People v Chaney
2021 NY Slip Op 04932 [197 AD3d 1359]
September 2, 2021
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 3, 2021


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Ushawn Chaney, Also Known as Kane,Appellant.

Robert N. Gregor, Lake George, for appellant.

Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Peter H. Willis of counsel), forrespondent.

Lynch, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (M. Caruso,J.), rendered September 28, 2018, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime ofcriminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

In December 2017, defendant was charged in a six-count indictment with variousdrug-related crimes stemming from conduct occurring in September 2016. Defendant thereaftermoved to, among other things, dismiss the indictment, contending that he had been denied hisconstitutional right to a speedy trial. Following a hearing, County Court denied defendant'smotion to dismiss the indictment, finding, among other things, that upon due consideration of allof the relevant factors, defendant was not denied due process. Thereafter, defendant pleadedguilty—in full satisfaction of the indictment—to one count of criminal sale of acontrolled substance in the third degree, waived his right to appeal and was sentenced to a prisonterm of three years followed by two years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals, arguingonly that County Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment due topreindictment delay.

Although defendant's due process argument survives both his unchallenged waiver of theright to appeal and his guilty plea (seePeople v Lende, 190 AD3d 1110, 1110 [2021], lv denied 36 NY3d 1121 [2021];People v Acevedo, 179 AD3d1397, 1399 [2020]; People vShufelt, 161 AD3d 1451, 1451-1452 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1008 [2018])and was preserved for our review by his motion to dismiss the indictment upon this ground (compare People v Alger, 23 AD3d706, 706 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 845 [2006]), we find it to be lacking in merit. "Inassessing whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated by allegedpreindictment delay, courts must consider the extent of the delay, the reason for the delay, thenature of the charges against the defendant, whether there has been an extended period of pretrialincarceration and whether the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay" (People v Williams, 163 AD3d1283, 1285 [2018] [citations omitted], lv denied 32 NY3d 1069 [2018]; accordPeople v Acevedo, 179 AD3d at 1399; People v Morris, 176 AD3d 1502, 1503 [2019], lv denied34 NY3d 1131 [2020]; see People vRegan, 196 AD3d 735, 737 [2021]; People v Avera, 192 AD3d 1382, 1383 [2021], lv denied 37NY3d 953 [2021]). Although "[w]e are mindful that an unreasonable and unjustified indictmentdelay violates a defendant's due process rights and may result in dismissal of the indictment, evenwhen no prejudice results" (People v Morris, 176 AD3d at 1503 [internal quotationmarks, brackets and citation omitted]), the case law makes clear that "no one factor orcombination of the factors . . . is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedytrial claim" (People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]). Rather, we must considerall of the factors [*2]as they apply to the case at hand (seeid. at 445; People v Acevedo, 179 AD3d at 1400; People v Williams, 163AD3d at 1285).

With respect to the length of preindictment delay (approximately 14 months), we have foundsimilar—or even longer—periods of delay to pass constitutional muster (seePeople v Lende, 190 AD3d at 1111 [alleged 15-month delay], citing People v Pitt, 43 AD3d 1248[2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 1008 [2007] [almost 18-month delay], and People v Arrington, 31 AD3d 801[2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 865 [2006] [almost 16-month delay]). Importantly, the delayhere was occasioned, in part, by ongoing investigations by different law enforcement agenciesinto another potential target—described as "a pretty big player in . . .narcotics dealing"—and the corresponding need to protect the identity of the confidentialinformant who conducted controlled buys with both defendant and the other potential target(see People v Acevedo, 179 AD3d at 1400-1401). The charges against defendant wereserious, consisting of class B and C felonies, and defendant readily acknowledges in his appellatebrief that he was not incarcerated prior to being indicted and that "there is no evidence that [he]was impaired by the pretrial delay" (see People v Alger, 23 AD3d at 707). Under thesecircumstances, we conclude that defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated(see People v Lende, 190 AD3d at 1111; People v Morris, 176 AD3d at1503-1504). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Aarons and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgmentis affirmed.


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