| People v Sutton |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 05590 [174 AD3d 1052] |
| July 11, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Marquise L. Sutton, Appellant. |
Bruce Evans Knoll, Albany, for appellant.
Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (Jordan J. Yorke of counsel), forrespondent.
Clark, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Hayden, J.),rendered May 23, 2016, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of manslaughter in thefirst degree.
In December 2015, based upon allegations that he shot the victim in the abdomen, therebycausing the victim's death, defendant was charged by indictment with manslaughter in the firstdegree. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to 25 years inprison, followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.
Defendant contends that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and wasagainst the weight of the evidence because the People failed to prove that he was the shooter orthat he had the requisite intent for a conviction of manslaughter in the first degree. Initially,defendant's legal sufficiency argument is unpreserved for our review because he did not renewhis challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence at the close of his proof (see People v Kolupa, 13 NY3d786, 787 [2009]; People vLane, 7 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]). Nevertheless, in the course of reviewing defendant'sweight of the evidence argument, we necessarily determine whether the elements ofmanslaughter in the first degree were proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Vega, 170 AD3d1266, 1267 [2019]; People vMartinez, 166 AD3d 1292, 1293 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1207 [2019]). Asrelevant here, a conviction for manslaughter in the first degree requires proof that, "[w]ith intentto cause serious physical injury to another person, [a defendant] cause[d] the death of suchperson or of a third person" (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]). A "defendant's intent may beinferred from his [or her] actions and the surrounding circumstances" (People v Molina, 79 AD3d 1371,1376 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 861 [2011]; see People v Rivers, 152 AD3d 1054, 1056 [2017], lvdenied 30 NY3d 1063 [2017]).
The undisputed evidence, including text messages sent and received by defendant,established that defendant accompanied Alicia Haskins to the victim's home when she went topick up her children from their parenting time with the victim. The testimony revealed thatcustody exchanges between Haskins and the victim had been contentious in the past and that, tohelp facilitate an amicable exchange, the victim's cousin was also present for the exchange. Byall accounts, a verbal argument ensued between Haskins and the victim, as well as the victim'sfather and the father's girlfriend, and the argument escalated into a physical altercation outside ofthe victim's home. The victim's cousin testified that, as she was putting the children in the car,she saw the victim's father holding Haskins down on the ground while the father's girlfriendstomped on Haskins. The victim's cousin testified that she thereafter heard a car door slam,followed by a gunshot. Several eyewitnesses testified to looking in the direction of the gunshotand seeing defendant standing outside of Haskin's car. The victim's father specifically testifiedthat he saw defendant standing with his arm outstretched in front of him, holding a gun.
The evidence also demonstrated that defendant left the scene on foot after the shooting andthat he thereafter sent several text messages indicating that he was in trouble and needed todisappear. As further established by the evidence, Haskins placed a recorded telephone call todefendant, during which he acknowledged his presence at the scene and made several otherpotentially inculpatory comments. Furthermore, Haskins testified that, prior to arriving at thevictim's home, she drove defendant to a house to pick up his "joint," which she understood tomean a gun. Although the firearm was never recovered, a shell casing and projectile belonging toa .40 caliber Smith and Wesson pistol were found at the scene, and the medical evidenceestablished that the victim died of massive blood loss resulting from a gunshot wound. In ourview, given all of the evidence, including defense testimony that there was another unidentifiedman present at the scene, it would not have been unreasonable for the jury to have acquitteddefendant of manslaughter in the first degree. However, the jury clearly credited the People'sevidence, determined that defendant was the shooter and found that, by shooting at the groupengaged in the physical altercation, defendant acted with the requisite intent (see People v Forde, 120 AD3d509, 509 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1043 [2014]; People v Hernandez, 233AD2d 273, 274 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 986 [1997]). Viewing the evidence in aneutral light and according deference to the jury's credibility determinations (see People v Babcock, 152 AD3d962, 967 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 947 [2017]), we find that the weight of theevidence amply supports the jury's guilty verdict (see People v Garland, 155 AD3d 527, 528-529 [2017], affd32 NY3d 1094 [2018]; People v Forde, 120 AD3d at 509; People v Hernandez,233 AD2d at 274).
Defendant also argues that the integrity of the grand jury proceeding was impaired by themanner in which the prosecutor presented the case, by allegedly incomplete and/or inadequateinstructions and by certain prejudicial witness testimony. Initially, defendant's challenge to thelegal sufficiency of the grand jury evidence is precluded by our finding that his conviction wasnot against the weight of the evidence and, thus, was "necessarily founded upon legally sufficientevidence" (People v Gaston, 147AD3d 1219, 1220 n 2 [2017]; see CPL 210.30 [6]). As to defendant's remainingchallenges to the grand jury proceedings, he did not raise such arguments in his motion todismiss the indictment and, thus, they are unpreserved (see CPL 210.20 [3]; People v Brandon, 133 AD3d 901,902 [2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 992 [2016]).
Defendant's remaining arguments require little discussion. Defendant failed to preserve hisarguments that County Court erred in not giving a circumstantial evidence charge, allowingimproper bolstering of evidence and admitting certain evidence without proper authentication orfoundation (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Rashid, 166 AD3d 1382, 1385 [2018], lv denied32 NY3d 1208 [2019]; People vAsh, 162 AD3d 1318, 1322 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1002 [2018]).Nevertheless, were these issues properly before us, we would find each one to be without merit.Finally, upon our review of the record, we are satisfied that defendant received meaningfulrepresentation (see People v Henry, 95 NY2d 563, 566 [2000]; People vBenevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]).
Lynch, J.P., Mulvey, Aarons and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.