| Matter of Village of Ballston Spa v City of Saratoga Springs |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 05248 [163 AD3d 1220] |
| July 12, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Village of Ballston Spa et al.,Petitioners, v City of Saratoga Springs et al., Respondents. |
Harris Beach PLLC, Albany (John A. Mancuso of counsel), for petitioners.
Miller, Mannix, Schachner & Hafner, LLC, Glens Falls (Mark Schachner of counsel),for respondents.
McCarthy, J.P. Proceeding initiated in this Court pursuant to EDPL 207 to review adetermination of respondent City of Saratoga Springs, among other things, condemning portionsof petitioners' property.
For several years, respondents City of Saratoga Springs and City Council of the City ofSaratoga Springs (hereinafter collectively referred to as the City) have been contemplatinginstalling a continuous nonmotorized trail to improve pedestrian and bicycle travel along GeyserRoad. The City developed designs for three projects, collectively known as the Geyser Road TrailProject (hereinafter the project), to meet its goal. The project would require the City to acquire astrip of land along Geyser Road for the paved trail, buffer areas, grading and drainage. Initially,the City incorrectly classified the project as an unlisted action, prepared a short environmentalassessment form (hereinafter EAF) and adopted a negative declaration indicating that the projectwould not have a significant adverse impact. After properly classifying the project as a type Iaction, the City undertook a more comprehensive review under the State Environmental QualityReview Act (see ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]), completing parts 1 and 2 of a fullEAF. During the process, petitioners, who own or live on property along Geyser Road that iswithin the area of the project, advised the City of their concerns regarding the project's [*2]potential environmental impacts and their objections to thecondemnation of portions of their property pursuant to eminent domain. Specifically, petitionerVillage of Ballston Spa complained that its water supply would be affected or at risk if the Citycondemned portions of two parcels owned by the Village that are located in the city.
Notwithstanding petitioners' objections and concerns, in July 2017, the City adopted aresolution that the project will not have any significant adverse environmental impact and issueda negative declaration for the project. After one of the petitioners raised alleged deficiencies inthe City's SEQRA review, in September 2017, the City adopted a supplemental resolutionratifying its SEQRA negative declaration, as well as a determination and findings under theEminent Domain Procedure Law (see EDPL 204). Petitioners commenced thisproceeding in this Court challenging the City's SEQRA determinations and proposedcondemnation of portions of petitioners' property for the project (see EDPL 207). Weconfirm.
The prior public use doctrine does not bar the City from condemning a portion of realproperty owned by the Village. That doctrine provides that, " 'where lands have oncebeen taken or acquired for public use, they cannot be taken for another public use, at least if suchother public use would interfere with or destroy the public use first acquired, unless the intentionof the Legislature that such lands should be so taken is shown by express terms or necessaryimplication' " (Matter of Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. ofAlbany-Schoharie-Schenectady-Saratoga Counties v Town of Colonie, 268 AD2d 838,841-842 [2000], quoting New York Cent. & Hudson Riv. R.R. Co. v City ofBuffalo, 200 NY 113, 117-118 [1910]; see Westchester Cr. Corp. v New York CitySchool Constr. Auth., 286 AD2d 154, 158 [2001] [public land should not be taken for adifferent public use absent a special and unusual reason], affd 98 NY2d 298 [2002]).Petitioners allege that the Village's property at issue is devoted to another public use because: it"contains an aquifer that acts as a water source to Village residents"; two of the Village's waterproduction wells "are located on land adjacent to the proposed trail"; "the Village's back up watersource, an open and above ground reservoir, is located [approximately] 1,500 feet from theproposed trail"; and trunk lines connected to the Village's reservoir are located underneath theproposed trail and flow from the reservoir to the Village. Petitioners further allege that theyraised concerns with the City about trail users accessing the reservoir and contaminating theVillage's water supply.
Providing water to residents is undoubtedly a public use. However, petitioners have notestablished that the Village's property is devoted to that use. Nothing in the record provespetitioners' bare allegation that trunk lines connected to the Village's reservoir are locatedunderneath the proposed trail. It appears that the Village's water production wells and reservoirare located adjacent to, not on, the property at issue, and petitioners have failed to demonstratehow the City's condemnation of the Village's property would "interfere with or destroy the publicuse" (Matter of Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Albany-Schoharie-Schenectady-SaratogaCounties v Town of Colonie, 268 AD2d at 841-842 [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]). Accordingly, the prior public use doctrine will not prevent the City from condemningthe Village's property.
Furthermore, the City complied with SEQRA's procedural requirements. A lead agency muststrictly comply with SEQRA's mandates (see Matter of New York City Coalition to End LeadPoisoning v Vallone, 100 NY2d 337, 348 [2003]). "SEQRA requires an [environmentalimpact statement (hereinafter EIS)] when an agency action 'may have a significant effect on theenvironment,' and such an impact is presumed to be likely where, as here, a type I action is [*3]involved; however, a type I action does not, per se, necessitate thefiling of an EIS" (Matter of Gabrielli vTown of New Paltz, 116 AD3d 1315, 1316 [2014] [internal quotation marks, bracketsand citations omitted], quoting ECL 8-0109 [2]; see 6 NYCRR 617.4 [a] [1]; Matter of Troy Sand & Gravel Co.,Inc. v Town of Nassau, 82 AD3d 1377, 1378 [2011]). "A negative declaration may beissued, obviating the need for an EIS, if the lead agency . . . determines that 'noadverse environmental impacts [will result] or that the identified adverse environmental impactswill not be significant' " (Matter of Gabrielli v Town of New Paltz, 116 AD3d at1316, quoting 6 NYCRR 617.7 [a] [2]; see Matter of New York City Coalition to End LeadPoisoning v Vallone, 100 NY2d at 347). The lead agency's determination of significancemust be in writing, contain "a reasoned elaboration" and provide "reference to any supportingdocumentation" (6 NYCRR 617.7 [b] [4]; see generally Matter of Jackson v New York StateUrban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 417 [1986]).
"Upon judicial review, [a court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the [leadagency], and may annul its decision 'only if it is arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by theevidence' " (Matter of Gabrielli v Town of New Paltz, 116 AD3d at 1316,quoting Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. vPlanning Bd. of Town of Southeast, 9 NY3d 219, 232 [2007]). "The court's function isto assure that the agency has satisfied SEQRA, procedurally and substantively, not to evaluatedata de novo, weigh the desirability of any particular action, choose among alternatives orotherwise substitute its judgment for that of the agency" (Matter of Town of Amsterdam v Amsterdam Indus. Dev. Agency, 95AD3d 1539, 1543 [2012] [citation omitted]; see Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 570[1990]). Moreover, "an agency's obligation under SEQRA must be viewed in light of a rule ofreason, realizing that not every conceivable environmental impact, mitigating measure oralternative must be identified and addressed before the substantive dictates of SEQRA aresatisfied" (Matter of Gabrielli v Town of New Paltz, 116 AD3d at 1318 [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]). The relevant inquiry is "whether the agency identified therelevant areas of environmental concern, took a hard look at them, and made a reasonedelaboration of the basis for its determination" (Matter of Jackson v New York State UrbanDev. Corp., 67 NY2d at 417 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
The City completed parts 1 and 2 of the EAF and was not required to complete part 3. TheEAF form directs that part 3 must be completed "for every question in [p]art 2 where the impacthas been identified as potentially moderate to large or where there is a need to explain why aparticular element of the proposed action will not, or may, result in a significant adverseenvironmental impact" (6 NYCRR 617.20, Appendix A, part 3). None of the impacts wereidentified as potentially moderate or large, and the City had discretion to determine whether therewas a need to explain why any particular aspect of the project will not have a significant adverseimpact on the environment. Thus, although the City could have completed part 3 of the EAF, itwas not required to do so (see Matter of Gabrielli v Town of New Paltz, 116 AD3d at1317).
Nevertheless, the City was required to provide a written "reasoned elaboration" for itsnegative declaration (6 NYCRR 617.7 [b] [4]). The July 2017 resolution containing the negativedeclaration did not contain sufficient information to explain the basis for the City'sdetermination. The September 2017 supplemental resolution—which reaffirmed thenegative declaration and provided more information regarding the basis for thatdetermination—specifically addressed each question in part 2 of the EAF in which thepotential for a small impact was identified and explained the City's reasoning in determining thatthe project would not result in any significant adverse environmental impacts. Although thesupplemental resolution contains a reasoned elaboration, the parties dispute whether thesupplemental [*4]resolution was permitted under SEQRA.
The purpose of 6 NYCRR 617.7 (b) (4), the regulation that requires a reasoned elaboration ofa determination of significance, "is to focus and facilitate judicial review and . . . toprovide affected landowners and residents with a clear, written explanation of the lead agency'sreasoning at the time the negative declaration is made" (Matter of Dawley v Whitetail 414, LLC, 130 AD3d 1570, 1571[2015]; accord Matter of RochesterEastside Residents for Appropriate Dev., Inc. v City of Rochester, 150 AD3d 1678,1680 [2017]; see Glen Head-Glenwood Landing Civic Council v Town of Oyster Bay, 88AD2d 484, 492 [1982]). Courts have held that documents containing the lead agency's reasoningand rationale, but prepared subsequent to the issuance of a negative declaration, cannot fulfill themandate for a reasoned elaboration (see e.g. Matter of Rochester Eastside Residents forAppropriate Dev., Inc. v City of Rochester, 150 AD3d at 1680; Matter of Dawley vWhitetail 414, LLC, 130 AD3d at 1570-1571). However, one of those courts found it notablethat, in the particular case under review, the document that was subsequently attached to thenegative declaration had not been provided to the lead agency until after its members had votedto approve the negative declaration, and the record there established that the lead agency hadnever officially adopted the attachment as part of its negative declaration (see Matter ofDawley v Whitetail 414, LLC, 130 AD3d at 1571).
In contrast, here the City did consider and adopt the supplemental resolution, in which theCity also reaffirmed its determination that the project would have no significant environmentalimpact (compare id.). Notably, this is not a situation where the lead agency originallydeclined to consider certain areas of potential environmental concern and later issued a revisednegative declaration to cure the omission without conducting a new review (compare Matterof Golten Mar. Co. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 193 AD2d 742, 743[1993]). Rather, the City actually performed the steps required in the SEQRA review process andconsidered areas of potential environmental concern, but failed to provide an adequate writtenexplanation for its negative declaration. Upon realizing its mistake (albeit after receivingcommunications from petitioners complaining about the negative declaration), and beforeapproving the condemnation of property in relation to the project, the City held a public meetingand formally adopted the supplemental resolution to remedy the defects in the July 2017 negativedeclaration (compare Matter of PittsfordCanalside Props., LLC v Village of Pittsford, 137 AD3d 1566, 1568 [2016][municipality had no authority to rescind negative declaration after it approved the underlyingproject], lv dismissed 27 NY3d 1080 [2016]; Vitiello v City of Yonkers, 255AD2d 506, 507 [1998] [resolution authorizing negative declaration was passed two months aftermunicipality adopted rezoning ordinance]). Under the circumstances, remittal to the City forfurther environmental review or explanation of its determination would be redundant (seeMatter of King v Saratoga County Bd. of Supervisors, 89 NY2d 341, 349-350 [1996]).
Petitioners contend that the City could not change its July 2017 negative declaration unless itcomplied with the regulatory provision governing amendments to a negative declaration(see 6 NYCRR 617.7 [e]). Pursuant to the relevant subdivision of the pertinentregulation, a lead agency may, in its discretion, amend a negative declaration when substantiveproject changes are proposed, new information is discovered or changes in circumstances relatedto the project arise that were not previously considered, and the lead agency has determined "thatno significant adverse environmental impacts will occur" (6 NYCRR 617.7 [e] [1] [iii]; seeBoyles v Town Bd. of Town of Bethlehem, 278 AD2d 688, 691 [2000]). The nextsubdivision states that a lead agency "must rescind a negative declaration" in any of those samesituations if the agency "determines that a significant adverse environmental impact may result"(6 NYCRR 617.7 [f] [1] [iii]; see Matter[*5]of Global Cos. LLC v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation, 155 AD3d 93, 98 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 913 [2018]).
Rather than constituting an exhaustive list of situations in which an agency may make anychanges to a negative declaration, in our view 6 NYCRR 617.7 (e) and (f) were intended toprescribe how a lead agency should or must respond when confronted with those listed situations.Thus, although we agree that none of the bases for amendment listed in the regulation wereraised here, that did not preclude the City from adopting the supplemental resolution. To holdotherwise would prevent a lead agency from ever correcting a mistake in a negative declarationunless one of the listed situations existed, and would require annulment of determinations andremittal for the agency to approve a "new" determination that often will be the same as theagency's revised determination; we reject an interpretation that elevates form over substance.Furthermore, considering the EAF, the supplemental resolution and the remainder of the record,we conclude that the City "identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a hardlook at them, and made a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its determination" (Matter ofJackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d at 417 [internal quotation marks andcitation omitted]).
The City did not abuse its discretion in determining the scope of the proposed taking.Although a municipality cannot use the power of eminent domain to take " 'property notnecessary to fulfill [a] public purpose, it is generally accepted that the condemnor has broaddiscretion in deciding what land is necessary to fulfill that purpose' " (Matter of Doyle v Schuylerville Cent.School Dist., 35 AD3d 1058, 1059 [2006], lv denied 9 NY3d 804 [2007],quoting Matter of Rafferty v Town of Colonie, 300 AD2d 719, 723 [2002]; accord Matter of Eisenhauer v County ofJefferson, 122 AD3d 1312, 1313 [2014]). "In this regard, a condemnor is not limited toan easement when it acquires property for a legitimate public purpose" (Matter of Doyle vSchuylerville Cent. School Dist., 35 AD3d at 1059; see Matter of City of New York [Third Water Tunnel, Shaft 30B], 18AD3d 342, 343 [2005], affd 6 NY3d 540 [2006]). The City proposed to take feeownership of a small strip of land along Geyser Road, including a strip on each petitioner'sproperty, that will eventually contain up to a three-foot wide portion of the trail—with therest of the trail constructed in the right-of-way to Geyser Road—as well as a buffer areaand land for grading, drainage and the extension of an existing culvert. Because the trail will beopen for continuous use for recreational purposes by all members of the public, the City did notexceed its discretion by seeking fee title rather than an easement (see Matter of Doyle vSchuylerville Cent. School Dist., 35 AD3d at 1059; compare Matter of Davis Holding Co., LLC v Village of Margaretville,55 AD3d 1101, 1104-1105 [2008]).
Egan Jr., Lynch, Clark and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.