People v Pratt
2020 NY Slip Op 04662 [186 AD3d 1055]
August 20, 2020
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, September 30, 2020


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Appellant,
v
Austin Pratt, Respondent.

William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Kenneth H. Tyler, Jr., of counsel), forappellant.

Jeffrey R. Parry, Fayetteville, for defendant-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Onondaga County Court (Stephen J. Dougherty, J.), dated May29, 2019. The order granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law, themotion is denied, the indictment is reinstated and the matter is remitted to Onondaga CountyCourt for further proceedings on the indictment.

Memorandum: The People appeal from an order granting defendant's motion to dismiss theindictment on statutory speedy trial grounds. Defendant was arrested on June 20, 2018, after hisex-girlfriend alleged that she had received an Instagram message that included photographs ofdefendant engaging in sexual acts with the ex-girlfriend's 10-year-old sister (victim). The victimconfirmed that the photographs were of herself and defendant. On September 7, 2018, defendantwas indicted on charges of predatory sexual assault against a child (Penal Law§ 130.96); criminal sexual act in the first degree (§ 130.50 [3]); threecounts each of use of a child in a sexual performance (§ 263.05), promoting asexual performance by a child (§ 263.15), and possessing a sexual performance by achild (§ 263.16); and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child(§ 260.10 [1]). On September 13, 2018, defendant was arraigned on the indictmentand the People declared their readiness for trial.

Trial was scheduled to commence on May 7, 2019. On May 1, 2019, however, the Peoplewithdrew their statement of readiness for trial, stating that new evidence had been discovered thatrequired further investigation because it might contain exculpatory information. Defendantthereafter moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, and County Court granted themotion. The court determined that the purported new evidence had been in the People'spossession for the majority of the postreadiness period, and that the People's failure to properlyinspect the evidence in their possession until the week before trial amounted to a lack of ordinarydiligence. The court therefore held that the People's original statement of readiness was illusory,and the court charged the People with the entire postreadiness period. We reverse the order, denythe motion, and reinstate the indictment.

"Where, as here, a felony is included in an indictment, the People must be ready for trialwithin six months, after subtracting excludable time" (People v Barden, 27 NY3d 550, 553 [2016]; see CPL 30.30[1] [a]). "The statutory period is calculated by 'computing the time elapsed between the filing ofthe first accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periodsof delay that are excludable under the terms of the statute and then adding to the result anypostreadiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People and are ineligible forexclusion' " (People vBarnett, 158 AD3d 1279, 1280 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1078[2018], quoting People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 208 [1992]).

There are two elements to readiness for trial: (1) " 'a statement of readiness by theprosecutor in open court, . . . or a written notice of readiness' "; and (2) "thePeople must in fact be ready to proceed at the time they declare readiness" (People vChavis, 91 NY2d 500, 505 [1998]; see People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 [1985])."The statute contemplates an indication of present readiness, not a prediction or expectation offuture readiness" (Kendzia, 64 NY2d at 337). Thus, "[a] statement of readiness at a timewhen the People are not actually ready is illusory and insufficient to stop the running of thespeedy trial clock" (People v England, 84 NY2d 1, 4 [1994], rearg denied 84NY2d 846 [1994]).

There is no dispute that the People were chargeable with an 85-day delay prior to announcingtheir readiness for trial on September 13, 2018. The People contend only that the court erred infinding that the entirety of the postreadiness time period was chargeable to them. We agree withthe People, and conclude that "the total delay that resulted was less than six months, and thusdefendant's statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated" (People v Bastian, 83 AD3d 1468, 1470 [4th Dept 2011], lvdenied 17 NY3d 813 [2011]).

Defendant failed to establish that the People were not ready for trial on September 13, 2018,and the People's subsequent withdrawal of their statement of readiness did not render theiroriginal statement illusory (see People vSmith, 66 AD3d 1223, 1224-1225 [3d Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 773[2010]). Defendant acknowledged, at oral argument on the motion, that he was not aware of whatevidence the People possessed at the time they announced readiness for trial, and he thereforecould not say whether the People were actually ready at that time. "In the absence of proof that[a] readiness statement did not accurately reflect the People's position . . . , thePeople [have] discharged their duty under CPL 30.30" (People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795,799 [1998]).

Furthermore, although defendant contends that the People had the relevant evidence in theirpossession in October 2018 and thus, as of that date, the People were not truly ready for trial andshould be chargeable for any delay occurring thereafter, the record establishes that the Peoplewere prepared to proceed to trial until the week before trial, when the prosecutor discovered thatthere may be evidence that would be exculpatory. " '[P]ostreadiness delay may becharge[able] to the People when the delay is attributable to their inaction and directly implicatestheir ability to proceed to trial' " (People v Fulmer, 87 AD3d 1385, 1385 [4th Dept 2011], lvdenied 18 NY3d 994 [2012], quoting Carter, 91 NY2d at 799).

The record shows that the People were not aware until April 30, 2019 that mistakes by policedetectives had incorrectly led them to conclude that they could not locate the user of theInstagram account that had been used to send the photographs of defendant engaging in sexualacts with the victim to defendant's ex-girlfriend. While we agree with the court that the People'slate realization was entirely due to the People's failure to properly inspect the evidence withintheir possession, the time chargeable to the People is only the delay that is directly attributable totheir inaction, and that which directly implicated their ability to proceed to trial (seeFulmer, 87 AD3d at 1385). Thus, the delay that is chargeable to the People due to theirinaction with respect to the photographs is any additional time that they required to investigatethe matter, which they could have previously investigated. Moreover, the People's need to furtherinvestigate the photographs did not render their prior statement of readiness illusory because therecord shows that, at the time they announced their readiness, the People would have been able toestablish a prima facie case and proceed at trial (see People v Hewitt, 144 AD3d 1607, 1607-1608 [4th Dept 2016],lv denied 28 NY3d 1185 [2017];People v Rouse, 4 AD3d 553, 556 [3d Dept 2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 805[2004]).

Ultimately, because defendant moved to dismiss the indictment nine days after the Peoplewithdrew their statement of readiness, that time period is, at present, the only time that couldhave been chargeable to the People as a result of their request for an adjournment. Thus, weconclude that the court erred in granting the motion because the 94-day period of delayattributable to the People did not exceed six months and thereby did not violate defendant's rightto a speedy trial (see Bastian, 83 AD3d at 1470). Present—Peradotto, J.P., Carni,Lindley, Curran and Troutman, JJ.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.