| People v Lane |
| 2021 NY Slip Op 01443 [192 AD3d 1262] |
| March 11, 2021 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Todd D. Lane, Appellant. |
Shane A. Zoni, Public Defender, Hudson (Jessica D. Howser of counsel), for appellant.
David E. Woodin, Special Prosecutor, Catskill, for respondent.
Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Columbia County (Czajka, J.), renderedJanuary 6, 2010, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of rape in the firstdegree, criminal sexual act in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree, and (2) from ajudgment of said court, rendered January 13, 2010 in Columbia County, which resentenceddefendant.
As the result of allegations that he had sexually molested a 10-year-old child on multipleoccasions in 2008, defendant was charged in an indictment with rape in the first degree, criminalsexual act in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree. In the midst of a 2009 jury trialon the charges, defendant pleaded guilty to the indictment after being apprised of his sentencingexposure and the fact that no sentencing commitments were being made. County Court thereafterdenied youthful offender treatment and imposed sentences that, as adjusted upon resentencing,resulted in a sentence of a total of 10 years in prison and 20 years of postrelease supervision.Defendant appeals, and we affirm.
Defendant, who was 17 years old at the time of the offenses, argues that County Courtabused its discretion in denying him youthful offender status. Inasmuch as he was convicted ofcrimes that included rape in the first degree and criminal sexual act in the first degree, and wasthe sole perpetrator of those crimes, he "was required to demonstrate 'mitigating circumstancesthat bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed' in order to be eligible for"that status (People v Williams, 155AD3d 1260, 1260 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1121 [2018], quoting CPL 720.10 [3][i]; see CPL 720.10 [2] [a]; People v Middlebrooks, 25 NY3d 516, 527-528 [2015]; People v Robertucci, 172 AD3d1782, 1783 [2019]). County Court did not determine that issue—instead observing, ingeneral terms, that youthful offender treatment was "not appropriate"—but the recordpermits us to make the necessary finding of eligibility in the first instance (see People v Minemier, 29 NY3d414, 419-420 [2017]; People vMarquis A., 145 AD3d 61, 68 [2016]; cf. People v Jones, 182 AD3d 698, 700-701 [2020]). Contrary todefendant's suggestion, neither his difficult upbringing nor his subsequent remorse bore directlyupon the manner in which he committed the crimes in question (see CPL 720.10 [3] [i];People v Garcia, 84 NY2d 336, 342 [1994]; People v Victor J., 283 AD2d 205,206 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 942 [2001]). Thus, defendant did not establish theexistence of any mitigating circumstances and was ineligible for youthful offenderconsideration.
Defendant also argues that the resentence was harsh and excessive, an issue that remains livegiven that he is still serving the postrelease supervision component of the sentence, but that issueis without merit (see e.g. People vSmith, 162 AD3d 1408, 1409 n 2 [2018]). The resentence was far below the maximumallowed and, in view of the [*2]seriousness of the crimes forwhich defendant was convicted, we perceive no abuse of discretion or extraordinarycircumstances that would warrant its reduction (see People v Lancaster, 121 AD3d 1301, 1304 [2014], lvdenied 24 NY3d 1121 [2015]; People v Rought, 90 AD3d 1247, 1249 [2011], lv denied 18NY3d 962 [2012]).
Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Clark, Pritzker and Colangelo, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgmentsare affirmed.