Matter of Keil v Greenway Heritage Conservancy for the Hudson Riv.Val., Inc.
2020 NY Slip Op 03580 [184 AD3d 1048]
June 25, 2020
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 5, 2020


[*1]
 In the Matter of Edwin A. Keil et al.,Appellants,
v
Greenway Heritage Conservancy for the Hudson River Valley, Inc., AlsoKnown as Greenway Conservancy for the Hudson River Valley, Inc.,Respondent.

William J. Better, PC, Kinderhook (Joseph D. Clyne of counsel), for appellants.

Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Meredith G. Lee-Clark of counsel), forrespondent.

Mulvey, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Mott, J.), entered May 22, 2019in Columbia County, which dismissed petitioners' application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLRarticle 78, to review a determination of respondent approving a final environmental impactstatement related to the development of a recreational trail.

Respondent, a public benefit corporation, was created "for the preservation and enhancementof the natural and historic resources of the Hudson [R]iver valley" (ECL 44-0111 [1]; see44-0103 [3]), and, in furtherance of that purpose, is required to "designate and develop or causeto be developed" a trail system along the Hudson River (ECL 44-0121 [1]). Pursuant to statute,respondent's trail plans must include "segments that can be restricted to non-motorized use"(ECL 44-0121 [1] [c]). To that end, respondent set out to establish the Albany-Hudson ElectricTrail (hereinafter Trail), a roughly 36-mile stretch of pedestrian and bicycle trail from the City ofRensselaer, Rensselaer County to just north of the City of Hudson, Columbia County, which isplanned to primarily follow a defunct electric trolley bed now used and maintained as a utilitycorridor by National Grid.[FN1] Respondent entered into a license agreementwith National Grid for use of the utility corridor as part of the Trail for the public's recreationaluse.

The proposed Trail includes a section of the utility corridor located in the Town of Stockport,Columbia County that abuts properties owned by the individual petitioners, and where petitionerGlencadia Farm, Ltd. has an express easement across the corridor. Respondent released a draftconcept plan for the Trail in August 2017 and, thereafter, began conducting various outreachinitiatives to engage with and inform the public about the Trail, including a website, publicmeetings, mailings to roughly 1,300 affected property owners and in-person meetings with morethan 75 property owners. In January 2018, respondent released a final concept plan. That samemonth, pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8[hereinafter SEQRA]; see also 6 NYCRR part 617), respondent released a draftenvironmental impact statement (hereinafter DEIS) for a 60-day public comment period. InSeptember 2018, respondent issued its final environmental impact statement (hereinafter FEIS)for the Trail project after a 30-day public comment period, finding that any adverseenvironmental impacts by the project would be adequately avoided or minimized by themitigation measures proposed. Respondent applied to the US Army Corps of Engineers(hereinafter the Corps) and the Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC) forpermits related to the adverse impacts and mitigation to wetlands associated with thedevelopment of the Trail, and the FEIS states that it is subject to these permitapprovals.[FN2]

Petitioners commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding, alleging that respondent failed tocomply with SEQRA and, thus, that respondent's determination approving the FEIS should beannulled. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding that respondent complied with SEQRA.Petitioners appeal.

We conclude that petitioners did not preserve for our review their argument concerning theCode of the Town of Stockport (hereinafter the zoning code), as they failed to include theirpresent argument in the petition and it was thus never presented to Supreme Court (see Matter of Rovinsky v Zucker, 167AD3d 122, 125 n 2 [2018]). As limited by the petition, Supreme Court addressed onlywhether respondent was bound by the zoning code, yet petitioners explicitly state in theirappellate brief that the issue of whether respondent was bound by the zoning code is not arguedon this appeal and will instead be addressed in a "separate action." Rather, petitioners now arguethat respondent committed an error of law by failing to consider the environmental implicationsof the zoning code, regardless of whether respondent was subject to it. We will not address thisunpreserved issue.

Pursuant to SEQRA, any development project "that requires state agency approval,. . . [and] 'which may have a significant effect on the environment,' must go througha full SEQRA assessment to make sure that it is undertaken in a way that minimizes damage tothe environment and public health" (Matter of Friends of P.S. 163, Inc. v Jewish Home Lifecare, Manhattan,30 NY3d 416, 424-425 [2017], quoting ECL 8-0109 [1], [2]). In compliance with thesubstantive and procedural requirements of SEQRA and all applicable regulations (seeECL 8-0109 [2]; 6 NYCRR parts 617-618), a lead agency must prepare a DEIS and FEIS to"analyze the environmental impact and any unavoidable adverse environmental effects of theproject under review, as well as alternatives to the proposed action, including a no-actionalternative[,] and mitigation measures" (Matter of Friends of P.S. 163, Inc. v Jewish HomeLifecare, Manhattan, 30 NY3d at 425 [internal quotation marks, ellipses and citationomitted]; see ECL 8-0109 [2] [a]-[d], [f]). Prior to approving the project, the agency mustdraft a Findings Statement that verifies that the agency complied with SEQRA and "provide[s] arationale for the agency's decision" (6 NYCRR 617.11 [c], [d] [3]; see 8-0109 [8]). Thisprocess is meant to " 'insure[ ] that agency decision-makers—enlightened bypublic comment where appropriate—will identify and focus attention on anyenvironmental impact of proposed action, that they will balance those consequences against otherrelevant social and economic considerations, minimize adverse environmental effects to themaximum extent practicable, and then articulate the bases for their choices' " (Matterof Friends of P.S. 163, Inc. v Jewish Home Lifecare, Manhattan, 30 NY3d at 425, quotingMatter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 414-415[1986]).

In reviewing an agency's SEQRA findings, courts accord a lead agency considerabledeference, as "it is not the role of the courts to weigh the desirability of any action or chooseamong alternatives, but to assure that the agency itself has satisfied SEQRA, procedurally andsubstantively" (Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d at 416).Although "[l]iteral compliance with both the letter and spirit of SEQRA is required andsubstantial compliance will not suffice" (Matter of Adirondack Historical Assn. v Village of Lake Placid/Lake PlacidVil., Inc., 161 AD3d 1256, 1258-1259 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted]), "[t]he court's role is not to second-guess the agency's determination" (Matter of Brunner v Town of SchodackPlanning Bd., 178 AD3d 1181, 1183 [2019]). Importantly, a reviewing court must notsubstitute its judgment of the facts and alternatives for that of the agency, and "an agency'sobligation under SEQRA must be viewed in light of a rule of reason, realizing that not everyconceivable environmental impact, mitigating measure or alternative must be identified andaddressed before the substantive dictates of SEQRA are satisfied" (Matter of Village of Ballston Spa v City ofSaratoga Springs, 163 AD3d 1220, 1223 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted]; see Matter of Friends of P.S. 163, Inc. v Jewish Home Lifecare, Manhattan, 30NY3d at 430; Matter of Saratoga LakeProtection & Improvement Dist. v Department of Pub. Works of City of SaratogaSprings, 46 AD3d 979, 985 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 706 [2008]). This Courtis thus "tasked with reviewing the record to determine whether the . . . lead agency. . . identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a hard look at them,and made a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its determination" (Matter of AdirondackHistorical Assn. v Village of Lake Placid/Lake Placid Vil., Inc., 161 AD3d at 1258 [internalquotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Brunner v Town of Schodack PlanningBd., 178 AD3d at 1183). "A determination 'should be annulled only if it is arbitrary,capricious or unsupported by the evidence' " (Matter of Heights of Lansing, LLC v Village of Lansing, 160 AD3d1165, 1166 [2018], quoting Matterof Riverkeeper, Inc. v Planning Bd. of Town of Southeast, 9 NY3d 219, 232 [2007];see Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 570 [1990]).

Respondent identified 63 discrete wetlands located along the proposed Trail, most of whichwere relatively small, lacked direct surface connections to larger bodies of water, had beenhuman-altered and were devoid of standing water. Although respondent's study of the affectedwetlands demonstrated that "[nine] of the 63 wetlands provide wildlife habitat, with the majorityof the wetlands providing groundwater recharge as their primary function[,]" "[m]any of thewetlands showed strong evidence of historically disturbed soils, due to the [s]tudy [a]rea locationon an abandoned trolley bed," and these "past disturbances have resulted in low biodiversity andhigh prevalence of invasive species within wetlands." Ultimately, respondent determined that,"[f]or these reasons, wetlands with functions such as aquatic habitat, wildlife habitat, nutrienttransformation, and erosion control are almost entirely absent from the [s]tudy [a]rea." Tominimize impacts, respondent altered the Trail design to avoid intersecting with wetlands asmuch as possible, including generally locating crossings in previously disturbed areas, at thenarrowest sections of wetlands or along the edges of wetlands where possible.

Where wetlands would be impacted, respondent determined that it could not pursuemitigation measures on site, as the corridor is narrow and contains the Trail as well as NationalGrid's utility infrastructure. To remedy the effects on approximately two aggregate acres ofwetlands that would be impacted along the 36-mile Trail, respondent proposed a wetlandmitigation project at Schodack Island State Park, which is within the same watershed as the Trailand equidistant from most points on the Trail. Respondent determined that the mitigation projectwould "create freshwater tidal wetlands, an ecologically rare wetland type that is a conservationpriority for New York State" and that, "[b]ecause the [mitigation] project involves restoring anarea that was once wetland (rather than creating an artificial wetland in an upland area), [it] willcreate high-value wetlands providing significant ecological, habitat, and flood mitigationservices." Respondent then began the wetlands permitting process with DEC and the Corps,which included extensive studies on the mitigation project and precise location of the wetlands tobe created. According to the FEIS, respondent planned for "[t]he exact acreage and design of thewetland mitigation project [within the State Park to] be finalized through a permit issued by the[Corps]," which has wetland permitting authority.

The record reflects that respondent identified wetlands to be affected by the Trail project,conducted an extensive study of the wetlands and their respective environmental values,formulated a mitigation plan and explained the benefits of that plan. Thus, respondent took ahard look at the environmental impact of the Trail upon affected wetlands and devised amitigation plan in accordance with SEQRA requirements (see ECL 8-0109; Matter ofBrunner v Town of Schodack Planning Bd., 178 AD3d at 1183-1184). Furthermore,respondent did not improperly delegate its SEQRA responsibilities regarding wetlands to DEC orthe Corps, as respondent provided a mitigation plan but reasonably recognized that it could notbe finalized until DEC and the Corps issued their approvals, which would necessarily come afterthe SEQRA process was completed (seeMatter of Mombaccus Excavating, Inc. v Town of Rochester, N.Y., 89 AD3d 1209,1212 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 808 [2012]; compare Matter of Penfield PanoramaArea Community v Town of Penfield Planning Bd., 253 AD2d 342, 349-350 [1999]).

In compliance with SEQRA, respondent rationally selected its chosen route for the Trail afterconsidering and evaluating alternatives. SEQRA requires lead agencies to "act and choosealternatives which, consistent with social, economic and other essential considerations, to themaximum extent practicable, minimize or avoid adverse environmental effects, including effectsrevealed in the environmental impact statement process" (ECL 8-0109 [1]; see Akpan vKoch, 75 NY2d at 570; Matter ofTown of Amsterdam v Amsterdam Indus. Dev. Agency, 95 AD3d 1539, 1542-1543[2012]). To that end, an agency's FEIS must provide "[t]he description and evaluation of eachalternative . . . at a level of detail sufficient to permit a comparative assessment ofthe alternatives discussed," including a no-action alternative (6 NYCRR 617.9 [b] [5] [v]). "Tobe meaningful, any choice among alternatives must be based on an awareness of all reasonableoptions, but the degree of detail required in assessing those alternatives will vary with thecircumstances and nature of each proposal. A rule of reason applies: the agency must consider areasonable range of alternatives to the specific project" (Matter of Town of Dryden vTompkins County Bd. of Representatives, 78 NY2d 331, 333-334 [1991] [citationsomitted]). "[A]gencies have considerable latitude evaluating environmental effects and choosingbetween alternative measures" (Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d at 570; see ECL 8-0109[8]; Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d at 417), and"disagree[ment] with the alternative chosen by the [agency] does not prove that the [agency] didnot take the requisite 'hard look' " (Matter of Morse v Town of Gardiner PlanningBd., 164 AD2d 336, 340 [1990]). "Where it appears . . . that there has been sucha reasonable consideration of alternatives, the judicial inquiry is at an end" (Matter of Townof Dryden v Tompkins County Bd. of Representatives, 78 NY2d at 334 [citationomitted]).

Petitioners contend that respondent failed to adequately consider an alternative path thatwould have diverted the Trail to County Route 25/25A for a few miles instead of following theportion of the utility corridor that abuts their properties. As part of its selection process,respondent engaged extensively with the public regarding the Trail, including its implicationsand alternatives, by offering several public comment periods, holding several public informationand comment sessions, and receiving and addressing hundreds of written comments on thematter. In response to comments, including some from petitioners, respondent evaluated severalalternative routes for the Trail in the area of petitioners' properties. Respondent's analysis reflectsthat the segment of County Route 25 that could potentially replace the use of the utility corridoradjacent to petitioners' properties is not conducive to pedestrian and bicycle traffic, as it consistsof narrow lanes with minimal or no shoulders and no sidewalks or other pedestrianaccommodations, including a single-lane bridge with elements noncompliant with the Americanswith Disabilities Act. Photographs included in the FEIS show that the space adjacent to therelevant section of roadway is encumbered with structures and signage and utility poles, amongother things, rendering the creation of safe travel space for pedestrians and bicyclists verydifficult. Moreover, most of the relevant segment has a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit, whichrespondent found would be complex to change. In contrast, respondent concluded that use of theutility corridor adjacent to petitioners' respective properties, as proposed, "pose[d no] specialengineering challenges" and would better serve the projects' safety and recreational goals.Respondent also relied upon the report of a consulting firm that evaluated various roadways foruse as the Trail and recommended the use of the utility corridor adjacent to petitioners' propertiesfor that segment of the Trail, after examining four alternatives.

Petitioners argue that their proposed alternative was preferable and that respondent actedirrationally by rejecting it, considering that the proposed Trail does include a short on-roadsegment on County Route 25 located south of petitioners' properties. However, that segment waslocated on-road due to engineering and other complications associated with the utility corridorparallel to that segment, including that three railroad bridges had been removed from the corridorand costs to rebuild them would be prohibitive, as well as title issues in the avoided portion ofthe corridor and the construction of a residence therein. In contrast, these concerns were notpresent along the utility corridor adjacent to petitioners' properties, and respondent demonstratedthat the use of the nearby segment of County Route 25 would present safety concerns forpedestrians and bicyclists. Additionally, the on-road portion was added in a location where thespeed limit is 30 miles per hour, as opposed to petitioners' proposal in a 55-mile-per-hoursegment. As petitioners note, their proposed alternative would result in the disruption of fewerwetland areas, among other benefits. However, as the record demonstrates that respondentconsidered that alternative and rationally determined that the use of the utility corridor adjacentto petitioners' properties provided the best option for the Trail in consideration of theabove-described safety, cost and environmental factors and the Trail's purpose to providesegments of non-motorized use by the public, we will not disturb that determination (seeMatter of Town of Dryden v Tompkins County Bd. of Representatives, 78 NY2d at 333-334;Matter of Saratoga Lake Protection & Improvement Dist. v Department of Pub. Worksof City of Saratoga Springs, 46 AD3d at 987-988).

Egan Jr., J.P., Aarons, Pritzker and Colangelo, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:The Trail will connect with othertrails at both ends, to become part of the 750-mile-long Empire State Trail.

Footnote 2:According to respondent, thepermits have been granted.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.