| Matter of Robinson v DiNapoli |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 03432 [172 AD3d 1513] |
| May 2, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of W. Charles Robinson,Appellant-Petitioner, v Thomas P. DiNapoli, as State Comptroller, et al.,Respondents-Respondents. |
C. Robinson & Associates, LLC, New York City (W. Charles Robinson of counsel), forappellant-petitioner.
Aarons, J. (1) Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Zwack, J.), entered February 1,2018 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, denied petitioner'smotion for summary judgment, and (2) proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred tothis Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determinationof respondent Comptroller denying petitioner's request for recalculation of his retirementbenefits.
Petitioner worked as the Village Attorney for the Village of Hempstead, Nassau County from1999 through 2005. He was appointed by the then-Mayor, and his appointment was approved byresolutions that were adopted by the then-Village Board of Trustees. Pursuant to suchresolutions, petitioner was to be paid a base salary of $28,500 per year as well as "reasonableadditional compensation based on unusual or extraordinary services" that extended tolitigation-related matters. While he was the Village Attorney, petitioner was also the principal ofa law firm that performed legal work for the Village, sometimes directly and other times througha third-party administrator that managed the Village's liability claims. Petitioner's tenure as theVillage Attorney ended when a new Mayor was elected.
In December 2006, petitioner filed an application for service retirement benefits with theNew York State and Local Retirement System. Although the Retirement System initially deniedhis application on the ground that he was an independent contractor, he contested thisdetermination and it was subsequently reversed. In September 2014, the Retirement Systemissued a revised determination recalculating petitioner's retirement benefits based on his annualsalary as the Village Attorney. The revised determination stemmed from salary adjustmentsprovided by the Village. Petitioner objected to the recalculation as failing to take into account theadditional compensation that he received above his annual salary, and he requested a hearing.Following a prolonged hearing, a Hearing Officer upheld the Retirement System's recalculation,finding that there was no proof to support petitioner's claim that the adjustments reported by theVillage were politically motivated and that, in any event, such hearing was not the proper forumfor petitioner to resolve his issues with the Village. Respondent Comptroller adopted the HearingOfficer's decision.
Petitioner, acting pro se, commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging theComptroller's determination. Petitioner thereafter moved to join additionalrespondents—namely, respondent Wayne J. Hall Sr., the current Mayor of the Village ofHempstead, and respondent Board of Trustees of the Village of Hempstead (hereinaftercollectively referred to as the Village respondents). Supreme Court granted the motion, andpetitioner filed an amended verified petition. Following joinder of issue, petitioner movedpursuant to CPLR 3212 and 7804 (g) for "summary determination" on its claims made solelyagainst the Village respondents. Supreme Court denied the motion and transferred the proceedingto this Court for review (see CPLR 7804 [g]). Petitioner also appeals.[FN*]
Petitioner's sole argument is that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion for "summarydetermination." Given that petitioner's motion was directed only to the Village respondents andnot to the Comptroller, such motion is not a proper avenue for petitioner to obtain summary reliefon any of his claims raised with respect to the Comptroller's determination. More critically, bylimiting his contentions to the claims asserted against the Village respondents, petitioner hasabandoned any argument that the Comptroller's determination was not supported by substantialevidence (see Matter of Nitti v Countyof Tioga, 149 AD3d 1332, 1332 [2017]). As such, the Comptroller's determination mustbe confirmed.
Regarding the motion for "summary determination," petitioner asserts that the denials in theVillage respondents' answer were improper and, therefore, the allegations in the amendedpetition must be deemed admitted. We disagree. Petitioner takes issue with the fact that most ofthe denials in the Village respondents' answer took the form of "[d]enies any knowledge orinformation sufficient to form a belief as to each and every allegation." Under the circumstancesof this case, we find that such denials were not improper such that they may be deemedadmissions (compare Gilberg v Lennon, 193 AD2d 646, 646 [1993]). Furthermore,contrary to petitioner's argument, his affidavit submitted in support of his motion does notestablish a prima facie case. In his affidavit, petitioner reiterated the allegations in the amendedpetition and reasserted his claim that the Village respondents' denials were improper. Becausepetitioner failed to satisfy his threshold burden of demonstrating entitlement to judgment as amatter of law on his claims asserted against the Village respondents, we find that Supreme Courtcorrectly denied his motion for "summary determination."
Finally, in view of our determination confirming the Comptroller's determination, anyremaining claims asserted against the Village respondents are not the proper subject of a CPLRarticle 78 proceeding. Accordingly, any claims alleged against the Village respondents must besevered from the amended petition and such matter must be converted to a plenary action(see CPLR 103 [c]). Petitioner's remaining arguments, to the extent not specificallyaddressed herein, have been considered and are without merit.
Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Devine and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal from the orderis dismissed, without costs. Adjudged that (1) the claims in the amended petition asserted againstrespondents Wayne J. Hall Sr. and Board of Trustees of the Village of Hempstead are severedand converted to a plenary action, and remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings notinconsistent with this Court's decision, and (2) the determination is confirmed, without costs, andamended petition dismissed to that extent.
Footnote *:Although petitioner filed a noticeof appeal from the order denying his motion for "summary determination," such appeal must bedismissed because no appeal lies as of right from a nonfinal order in a CPLR article 78proceeding (see CPLR 5701 [b] [1]). We may nevertheless review those issues raisedregarding said order within the context of the transferred proceeding (see Matter of Fischer v Nyack Hosp.,140 AD3d 1264, 1265 n 2 [2016]).