster Bay, 130 AD3d885, 890 [2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Matter ofDashnaw v Town of Peru, 111 AD3d at 1225). Further, on a motion to dismiss pursuant toCPLR 3211 (a) (7), courts may reach "the merits of a properly pleaded cause of action for adeclaratory judgment . . . where no questions of fact are presented by thecontroversy" (Matter of Tilcon N.Y.,Inc. v Town of Poughkeepsie, 87 AD3d 1148, 1150 [2011] [internal quotation marks,brackets and citation omitted]; see Matter of Dashnaw v Town of Peru, 111 AD3d at1225).
Relevant to this dispute, plaintiffs allege that Metro entered into service agreements withadult entertainment clubs (hereinafter registered clubs) and dancers entered into separateagreements seeking referrals to the registered clubs. Patrons at registered clubs could use a creditor debit card at the point of banking machine to purchase scrip. The point of banking machinegenerated a receipt that specified the amount of scrip purchased during each transaction, and aservice fee—payable to Metro—was added to each transaction. An agent oremployee of Metro or a registered club would deliver scrip to the patron in the amount specifiedon the receipt and the patron could then use the scrip to pay for dances or to tip the dancers. Adancer referred by Metro to a registered club was required to accept scrip from patrons and to payfor the referral service by allowing Metro to subtract a percentage from the total amount of scripthat the dancer redeemed.
The audited sales of scrip were derived from the point of banking machine transactionservice fees, the redemption fee and the cash value of the scrip that the dancers redeemed, lessthe redemption fee. The gravamen of plaintiffs' claim is that Metro was neither a "vendor"pursuant to Tax Law § 1101 (b) (8) nor a "person required to collect. . . tax" pursuant to Tax Law § 1131 (1) because none of theserevenue sources were receipts subject to sales tax among the enumerated taxable services underTax Law § 1105.
We affirm, albeit on a different ground. Generally, a taxpayer challenging a tax assessmentmust first exhaust the available administrative remedies prior to commencing an action (seeWatergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52, 57 [1978]; Davidson v RochesterTel. Corp., 163 AD2d 800, 802 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 714 [1990]; W. T.Wang, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 88 AD2d 825, 826 [1982],affd 58 NY2d 1021 [1983]; see also Tax Law § 1140). The twoexceptions to this exclusive remedy requirement are "when a tax statute is alleged to beunconstitutional, by its terms or application, or where the statute is attacked as whollyinapplicable" (Bankers Trust Corp. vNew York City Dept. of Fin., 1 NY3d 315, 321 [2003] [internal quotation marks,brackets, ellipsis and citation omitted]). "To challenge a statute as wholly inapplicable, thetaxpayer must allege that the agency had no jurisdiction over it or the matter that was taxed"(id. at 322). In such a situation, a declaratory judgment action may be commenced tochallenge a tax assessment only where there are no factual issues raised (see Kallenberg MeatProds. v O'Cleireacain, 209 AD2d 381, 382-383 [1994]).
Any charge by a nightclub that offers exotic dancing for profit is taxable as an "[a]musementcharge" within the definition of a "roof garden, cabaret or other similar place" (Tax Law§§ 1101 [d] [3], [4]; 1105 [f] [3]; see Matter of 677 New Loudon Corp. v State of N.Y. Tax AppealsTrib., 85 AD3d 1341, 1346 [2011]). Further, receipts from the sale of scrip are taxablewhen the scrip is used to pay for a private dance at such a club (see Matter of HDV Manhattan, LLC v TaxAppeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 156 AD3d 963, 966 [2017]). It is "presumed that all. . . amusement charges of any type mentioned in [Tax Law § 1105 (f)]are subject to tax until the contrary is established, and the burden of proving that any. . . amusement charge . . . is not taxable . . . shall be uponthe person required to collect tax" (Tax Law § 1132 [c] [1]). Accepting theallegations in the complaint to be true, we find, like Supreme Court, that Metro may be deemed a"recipient of amusement charges" required to collect sales tax (Tax Law§§ 1101 [d] [3], [11]; 1131 [1]). As defendants argued in support of theirmotion to dismiss, however, there are myriad questions of fact regarding the relationship betweenplaintiffs, the dancers and the registered clubs. Given these questions, we are unable to concludewhether or to what extent plaintiffs' receipts are taxable. As such, we find that this case fallswithin the general rule that a party must use available statutory and administrative remedies tochallenge a tax assessment (see Allstate Ins. Co. v Tax Commn. of State of N.Y., 115AD2d 831, 832 [1985], affd 67 NY2d 999 [1986]). As plaintiffs failed to exhaust theiradministrative remedies, dismissal of the complaint was proper (see Kallenberg Meat Prods. vO'Cleireacain, 209 AD2d at 382-383; Allstate Ins. Co. v Tax Commn. of State ofN.Y., 115 AD2d at 831). Given this determination, plaintiffs' remaining arguments,including those regarding their motions to, among other things, reargue and renew, areacademic.
Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Devine and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the orders are affirmed,without costs.