People v Grant
2020 NY Slip Op 03674 [185 AD3d 608]
July 1, 2020
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, September 2, 2020


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Madi Grant, Appellant.

Steven A. Feldman, Uniondale, NY (Arza Feldman of counsel), for appellant.

Madeline Singas, District Attorney, Mineola, NY (Yael V. Levy, Kevin C. King, andSarah S. Rabinowitz of counsel), for respondent.

Motion by the respondent for leave to reargue an appeal from a judgment of the SupremeCourt, Nassau County, rendered August 11, 2017, which was determined by decision and orderof this Court dated December 11, 2019.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, itis

Ordered that the motion is granted, and upon reargument, the decision and order of this Courtdated December 11, 2019 (People vGrant, 178 AD3d 850 [2019]), is recalled and vacated, and the following decision andorder is substituted therefor:

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Robert A.McDonald, J.), rendered August 11, 2017, convicting him of manslaughter in the second degree,vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, leaving the scene of an incident without reporting,operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, operating a motor vehicle whileability impaired by a combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs,aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, arson in the third degree,and conspiracy in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence, including adirection that the defendant make restitution in the sum of $39,374.75.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, (1) by vacating the provision thereofdirecting the defendant to make restitution in the sum of $39,374.75 and substituting therefor aprovision directing the defendant to make restitution to the Crime Victims Board for thefamily of Sherman Richardson in the sum of $15,000 and to Enterprise Rent-A-Car in the sum of$3,374.75, and (2) by vacating the provision thereof directing payment of the mandatorysurcharge by civil judgment and substituting therefor a provision directing payment of themandatory surcharge pursuant to Penal Law § 60.35 (5); as so modified, thejudgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt isunpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484,492 [2008]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution(see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient toestablish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon our independentreview pursuant to CPL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against theweight of the evidence (see People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633, 643-644 [2006]).

The defendant's contention that his historical cell site location information should have beensuppressed because it was purportedly obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rightsunder Carpenter v United States (585 US &mdash, 138 S Ct 2206 [2018]) is unpreservedfor appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, the court order authorizing theacquisition of the records made an express finding of probable cause, which was supported by thePeople's evidentiary showing (see People v Freitag, 148 AD2d 544, 545 [1989]).Accordingly, the order " 'was effectively a warrant' which complied with the requirementof Carpenter" (People vClark, 171 AD3d 942, 943 [2019], quoting People v Sorrentino, 93 AD3d 450, 451 [2012]; see People v Cutts, 62 Misc 3d411, 415 [Sup Ct, NY County 2018]).

However, the amount of restitution payable to the Crime Victims Board for the family ofSherman Richardson improperly exceeds $15,000 and violates the statutory cap in Penal Law§ 60.27 (5) (a). Penal Law § 60.27 (5) (a) provides that, except withthe consent of the defendant or in instances where restitution is ordered as a condition ofprobation or conditional discharge, "the amount of restitution or reparation required by the courtshall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars in the case of a conviction for a felony" (see Peoplev Horne, 97 NY2d 404, 414 [2002]). This provision is qualified by Penal Law§ 60.27 (5) (b), which allows a court to order restitution in excess of this amount aslong as the sum is "limited to the return of the victim's property, including money, or theequivalent value thereof" (see People v Horne, 97 NY2d at 414). As for therestitution payable to the Crime Victims Board for Richardson's family, the amount in excess of$15,000 did not meet the requirements of Penal Law § 60.27 (5), since the amountof the defendant's restitution set by the Supreme Court was not intended as reimbursement for thevalue of the property destroyed. However, restitution in the sum of $3,374.75 to EnterpriseRent-A-Car, the owner of the vehicle operated by the defendant and later set on fire, was proper(see People v Horne, 97 NY2d at 414; People v Hall-Wilson, 69 NY2d 154 [1987]).

In addition, the Supreme Court, at sentencing, should not have directed payment of themandatory surcharge by civil judgment (see Penal Law § 60.35 [5]; People v Jones, 26 NY3d 730, 732[2016]).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Cohen, Barros andConnolly, JJ., concur.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.