| People v Myles |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 03372 [172 AD3d 752] |
| May 1, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Maureen Myles, Appellant. |
Salvatore C. Adamo, New York, NY, for appellant.
Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Marcia R. Kucera and Guy Arcidiaconoof counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (FernandoCamacho, J.), rendered October 22, 2015, convicting her of grand larceny in the third degree,grand larceny in the fourth degree (two counts), scheme to defraud in the first degree, and petitlarceny (three counts), after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The charges against the defendant arose from a charity fundraiser that she organized to raisefunds to purchase a wheelchair-accessible van for her friend's son. The defendant was accused ofusing donated funds for her own benefit, as opposed to the charitable purpose for which theywere raised.
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support herconvictions is unpreserved for appellate review, as defense counsel made only a general motionfor a trial order of dismissal based upon the People's alleged failure to make out a prima faciecase (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]; People v Barnett, 163 AD3d 700,701 [2018]; People v McAuley, 154AD3d 720, 720 [2017]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to theprosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legallysufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of each crime charged in the indictment beyond areasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review ofthe weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]), we neverthelessaccord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony,and observe demeanor (see People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633, 644 [2006]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfiedthat the verdict of guilt of grand larceny in the third degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree(two counts), scheme to defraud in the first degree, and petit larceny (three counts) was notagainst the weight of the evidence (see id. at 644).
The defendant's contention that the County Court's Sandoval ruling (see People vSandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]) deprived her of her constitutional right to a fair trial isunpreserved for appellate review, as she did not raise any constitutional challenge to theSandoval ruling before the County Court (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Grant, 7 NY3d 421, 424[2006]; People v Wheelings, 137AD3d 1310, 1311 [2016]). The defendant's further contention that the court abused itsdiscretion in its Sandoval ruling is without merit. "The extent to which the prosecutionshould be allowed to impeach the credibility of a defendant is a matter that is generally left to thesound discretion of the trial court" (People v Lipton, 162 AD3d 1070, 1071 [2018] [internal quotationmarks omitted]; see People v Wheelings, 137 AD3d at 1311). Here, the court'sSandoval ruling permitting the People to inquire as to whether the defendant had beenconvicted of three felonies involving crimes of theft and engaging in a scheme to defraud, butprecluding any questioning about the underlying facts of those prior crimes, avoided any undueprejudice to the defendant and constituted a provident exercise of the court's discretion (seePeople v Lipton, 162 AD3d at 1071; People v Lombardo, 151 AD3d 887, 887-888 [2017]; People v Edwards, 118 AD3d 909,909 [2014]), particularly because "[c]rimes of theft will usually have a very material relevance asto the defendant's credibility" (People vWright, 121 AD3d 924, 928 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
The defendant's contention that the County Court erred in admitting evidence regarding hereducational background is also without merit. Contrary to the defendant's contention, thisevidence was not Molineux evidence (see People v Molineux, 168 NY 264[1901]), since it did not concern uncharged crimes or other bad acts (see People v Brewer, 28 NY3d271, 276 [2016]; People vBinning, 108 AD3d 639, 639 [2013]). Accordingly, we agree with the court'sdetermination not to consider the documents related to the defendant's educational backgroundunder the Molineux standard. To the extent that the defendant challenges this evidence onrelevancy grounds, the evidence was relevant to demonstrate the lies made by the defendant inorder to defraud her victims.
The defendant's contention that certain oral statements she made to a detective prior to herarrest should have been suppressed is academic in light of the fact that those statements were notintroduced at trial (see People vMurad, 55 AD3d 754, 755 [2008]; People v Menendez, 50 AD3d 1061, 1061 [2008]; People vMusmacher, 133 AD2d 352, 353 [1987]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).Dillon, J.P., Cohen, Duffy and Christopher, JJ., concur.