People v Light
2020 NY Slip Op 03148 [184 AD3d 904]
June 4, 2020
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 5, 2020


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Iliya J. Light, Appellant.

Craig Meyerson, Peru, for appellant.

Kristy L. Sprague, District Attorney, Elizabethtown (Kathryn M. Moryl of counsel), forrespondent.

Pritzker, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Essex County (Meyer, J.),rendered October 12, 2017, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of criminalpossession of stolen property in the fourth degree, driving while ability impaired by drugs,criminal impersonation in the second degree, reckless driving, reckless endangerment in thesecond degree (three counts) and criminal mischief in the third degree (two counts).

On March 23, 2017, shortly after 6:00 p.m., defendant, under the influence of heroin andoperating a stolen vehicle, engaged police in a high-speed chase on State Route 74 in the Townof Schroon, Essex County, after which he was apprehended and arrested. Thereafter, pursuant tothe terms of a plea agreement, defendant waived indictment and pleaded guilty to a superior courtinformation (hereinafter SCI) charging him with criminal possession of stolen property in thefourth degree, driving while ability impaired by drugs, criminal impersonation in the seconddegree, reckless driving, three counts of reckless endangerment in the second degree and twocounts of criminal mischief in the third degree, further waiving his right to appeal. He wasthereafter sentenced to a prison term of 11/3 to 4 years for his conviction ofcriminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and a consecutive prison term of11/3 to 4 years for his conviction of criminal mischief in the third degree (count 8),as well as other equal and lesser concurrent terms of incarceration. Defendant appeals.

Defendant initially contends that his waiver of indictment is invalid, and, thus, his SCIjurisdictionally defective, because, even when read together as a single document, neither of thetwo forms indicate the approximate time of the subject offenses as required by CPL 195.20.However, where, as here, the approximate time of the offenses is nonelemental and the defendantmakes no argument that he or she lacked notice of the precise crimes for which he or she waivedprosecution by indictment, the omission of such information is a nonjurisdictional defect, and,thus, any challenge with respect thereto is forfeited by a guilty plea (see People v Lang,34 NY3d 545, 568-569 [2019]; People vShindler, 179 AD3d 1306, 1307 [2020]; People v Elric YY., 179 AD3d 1304, 1305 [2020]). We also notethat, here, the approximate time of the offenses is readily ascertainable from the local courtaccusatory instruments (see People v Lang, 34 NY3d at 569-570).

Defendant further contends that his waiver of indictment is invalid because the Essex CountyDistrict Attorney did not sign defendant's written waiver of indictment. Although CPL 195.20plainly requires that a district attorney's consent be endorsed on a defendant's written waiver ofindictment, again, defendant's claim is only reviewable as of right if the alleged omission rendersthe SCI jurisdictionally defective (seegenerally People v Myers, 32 NY3d 18, 21 n 1 [2018]; People v Boston, 75NY2d 585, 587 [1990]). Here, the record contains a copy of defendant's written waiver ofindictment, which, although signed by defendant in open court in the presence of counsel, revealsa blank signature line intended for the District Attorney's endorsement. However, the record alsoreveals that an order approving that waiver was entered by County Court thereafter (seeCPL 195.30), and, therein, the court expressly found, among other things, that the waiver wasconsented to by the District Attorney (see CPL 195.10 [1] [c]). Under thesecircumstances, we view the absence of the District Attorney's endorsement on the written waiverof indictment to be a technical violation of the statute that in no way infringed upon defendant'sright to indictment by a grand jury (cf.People v Pigford, 148 AD3d 1299, 1302 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1085[2017]; see generally NY Const, art I, § 6; compare People v McGregor, 44 AD3d1089, 1090 [2007]; People vDonnelly, 23 AD3d 921, 922 [2005]). Accordingly, by pleading guilty, defendant hassimilarly forfeited this challenge.

Defendant lastly contends that County Court illegally imposed consecutive sentences for hisconvictions of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and criminal mischiefin the third degree (count 8), a claim that survives both his unchallenged waiver of the right toappeal and his guilty plea (see People vParks, 180 AD3d 1109, 1110 n [2020]; People v Guzman-Moore, 144 AD3d 1267, 1268 [2016], lvdenied 29 NY3d 949 [2017]; Peoplev Velazquez, 125 AD3d 1063, 1064 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 993 [2015]),and does not require preservation (seePeople v Nieves, 2 NY3d 310, 315-316 [2004]; People v Jones, 41 AD3d 507, 508 [2007], lv denied 9NY3d 877 [2007]). As relevant here, concurrent sentences must be imposed "for two or moreoffenses committed through a single act" (Penal Law § 70.25 [2]; see People v Rodriguez, 25 NY3d238, 244 [2015]; People vMajor, 143 AD3d 1155, 1159 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1147 [2017]), whereas"trial courts retain consecutive sentence discretion when separate offenses are committed throughseparate acts, though they are part of a single transaction" (People v Brown, 80 NY2d361, 364 [1992]; see Penal Law § 70.25 [1]; People v Ramirez, 89NY2d 444, 450-451 [1996]; People vDunham, 172 AD3d 1462, 1466 [2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 1068 [2019]). ThePeople bear the burden of proving that separate and distinct acts occurred (see People vRodriguez, 25 NY3d at 244; People v Laureano, 87 NY2d 640, 644 [1996]), and,where a defendant has pleaded guilty, the People may rely on the allegations in the accusatoryinstrument and any facts adduced at the plea allocution to meet that burden (see People vLaureano, 87 NY2d at 644; People vThompson, 159 AD3d 1281, 1282-1283 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1008[2018]).

As echoed by defendant during his plea allocution, the SCI establishes that defendant'sconviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree stemmed from hispossession of the subject stolen vehicle (see Penal Law § 165.45 [5]),whereas his conviction of criminal mischief in the third degree (count 8) was based upon himhaving intentionally caused certain damage to a State Police vehicle during the subject policepursuit, albeit while operating that stolen vehicle (see Penal Law § 145.05[2]). Thus, while the foregoing crimes occurred in the course of one continuous criminalincident, the charges arose from separate, distinct acts (see Penal Law§ 15.00 [1]; comparePeople v Borush, 39 AD3d 890, 890 [2007]). County Court's imposition of consecutivesentences with respect to those crimes was therefore not illegal.

Egan Jr., J.P., Mulvey, Aarons and Colangelo, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.


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