People v Norman
2020 NY Slip Op 02567 [183 AD3d 1240]
May 1, 2020
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 1, 2020


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Marcus A. Norman, Appellant.

D.J. & J.A. Cirando, PLLC, Syracuse (John A. Cirando of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.

Patrick E. Swanson, District Attorney, Mayville (Marilyn Fiore-lehman of counsel),for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Chautauqua County Court (Michael M. Mohun, A.J.),rendered September 29, 2016. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, ofburglary in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimouslyaffirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a juryverdict, of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]). Wereject defendant's contention that County Court erred in refusing to suppressidentification testimony arising from a showup procedure during which defendant wasidentified by a resident of the apartment where the burglary was committed. We concludethat the showup procedure, which was conducted within two hours of the burglary, was" 'reasonable under the circumstances' " (People v Cedeno, 27 NY3d110, 123 [2016], cert denied 580 US &mdash, 137 S Ct 205 [2016]; seePeople v Brisco, 99 NY2d 596, 597 [2003]; People v Duuvon, 77 NY2d 541,543 [1991]). The showup procedure was "part of a continuous, ongoing policeinvestigation . . . , which spanned two [municipalities] and involvedmultiple law enforcement agencies, due in large part to the flight of defendant" (People v Johnson, 167 AD3d1512, 1513 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 33 NY3d 949 [2019]), and wasconducted "as soon as practicable following defendant's apprehension" (People v August, 33 AD3d1046, 1048 [3d Dept 2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 878 [2007]). Moreover, theshowup procedure was not rendered unduly suggestive by the fact that defendant washandcuffed (see People vStanley, 108 AD3d 1129, 1130 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 959[2013]), or by a police officer's comments to the witness inasmuch as those comments" 'merely conveyed what a witness of ordinary intelligence would have expectedunder the circumstances' " (August, 33 AD3d at 1049; see People v Williams, 15AD3d 244, 246 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 771 [2005]).

Defendant contends that the court erred in rejecting his Batson challengewith respect to the People's exercise of a peremptory strike on a prospective juror. Wereject that contention. The court's determination whether a proffered race-neutral reasonfor striking a prospective juror is pretextual is accorded great deference on appeal (see People v Linder, 170 AD3d1555, 1558 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 1071 [2019]; People v Larkins, 128 AD3d1436, 1441-1442 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1001 [2016]). Here,the People's proffered reason was that the prospective juror stated during voir dire thatshe had been the victim of a burglary and that she was dissatisfied with thenon-resolution of her case. We conclude that the proffered reason was sufficient tosatisfy "the People's 'quite minimal' burden of providing a race-neutral reason" forexercising a peremptory strike (People v Herrod, 174 AD3d 1322, 1323 [4th Dept 2019],lv denied 34 NY3d 951 [2019]; see generally Linder, 170 AD3d at1558).

We also reject the contention of defendant that the court erred in denying hischallenges for cause with respect to three prospective jurors. "CPL 270.20 (1) (b)provides that a party may challenge a potential juror for cause if the juror 'has a state ofmind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict basedupon the evidence adduced at the trial' " (People v Harris, 19 NY3d 679, 685 [2012]). Here, the threeprospective jurors did not discuss any experiences or express any opinions that revealedany potential for bias or cast any serious doubt on their ability to render an impartialverdict, and thus they did not evince a state of mind that was "likely to preclude [them]from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial" (CPL270.20 [1] [b]; cf. People v Rice [appeal No. 1], 199 AD2d 1054, 1054 [4th Dept1993]).

We also reject defendant's contention that the court's refusal to discharge two swornjurors deprived defendant of his right to a fair and impartial jury. In order to discharge asworn juror, the court "must be convinced that the juror's knowledge will prevent [himor] her from rendering an impartial verdict" (People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299[1987]). Here, upon learning of potential issues with the two sworn jurors, the court anddefense counsel questioned those two jurors and elicited responses that they would befair and impartial. On this record, we are unable to conclude that the court "could havebeen 'convinced' . . . , based on any unequivocal responses of the juror[s],that the juror[s] [were] 'grossly unqualified to serve in the case' " (People vTelehany, 302 AD2d 927, 928 [4th Dept 2003]; see CPL 270.35 [1]).

Defendant correctly concedes that he failed to preserve for our review his contentionthat the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction inasmuch as hepresented evidence after the court denied his motion for a trial order of dismissal at theclose of the People's case, and he failed to renew his motion at the close of the proof(see People v Hines, 97 NY2d 56, 61 [2001], rearg denied 97 NY2d 678[2001]; People v Swail, 19AD3d 1013, 1013 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 759 [2005], deniedupon reconsideration 6 NY3d 853 [2006]). In any event, that contention lacks merit(see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Viewing theevidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of theevidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495).

We reject the further contention of defendant that he was denied effective assistanceof counsel (see generally People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981])." '[I]t is incumbent on defendant to demonstrate the absence of strategic or otherlegitimate explanations' for [defense] counsel's alleged shortcomings" (People vBenevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998], quoting People v Rivera, 71 NY2d705, 709 [1988]). Defendant failed to meet that burden. The alleged instances ofineffective assistance concerning defense counsel's failure to make various objections orto seek curative instructions are "based largely on [defendant's] hindsight disagreementswith . . . trial strategies, and defendant failed to meet his burden ofestablishing the absence of any legitimate explanations for those strategies" (People v Rogers, 70 AD3d1340, 1341 [4th Dept 2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 892 [2010], certdenied 562 US 969 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Whalen, P.J.,Centra, Peradotto, Winslow and Bannister, JJ.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.