| People v Campbell |
| 2021 NY Slip Op 04615 [197 AD3d 482] |
| August 4, 2021 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Malachi Campbell, Appellant. |
Jillian S. Harrington, Staten Island, NY, for appellant.
Joyce A. Smith, Acting District Attorney, Mineola, NY (Kevin C. King and John B. Latellaof counsel), for respondent.
Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (TeresaK. Corrigan, J.), both rendered June 21, 2016, convicting him of course of sexual conduct againsta child in the first degree under indictment No. 1106/14, and criminal possession of a weapon inthe second degree under indictment No. 1178/14, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposingsentences.
Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.
The defendant pleaded guilty to course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degreeand criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree under separate indictments. Prior tosentencing, the defendant moved to withdraw his pleas of guilty. The Supreme Court denied themotion and sentenced the defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. The defendantappeals.
The defendant's contention that his pleas were not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent becausehe was not advised how the tolling provisions of Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (v)would impact the possible imposition of an enhanced sentence as a prior felony offender isunpreserved for appellate review, because he did not move to withdraw his pleas of guilty on thisground prior to the imposition of sentences (see People v Torres, 192 AD3d 831 [2021]; People v Leasure, 177 AD3d 770,772 [2019]; People vRodriguez-Abreu, 170 AD3d 895, 896 [2019]). In any event, the defendant's contentionis without merit (see People vTorres, 192 AD3d 831 [2021]; People v King, 166 AD3d 1236, 1237 [2018]; People v Richardson, 132 AD3d1022, 1022-1023 [2015]).
The defendant's claim that he was coerced into pleading guilty is "belied by his statementsunder oath at the plea proceeding" (People v Jackson, 170 AD3d 1040, 1040-1041 [2019]), whichreveal that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his pleas of guilty, absent anythreats or force, having reached a favorable plea agreement with the assistance of competentcounsel with whose representation the defendant was satisfied (see People v Etienne, 193 AD3d971 [2021]).
"The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty [*2]rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and generally willnot be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion" (id. at 971-972 [internalquotation marks omitted]). Here, the Supreme Court's denial of the defendant's motion towithdraw his pleas of guilty without conducting a hearing was not an improvident exercise ofdiscretion.
Because all of the defendant's substantive arguments involve the issue of whether heknowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his pleas of guilty, which is not subject to anappeal waiver, the defendant's remaining argument concerning the validity of his waiver of theright to appeal need not be addressed (see People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 10 [1989]; People v Murrell, 126 AD3d 918,919 [2015]). LaSalle, P.J., Chambers, Barros and Wooten, JJ., concur.