| People v Box |
| 2020 NY Slip Op 01813 [181 AD3d 1238] |
| March 13, 2020 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Kyle A. Box, Appellant. |
Danielle C. Wild, Rochester, for defendant-appellant.
Kristyna S. Mills, District Attorney, Watertown, for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson County Court (Kim H. Martusewicz, J.),rendered March 3, 2017. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, ofmurder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, arson in the second degree, arsonin the third degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, tampering with physicalevidence (two counts), grand larceny in the fourth degree, criminal possession of stolenproperty in the fourth degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourthdegree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified onthe law and the facts by reversing those parts convicting defendant of arson in the thirddegree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, andcriminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and dismissing counts four,five, eight, and nine of the indictment, and as modified the judgment is affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a juryverdict of, inter alia, murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]),assault in the first degree (§ 120.10 [1]), arson in the second degree(§ 150.15), arson in the third degree (§ 150.10 [1]), recklessendangerment in the first degree (§ 120.25), grand larceny in the fourthdegree (§ 155.30 [8]), criminal possession of stolen property in the fourthdegree (§ 165.45 [5]), and two counts of tampering with physical evidence(§ 215.40 [2]). Defendant's conviction stems from his conduct in stabbingthe victim 46 times in the victim's home, setting fire to the house, and then stealing thevictim's vehicle. Defendant gave a statement to the police admitting that he stabbed thevictim, but claimed he did so in self-defense. Defendant also pursued an extremeemotional disturbance (EED) affirmative defense during the trial.
We reject defendant's contention that County Court erred in refusing to suppress hisstatements to the police. Prior to the Miranda warnings being given, defendantwas not in custody. He voluntarily accompanied the police during their investigation ofthe crime and then to the police station, and the questioning was primarily investigatory,not accusatory (see People vTowsley, 53 AD3d 1083, 1084 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 795[2008]; People v Duda, 45AD3d 1464, 1466 [4th Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 764 [2008]). Weconclude that a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would not have believed thathe or she was in custody (see generally People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969],cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]). Shortly after arriving at the police station, thepolice learned of evidence connecting defendant to the crime and thus advised defendantof his Miranda rights, which defendant waived, prior to interrogating defendant.Contrary to defendant's further contentions, the detective's statements prior to issuing theMiranda warnings did not vitiate or neutralize the effect of the warnings (cf. People v Dunbar, 24 NY3d304, 315-316 [2014], cert denied 575 US &mdash, 135 S Ct 2052 [2015]),and the police did not engage in tactics that were so fundamentally unfair as to render thestatements involuntary (seePeople v Wolfe, 103 AD3d 1031, 1035 [3d Dept 2013], lv denied 21NY3d 1021 [2013]; seegenerally People v Brown, 111 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2013], lvdenied 22 NY3d 1155 [2014]).
Defendant contends that the verdict finding him guilty of murder in the seconddegree, assault in the first degree, arson in the second degree, reckless endangerment inthe first degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and criminal possession of stolenproperty in the fourth degree is against the weight of the evidence. Addressing first thecounts of murder in the second degree and assault in the first degree, upon ourindependent review of the evidence in light of the elements of those crimes as charged tothe jury, as well as the charge with respect to the defense of justification and the EEDaffirmative defense (seegenerally People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we reject defendant'scontention (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Thejury's rejection of the justification defense with respect to the counts of murder in thesecond degree and assault in the first degree is not against the weight of the evidenceinasmuch as the weight of the evidence supports a determination that defendant lacked asubjective belief that his use of deadly physical force was necessary to protect himselfagainst the victim's use or imminent use of deadly physical force or a forcible criminalsexual act, or that a reasonable person in the same situation would not have perceivedthat deadly force was necessary (see generally People v Umali, 10 NY3d 417, 425 [2008],rearg denied 11 NY3d 744 [2008], cert denied 556 US 1110 [2009]; People v Burman, 173 AD3d1727, 1730 [4th Dept 2019]; People v Ford, 114 AD3d 1273, 1274-1275 [4th Dept2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 962 [2014]). The jury's rejection of the EEDaffirmative defense is also not contrary to the weight of the evidence (see People v Steen, 107 AD3d1608, 1608 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 959 [2013]), especiallyconsidering defendant's conduct after the stabbing occurred.
We further conclude that the jury's verdict with respect to arson in the second degreeis not against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at495). "A person is guilty of arson in the second degree when he [or she] intentionallydamages a building . . . by starting a fire, and when (a) another person whois not a participant in the crime is present in such building . . . at the time,and (b) the defendant knows that fact or the circumstances are such as to render thepresence of such a person therein a reasonable possibility" (Penal Law§ 150.15). "[T]he definition of person contemplates a living human being,"and thus section 150.15 requires that such a person be alive when the fire is started (People v Taylor, 158 AD3d1095, 1103 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 941 [2018], deniedreconsideration 32 NY3d 1178 [2019]). Here, the medical examiner testified that theautopsy showed that the victim was still alive when the fire was started and, contrary todefendant's contention, the jury could infer from the evidence that defendant was awarethat such was a reasonable possibility.
We agree with defendant, however, that the verdict finding him guilty of recklessendangerment in the first degree is against the weight of the evidence. "A person is guiltyof reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances evincing adepraved indifference to human life, he [or she] recklessly engages in conduct whichcreates a grave risk of death to another person" (Penal Law § 120.25).Count five of the indictment alleged that defendant recklessly engaged in conductcreating a grave risk of death to emergency responders when he intentionally started thefire. We agree with defendant that the verdict on that count is against the weight of theevidence because the People did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendantacted with depraved indifference to human life when he set the fire (see People v Harvin, 75 AD3d559, 561 [2d Dept 2010]; see also People v Jean-Philippe, 101 AD3d 1582, 1583 [4thDept 2012]; see generallyPeople v Williams, 111 AD3d 1435, 1435-1436 [4th Dept 2013], affd24 NY3d 1129 [2015]; People vFeingold, 7 NY3d 288, 296 [2006]). Inasmuch as defendant is challenging onlythe weight of the evidence with respect to that count and does not challenge the legalsufficiency of the evidence with respect to that count, we cannot reduce the conviction tothe lesser included offense of reckless endangerment in the second degree (see Peoplev Cooney [appeal No. 2], 137 AD3d 1665, 1668-1669 [4th Dept 2016], appealdismissed 28 NY3d 957 [2016]). We therefore modify the judgment by reversingthat part convicting defendant of reckless endangerment in the first degree anddismissing count five of the indictment.
We further agree with defendant that the verdict finding him guilty of grand larcenyin the fourth degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree isagainst the weight of the evidence. With respect to each of those counts, the People wererequired to establish that the value of the stolen motor vehicle exceeded $100(see Penal Law §§ 155.30 [8]; 165.45 [5]). It is well settledthat a witness "must provide a basis of knowledge for his [or her] statement of valuebefore it can be accepted as legally sufficient evidence of such value" (People vLopez, 79 NY2d 402, 404 [1992]; see People v Guarnieri, 122 AD3d 1078, 1079 [3d Dept2014]). "Conclusory statements and rough estimates of value are not sufficient" (People v Loomis, 56 AD3d1046, 1047 [3d Dept 2008]; see People v Slack, 137 AD3d 1568, 1569 [4th Dept 2016],lv denied 27 NY3d 1139 [2016]). Although the monetary element of each crimeis quite low, the People did not attempt to meet that threshold through the testimony ofany witness. The testimony of a detective that the vehicle was "[d]efinitely worth overprobably 10,000" did not satisfy the monetary element of either crime inasmuch as heprovided no basis of knowledge for his statement of value. We therefore further modifythe judgment by reversing those parts convicting defendant of grand larceny in the fourthdegree and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and dismissingcounts eight and nine of the indictment.
Defendant contends that a police officer impermissibly usurped the jury'sfact-finding role and acted as a summation witness in testifying that the evidence did notmatch defendant's claim of self-defense. An officer may testify as to his or herobservation of the crime scene (see People v Carducci, 143 AD3d 1260, 1261 [4th Dept2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1143 [2017]). To the extent that the officer offeredimpermissible opinion testimony, we conclude that any error was harmless (seegenerally People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]; People v Casanova, 152 AD3d875, 878-879 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 948 [2017]).
Defendant's contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel becausedefense counsel pursued the EED affirmative defense against his wishes is based onmatters outside the record and must be raised by way of a motion pursuant to CPL article440 (see People v Timmons,151 AD3d 1682, 1684 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 984 [2017]; People v Marshall, 134 AD3d486, 486 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1002 [2016]; People v Jones, 63 AD3d1582, 1583 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 797 [2009]). To the extentthat defendant alleges that pursuing the defense was a poor strategy, we conclude that theEED affirmative defense was a reasonable and legitimate strategy, and we thus reject thatallegation of ineffective assistance of counsel (see generally People v Benevento,91 NY2d 708, 712-713 [1998]). We have reviewed the remaining instances of allegedineffective assistance set forth by defendant and conclude that he received meaningfulrepresentation (see generally People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).
As defendant contends and the People correctly concede, arson in the third degree isan inclusory concurrent count of arson in the second degree (see People v Piccione, 78AD3d 1518, 1519 [4th Dept 2010]). Thus, that part of the judgment convictingdefendant of arson in the third degree must be reversed and count four of the indictmentdismissed (see generally Peoplev Hickey, 171 AD3d 1465, 1466-1467 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 33NY3d 1105 [2019]). We therefore further modify the judgment accordingly. Contrary todefendant's contention, however, assault in the first degree is not an inclusory concurrentcount of murder in the second degree (see People v Wyant, 98 AD3d 1277, 1277 [4th Dept 2012];People v Alvarez, 38 AD3d930, 934 [3d Dept 2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 981 [2007]).
Finally, we note that the certificate of conviction incorrectly reflects that defendantwas convicted of two counts of tampering with physical evidence pursuant to Penal Law§ 215.50 (2), and it must therefore be amended to reflect that he wasconvicted of two counts of tampering with physical evidence pursuant to section 215.40(2) (see People vCruz-Rivera, 174 AD3d 1512, 1514 [4th Dept 2019]). Present—Centra,J.P., Carni, Lindley, Curran and Troutman, JJ.