People v Lewis
2019 NY Slip Op 08289 [177 AD3d 1351]
November 15, 2019
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 1, 2020


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Robert D. Lewis, Sr., Appellant.

Leanne Lapp, Public Defender, Canandaigua, D.J. & J.A. Cirando, PLLC,Syracuse (Rebecca L. Konst of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

James B. Ritts, District Attorney, Canandaigua (V. Christopher Eaggleston ofcounsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Ontario County Court (Frederick G. Reed, A.J.),rendered October 26, 2016. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, ofassault in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimouslyaffirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a juryverdict, of assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10 [1]). Theconviction arises from an incident on May 21, 2014, in Geneva, New York, in whichdefendant struck the victim repeatedly with a metal pipe. Defendant fled the scene, andensuing efforts by members of law enforcement to find him proved unsuccessful. Awarrant was issued for defendant's arrest, and he was eventually located in September2015 in Detroit, Michigan. Defendant was then arrested and extradited to New York forprosecution.

Contrary to defendant's contention, County Court properly determined that hisstatutory right to a speedy trial was not violated. Where, as here, a defendant is chargedwith a felony, the People must announce readiness for trial within six months of thecommencement of the action (see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]; People v Cortes, 80NY2d 201, 207 n 3 [1992]). It is undisputed that the criminal action was commenced onMay 22, 2014 with the filing of the felony complaint (see CPL 1.20 [17];People v Osgood, 52 NY2d 37, 43 [1980]). Almost two years later, on February 5,2016, an indictment was filed, at which time the People announced their readiness fortrial. At the hearing on defendant's speedy trial motion, however, the People establishedthat most of the prereadiness delay was excludable (see generally People vBerkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 348-349 [1980]; People v Gushlaw [appeal No. 2],112 AD2d 792, 793 [4th Dept 1985], lv denied 66 NY2d 919 [1985]).

The evidence presented at the hearing established that, following the assault,members of law enforcement exhausted all investigative leads and made extensive effortsto find defendant prior to his apprehension in Michigan. The police searched fordefendant at his last known address and other associated addresses in Ontario County,New York; Rochester, New York; Illinois; and Indiana. They also intervieweddefendant's family members, friends and acquaintances; engaged fellow members of lawenforcement from other jurisdictions to assist in the search; maintained periodic contactwith defendant's children; searched local and national databases periodically for updatedinformation on defendant's whereabouts; and monitored Facebook pages of defendant'sfamily members and associates in an effort to find him. Meanwhile, defendant, who hadbeen released from parole supervision a few months prior to the assault, was admittedlyaware that the police were looking for him.

" 'The police are not required to search for a defendant indefinitely' "(People v Williams, 137AD3d 1709, 1710 [4th Dept 2016]; see People v Butler, 148 AD3d 1540, 1541 [4th Dept2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1090 [2017]) and, even assuming, arguendo, that thePeople failed to establish due diligence in locating defendant, the law does not impose adue diligence obligation where, as here, the People establish that a defendant's "locationis unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution" (CPL 30.30 [4][c] [i]; see People v Torres, 88 NY2d 928, 931 [1996]; People v Devore, 65 AD3d695, 696 [2d Dept 2009]). Thus, the period of time from May 22, 2014, toSeptember 1, 2015, the day before defendant's arrest in Michigan, was properly excludedby the court from the speedy trial calculation (see generally People v Luperon, 85NY2d 71, 77 [1995]).

In addition, the time from defendant's refusal to waive extradition until the timewhen he was returned to New York, i.e., September 2, 2015, to December 15, 2015, wasproperly charged to defendant (see CPL 30.30 [4] [e]). Furthermore, the periodfrom January 19, 2016, through January 28, 2016, was properly charged to defendantbecause he waived his speedy trial rights pursuant to CPL 30.30 with respect to thatperiod, in exchange for which the People agreed to postpone their grand jurypresentation in order to accommodate defendant's request to testify before the grand jury(see People v Waldron, 6NY3d 463, 467-468 [2006]; People v Wheeler, 159 AD3d 1138, 1141 [3d Dept 2018],lv denied 31 NY3d 1123 [2018]). Thus, after taking into considerationexcludable periods of time, we conclude that the People announced readiness for trialwell within the statutory six-month time frame (see People v Harrison, 171 AD3d 1481, 1482 [4th Dept2019]).

Contrary to defendant's additional contention, viewing the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the People, we conclude that "there is a valid line of reasoning andpermissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of thecrime proved beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007] [internalquotation marks omitted]). The trial evidence was legally sufficient to establish that thevictim suffered serious physical injury inasmuch as he lost consciousness and sustained alarge laceration to his head with heavy bleeding and a skull fracture, which resulted in apermanent skull depression and years of debilitating headaches (see People v Robinson, 121AD3d 1405, 1407 [3d Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1221 [2015]; People v Casey, 61 AD3d1011, 1012-1013 [3d Dept 2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 913 [2009]; Peoplev Romer, 163 AD2d 880, 880 [4th Dept 1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 896[1990]). Furthermore, defendant's intent to cause serious physical injury to the victimmay be inferred from defendant's conduct in striking the victim's head with a metal pipe(see People v Pine, 82AD3d 1498, 1500 [3d Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 820 [2011],denied reconsideration 17 NY3d 904 [2011]).

Contrary to defendant's further contention, viewing the evidence in light of theelements of the crime as charged to the jury (see Danielson, 9 NY3d at 349), andaccording deference to the jury's credibility determinations (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d633, 644 [2006]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of theevidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; People v Haynes, 39 AD3d562, 563 [2d Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 845 [2007]). Even assuming,arguendo, that a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we cannot say that"the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded" (People v Jackson, 162 AD3d1567, 1567 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 938 [2018]; seegenerally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495).

Defendant also contends that the verdict is repugnant inasmuch as the jury acquittedhim of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (Penal Law§ 265.02 [1]) and convicted him of assault in the first degree(§ 120.10 [1]). We reject that contention. A repugnancy claim must be"[e]xamined against the elements of the crimes as charged by the trial court and withoutregard to the particular facts of the case" (People v Johnson, 70 NY2d 819, 820[1987]; see People vMuhammad, 17 NY3d 532, 539 [2011]). "[A] conviction will be reversed [asrepugnant] only in those instances where acquittal on one crime as charged to the jury isconclusive as to a necessary element of the other crime, as charged, for which the guiltyverdict was rendered" (People v Tucker, 55 NY2d 1, 7 [1981], reargdenied 55 NY2d 1039 [1982]). Here, defendant's acquittal on the weapon charge didnot necessarily negate an essential element of the assault charge of which he wasconvicted (see generally Peoplev Colsrud, 144 AD3d 1639, 1639 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d1030 [2017]; People vSmith, 140 AD3d 1774, 1775 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1127[2016]).

Defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial due to prosecutorialmisconduct is for the most part unpreserved for our review (see CPL 470.05 [2];see generally People vAlligood, 115 AD3d 1346, 1347-1348 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 23NY3d 1017 [2014]). In any event, "[r]eversal on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct 'ismandated only when the conduct has caused such substantial prejudice to the defendantthat he [or she] has been denied due process of law' " (People v Rubin,101 AD2d 71, 77 [4th Dept 1984], lv denied 63 NY2d 711 [1984]) and, here, weconclude that any improprieties were " 'not so egregious as to deprive defendantof a fair trial' " (Peoplev Graham, 125 AD3d 1496, 1498 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d1008 [2015]).

Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Centra, J.P.,Peradotto, Carni, Troutman and Winslow, JJ.


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