| People v Whelan |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 04425 [173 AD3d 778] |
| June 5, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Frank Whelan, Appellant. |
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Michael Arthus of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and Ann Bordley ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Suzanne M.Mondo, J.), rendered November 26, 2013, convicting him of course of sexual conduct against achild in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child (two counts), upon a juryverdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
On August 30, 2009, the defendant was arraigned on a criminal complaint. Subsequently, onDecember 30, 2009, a grand jury indicted the defendant, inter alia, on one count of course ofsexual conduct against a child in the second degree (Penal Law § 130.80 [1] [a])and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10 [1]). Onthe same day, the People served and filed a statement of readiness for trial. The defendant wasarraigned on the indictment on March 3, 2010. The defendant then moved pursuant to CPL 30.30to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. TheSupreme Court denied the motion.
Thereafter, when it was revealed that the grand jury had been presented this case by a specialassistant district attorney, the defendant moved a second time pursuant to CPL 30.30 to dismissthe indictment. The defendant contended that the People's December 30, 2009, statement ofreadiness was illusory because the indictment was jurisdictionally defective, having beenobtained by a special assistant district attorney without authority to present the case to a grandjury. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The People obtained a superseding indictmentidentical to the initial indictment, and after a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of one countof course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree and two counts of endangeringthe welfare of a child. The defendant appeals.
The defendant's contention that his motions pursuant to CPL 30.30 should have been grantedis without merit. Pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (a), the Supreme Court must grant a motion todismiss an indictment charging a felony offense where the People are not ready for trial withinsix months after the commencement of the criminal action, which, in this case, consists of aperiod of 183 days. Once the People announce that they are ready for trial, postreadiness delay ischargeable to them only "when the delay is attributable to their inaction and directly implicatestheir ability to proceed" (People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795, 799 [1998]). The defendant hasthe burden of demonstrating that any postreadiness delays should be charged to the People(see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 215 [1992]; People v Beasley, 69 AD3d 741, 743 [2010], affd 16 NY3d289 [2011]; People v Brewer, 63AD3d 402, 403 [2009]). Here, the defendant essentially challenges the Supreme Court'sconclusion that postreadiness rules are applicable because the December 30, 2009, statement ofreadiness was illusory. Thus, according to the defendant, the People should be charged with morethan two years of delay. However, the basis of that challenge, stemming from the specialassistant district attorney's purported lack of authority to present this case to the grand jury, iswithout merit.
"To be effective, a statement of readiness must be communicated . . . at a timewhen the People are truly ready to proceed" (People v Carter, 91 NY2d at 798; see People v McCarthy, 146 AD3d983 [2017]). "A statement of readiness at a time when the People are not actually ready isillusory and insufficient to stop the running of the speedy trial clock" (People v England,84 NY2d 1, 4 [1994]). The People's statement of readiness is presumed to be correct, "[i]n theabsence of proof that the readiness statement did not accurately reflect the People's position"(People v Carter, 91 NY2d at 799). Here, there is no evidence in the record that thePeople's announcement of readiness on December 30, 2009, was not made in good faith or didnot reflect an actual present state of readiness (see People v McCarthy, 146 AD3d at984). Contrary to the defendant's contention, People v Del Col (88 AD3d 737 [2011]) is distinguishable and doesnot warrant a contrary result. In Del Col, the County Court properly determined, underthe circumstances of that case, that the District Attorney lacked the authority to appoint theprosecutor who presented the subject charges to the grand jury. Here, in contrast, under thecircumstances of this case, the prosecutor who presented this case to the grand jury was properlyappointed and did not lack authority to so present to the grand jury (see People v Ramos, 34 Misc 3d914 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2012]).
Inasmuch as the total time chargeable to the People did not exceed 183 days, we agree withthe Supreme Court's determination to deny the defendant's motions pursuant to CPL 30.30 todismiss the indictment (see People vBarnes, 160 AD3d 890, 890 [2018]).
As the defendant correctly concedes, his challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence isunpreserved for appellate review, because defense counsel never moved for a trial order ofdismissal (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484 [2008]). In any event, viewing theevidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond areasonable doubt (see People vDanielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495[1987]).
In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of theevidence (see CPL 470.15 [5], People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348), wenevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear thetestimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004];People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfiedthat the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633[2006]).
The defendant's contention that his defense counsel's failure to make a motion for a trialorder of dismissal amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit, as "defensecounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless motion" (People vMeslin, 201 AD2d 744, 744 [1994]). Leventhal, J.P., Roman, Maltese and Iannacci, JJ.,concur.