| People v Anderson |
| 2020 NY Slip Op 06881 [188 AD3d 1699] |
| November 20, 2020 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Appellant, v Chasarea L. Anderson, Respondent. |
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Scott Myles of counsel), for appellant.
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Drew R. Dubrin of counsel), fordefendant-respondent.
Appeal from an oral order of the Monroe County Court (Sam L. Valleriani, J.), datedFebruary 20, 2019. The oral order dismissed the indictment.
It is hereby ordered that the oral order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law,those parts of the omnibus motion and the supplemental motion seeking to dismiss theindictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 based on a delay in prosecution during the period from July14, 2017, to February 12, 2018 are denied, the indictment is reinstated and the matter is remittedto Monroe County Court for further proceedings on the indictment.
Memorandum: The People appeal from an oral order (see generally People v Elmer, 19 NY3d 501, 507-508 [2012])granting defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds(see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]). Defendant was indicted by a sealed indictment on July 14, 2017.He was ultimately apprehended in Georgia on September 7, 2018, and arraigned on September27, 2018, at which time the People announced their readiness for trial. In his omnibus motion andsupplemental motion, defendant contended that the People had failed to exercise due diligence inattempting to locate him and, as a result, the periods during which he was absent or unavailablecould not be excluded from speedy trial calculations (see CPL 30.30 [4] [c] [i]). CountyCourt ultimately held a hearing, but limited the evidence to be presented to the time period fromthe indictment through February 12, 2018, i.e., the date that law enforcement officers learned thatdefendant might be residing in Georgia.
There is no dispute that defendant met his initial burden "of alleging that the People were notready for trial within the statutorily prescribed time period" (People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41, 45 [2016]; see CPL 30.30 [1][a]), and that the burden therefore shifted to the People to demonstrate "sufficient excludabletime" (People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 338 [1985]). We agree with the People that thecourt erred in concluding that they failed to establish that the time period at issue at the hearingwas excludable from speedy trial calculations.
In computing the time within which the People must be ready for trial, the court mustexclude, inter alia, the period of delay resulting from defendant's absence (see CPL 30.30[4] [c] [i]). "A defendant must be considered absent whenever his location is unknown and he isattempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution, or his location cannot be determined by duediligence" (id.).
Inasmuch as there is no contention that defendant was attempting to avoid apprehension orprosecution, the issue is whether law enforcement acted with due diligence in attempting tolocate him. Although " '[t]he police are not required to search for a defendantindefinitely, . . . they must exhaust all reasonable investigative leads as to his or herwhereabouts' " (People vWilliams, 137 AD3d 1709, 1710 [4th Dept 2016]). The determination whether lawenforcement exercised due diligence in attempting to locate a defendant is a mixed question oflaw and fact (see People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 78 [1995]; People v Montes, 178 AD3d 1283,1286 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1161 [2020], denied reconsideration 35NY3d 943 [2020]).
Here, we conclude that the People established that they exercised due diligence in attemptingto locate defendant during the time period at issue at the hearing. Law enforcement officersroutinely checked computer databases, social media outlets, criminal history reports andinformation from other government agencies to attempt to identify locations where defendantmight be located. In addition, officers investigated all of the addresses associated with defendantto varying degrees, speaking with maintenance workers, neighbors, tenants, and defendant'smother. In attempting to conduct subsequent interviews with defendant's mother, lawenforcement officers learned that she no longer resided at the same address. Law enforcementofficers also contacted and spoke with all of defendant's known employers. Although lawenforcement officers did not conduct a full investigation of one address that appeared on onecredit agency report, one of the officers testified at the hearing that credit reports were notreliable because "anyone . . . could go apply for a credit card online today and write[any address] on the application." Without any corroboration of defendant's affiliation with thataddress, the officer did not investigate beyond driving to the address and verifying that it was acommercial and retail building. Ultimately, on February 12, 2018, the officers' periodic databasesearches yielded a potential address in Georgia.
"[N]otwithstanding the fact that greater efforts could have been undertaken" (People vGrey, 259 AD2d 246, 249 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 880 [2000]), weconclude that the People established that they exercised the requisite due diligence in attemptingto locate defendant during the time period at issue at the hearing and thus that the period of timefrom July 14, 2017, through February 12, 2018, should be excluded from speedy trialcalculations (see e.g. People vLewis, 177 AD3d 1351, 1352 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1130 [2020],denied reconsideration 35 NY3d 971 [2020]; People v Butler, 148 AD3d 1540, 1541 [4th Dept 2017], lvdenied 29 NY3d 1090 [2017]; People v Petrianni, 24 AD3d 1224, 1224-1225 [4th Dept 2005];cf. Williams, 137 AD3d at 1710-1711; People v Devore, 65 AD3d 695, 697 [2d Dept 2009]; People vDavis, 205 AD2d 697, 699 [2d Dept 1994]).
Although defendant contends that we should nevertheless affirm the oral order on the groundthat other periods of time are not excludable and still exceed the statutorily prescribed timeperiod, we do not address that contention inasmuch as it was "not ruled upon" by the court(People v LaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470, 474 [1998], rearg denied 93 NY2d 849[1999]; see CPL 470.15 [1]; People v Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192, 195 [2011]).
We therefore reverse the oral order, deny those parts of the omnibus motion andsupplemental motion seeking to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 based on a delayin prosecution during the period from July 14, 2017, to February 12, 2018, reinstate theindictment and remit the matter to County Court for further proceedings on the indictment,including further proceedings related to the speedy trial motion, if necessary.Present—Peradotto, J.P., Carni, Curran and Troutman, JJ.