| People v Gittens |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 09284 [178 AD3d 1070] |
| December 24, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Peter Gittens, Appellant. |
Janet E. Sabel, New York, NY (Robin Richardson of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Morgan J. Dennehy, andSullivan & Cromwell LLP [Andrew N. Stahl], of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (WilliamHarrington, J.), rendered July 13, 2015, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in thesecond degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Although a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to confront adverse witnesses throughcross-examination (see US Const 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6), thatright is not unfettered (see People vCaballero, 137 AD3d 929, 930 [2016]; People v Francisco, 44 AD3d 870, 870 [2007]). "The trial court hasbroad discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination when the questions are irrelevant or onlymarginally relevant, concern collateral issues, or pose a danger of misleading the jury"(People v Francisco, 44 AD3d at 870; see People v Cato, 5 AD3d 394 [2004]). "In cross-examining a lawenforcement witness, the same standard for good faith basis and specific allegations relevant tocredibility applies, as does the same broad latitude to preclude or limit cross-examination" (People v Crupi, 172 AD3d 898,899 [2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Smith, 27 NY3d 652, 661-662 [2016]). Contrary tothe defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precludingdefense counsel from cross-examining a police witness concerning a certain finding made by afederal court in an unrelated criminal proceeding (see People v McFaline, 167 AD3d 465, 466 [2018]; People v McKenzie, 148 AD3d936, 937 [2017]; People vCruz, 131 AD3d 706, 707 [2015]; People v Elliot, 127 AD3d 779, 780 [2015]).
"The determination of an appropriate sentence requires the exercise of discretion after dueconsideration given to, among other things, the crime charged, the particular circumstances of theindividual before the court and the purpose of a penal sanction, i.e., societal protection,rehabilitation and deterrence" (People v Farrar, 52 NY2d 302, 305 [1981]). Here,considering all of the circumstances, it cannot be said that the sentencing court failed to observesentencing principles. Further, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People vSuitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Balkin, J.P., Cohen, Miller and LaSalle, JJ., concur.