People v George
2021 NY Slip Op 06189 [199 AD3d 831]
November 10, 2021
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 29, 2021


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Infinite George, Appellant.

Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Mark W. Vorkink of counsel), for appellant.

Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill and Jill A. Gross-Marksof counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Charles S.Lopresto, J.), rendered November 9, 2016, convicting him of attempted criminal sale of acontrolled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a firearm, upon his plea ofguilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

By pleading guilty, the defendant forfeited appellate review of his claims that he wasdeprived of his statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.30 (see People vO'Brien, 56 NY2d 1009, 1010 [1982]; People v Howe, 56 NY2d 622 [1982]; People v Hernandez, 176 AD3d1100, 1101 [2019]; People vBriggs, 123 AD3d 1051 [2014]).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the recent amendment to CPL 30.30 does not affectthe defendant's forfeiture of his statutory speedy trial claim. As amended, CPL 30.30 (6) providesthat a statutory speedy trial claim "shall be reviewable upon an appeal from an ensuing judgmentof conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment [was] entered upon a plea of guilty."However, that amended provision did not go into effect until after the defendant pleaded guiltyand the judgment of conviction was rendered (see L 2019, ch 59, part KKK,§§ 1, 2). Further, that provision does not apply retroactively. Generally,statutory amendments " 'are presumed to have prospective application unless theLegislature's preference for retroactivity is explicitly stated or clearly indicated' " by thelanguage of the statute and legislative history (People v Duggins, 192 AD3d 191, 193 [2021], quoting Matterof Gleason [Michael Vee, Ltd.], 96 NY2d 117, 122 [2001]). The language of CPL 30.30 (6)does not include any express indication that it was to have retroactive effect. Indeed, theprovision itself indicated that it was not to take effect for nearly eight months (see CPL30.30 [6]). In addition, the statute affects the rights of the parties and "bestows a new right" upondefendants (People v Lara-Medina,195 AD3d 542, 542 [2021]; see People v Duggins, 192 AD3d at 195). Given thelanguage and effect of CPL 30.30 (6), that provision cannot properly be construed as applyingretroactively (see People vLara-Medina, 195 AD3d 542 [2021]; People v Duggins, 192 AD3d at 194-195).Rivera, J.P., Miller, Genovesi and Ford, JJ., concur.


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