| People v Lende |
| 2021 NY Slip Op 00211 [190 AD3d 1110] |
| January 14, 2021 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Lynda Lende, Appellant. |
Veronica Reed, Schenectady, for appellant.
Susan J. Mallery, District Attorney, Howes Cave (Kevin P. Mallery of counsel), forrespondent.
Aarons, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schoharie County (Bartlett III, J.),rendered September 12, 2018, convicting defendant upon her plea of guilty of the crime ofcriminal possession of marihuana in the fourth degree.
Defendant was charged with criminal possession of marihuana in the first degree andunlawful growing of cannabis after law enforcement discovered marihuana plants growing in herresidence. Following the denial of defendant's pretrial motions, defendant entered anAlford plea to the reduced charge of criminal possession of marihuana in the fourthdegree and was required, as part of the plea agreement, to execute a waiver of appeal. On thesame day that she pleaded guilty, defendant was sentenced to a one-year conditional charge and amonetary fine. Defendant appeals. We affirm.
Defendant contends that her motion to dismiss the indictment should have been grantedbecause she was denied her constitutional right to a speedy trial. As an initial matter, we note thatthis contention survives defendant's appeal waiver and guilty plea regardless of their validity (see People v Acevedo, 179 AD3d1397, 1399 [2020]; People vIrvis, 90 AD3d 1302, 1303 [2011], lv denied 19 NY3d 962 [2012]). That said,whether defendant was denied her constitutional right to a speedy trial due to preindictment delayrequires the consideration of five factors: "(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay;(3) the nature of the underlying charges; (4) any extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5)any impairment of defendant's defense" (People v Lanfranco, 124 AD3d 1144, 1145 [2015] [internalquotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 25 NY3d 1203 [2015]; see People vTaranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]; People v Acevedo, 179 AD3d at 1399). Evenaccepting defendant's premise that the preindictment delay was 15 months, such fact by itself isnot dispositive given that longer periods of delay have not been found to be constitutionallyinfirm (see e.g. People v Pitt, 43AD3d 1248, 1249 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 1008 [2007] [almost 18-month delay];People v Arrington, 31 AD3d801, 802 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 865 [2006] [almost 16-month delay]). Takinginto account that defendant was charged with, among other things, criminal possession ofmarihuana in the first degree, a class C felony, the fact that defendant was not incarcerated priorto being indicted and the lack of prejudice to defendant, defendant's constitutional right to aspeedy trial was not violated (see Peoplev Tuper, 118 AD3d 1144, 1146 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 954 [2015]; People v McCorkle, 67 AD3d1249, 1250-1251 [2009]).
Defendant also asserts that, as a consequence of her counsel rendering ineffective assistance,she felt rushed into pleading guilty. Preliminarily, we note that this claim, given that it impactsthe voluntariness of her plea, survives defendant's appeal waiver regardless of its validity (see People v Carroll, 172 AD3d1821, 1821[*2][2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 929[2019]). We additionally note that it does not appear that defendant made a postallocution motionto withdraw her plea on this ground, thereby rendering her claim unpreserved (see People v Horton, 173 AD3d1342, 1343 [2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 932 [2019]; People v White, 172 AD3d 1822,1823-1824 [2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 1110 [2019]). Because, however, "defendantpleaded guilty and was sentenced in the same proceeding," she did not have the practicalopportunity to make a timely postallocution motion (People v Griffin, 165 AD3d 1316, 1317 [2018]). Under thesecircumstances, defendant's claim is properly before us.
As to the merits, the record belies defendant's contention that she was rushed into pleadingguilty. Furthermore, defendant does not dispute that she received a favorable result and admittedduring the plea proceeding that she was satisfied with counsel's representation. Viewing counsel'srepresentation in its entirety, defendant was not deprived of meaningful representation (see People v Briggs, 138 AD3d1355, 1356 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 927 [2016]; People v Salaman, 293AD2d 874, 875 [2002]). Defendant's remaining contentions have been considered and areunavailing.
Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Mulvey and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgmentis affirmed.