| People v Baldwin |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 04829 [173 AD3d 1748] |
| June 14, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v James Baldwin, Appellant. |
The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Sherry A. Chase of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
John J. Flynn, District Attorney, Buffalo (Matthew B. Powers of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (M. William Boller, A.J.),rendered August 13, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of arson inthe second degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of arson inthe second degree (Penal Law § 150.15), defendant contends that the evidence islegally insufficient to establish his identity as the person who intentionally set fire to hisex-girlfriend's apartment. We reject that contention. The circumstantial evidence of guilt adducedby the People established that defendant "had both a motive and the opportunity to commit thecrime" (People v Heck, 103 AD3d1140, 1141 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1074 [2013]; see also People v Gardner, 26 AD3d741, 741-742 [4th Dept 2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 848 [2006]). Specifically, it wasundisputed at trial that defendant was upset with his ex-girlfriend (victim) because she wasignoring him. It was also undisputed that, on the night of the fire, defendant banged on the doorsand window of the victim's apartment, asking to be let in. Defendant also repeatedly called thevictim's cell phone, only to be told by her son that he could not let defendant inside, and then tolda friend that he was angry at the victim because she would not let him inside. A fire was startedat the victim's apartment shortly after those events, and the fire marshall testified that the fire wasdeliberately set. Furthermore, the victim's son testified that, during the fire, he saw defendantwalking toward the victim's house. According to the son, defendant turned around and walkedaway after noticing him. The People also presented direct evidence of guilt, i.e., testimony fromthe victim and two of defendant's friends that defendant admitted to having started the fire (see People v Thomas, 158 AD3d1135, 1136 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1088 [2018]). Viewing the evidencein the light most favorable to the People, as we must (see People v Conway, 6 NY3d 869, 872 [2006]; People vContes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we conclude that there is a "valid line of reasoning andpermissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury"(People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements ofthe crime as charged to the jury (seePeople v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is notagainst the weight of the evidence with respect to defendant's identity as the perpetrator (seegenerally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). Even assuming, arguendo, that a different verdictwould not have been unreasonable, we cannot say that "the jury failed to give the evidence theweight it should be accorded" (People vJackson, 162 AD3d 1567, 1567 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 938[2018]).
Defendant also contends that the verdict is repugnant inasmuch as the jury acquitted him ofburglary in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.30) and convicted him of arson in thesecond degree (§ 150.15). Defendant failed to preserve that contention for ourreview because he "failed to object to the alleged repugnancy of the verdict before the jury wasdischarged" (People v Spears, 125AD3d 1401, 1402 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1172 [2015]). In any event,his contention lacks merit. A repugnancy claim must be "[e]xamined against the elements of thecrimes as charged by the trial court and without regard to the particular facts of the case"(People v Johnson, 70 NY2d 819, 820 [1987]; see People v Muhammad, 17 NY3d 532, 539 [2011]). "[A]conviction will be reversed [as repugnant] only in those instances where acquittal on one crimeas charged to the jury is conclusive as to a necessary element of the other crime, as charged, forwhich the guilty verdict was rendered" (People v Tucker, 55 NY2d 1, 7 [1981], reargdenied 55 NY2d 1039 [1982]; seePeople v McLaurin, 50 AD3d 1515, 1516 [4th Dept 2008]).
Here, because it was not legally impossible for the jury to convict defendant of arson in thesecond degree and acquit him of burglary in the first degree, as charged by the court, the verdictwith respect to those counts is not repugnant (see generally Muhammad, 17 NY3d at539-540). Although the People's theory at trial was that defendant entered the victim's apartmentto set the fire, the court's charge with respect to the arson count did not require the jury to makeany such finding.
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and conclude that they lack merit.
Finally, we note that the certificate of conviction incorrectly reflects that defendant wasconvicted upon a plea of guilty, and it must therefore be amended to reflect that he was convictedupon a jury verdict (see People vMills, 63 AD3d 1717, 1718 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 861 [2009]).Present—Centra, J.P., Carni, Lindley, Troutman and Winslow, JJ.