People v Edmondson
2021 NY Slip Op 08201 [191 AD3d 1015]
February 24, 2021
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 31, 2021


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Steven Edmondson, Appellant.

Jason M. Bernheimer, Katonah, NY (Samantha L. Cruzado of counsel), for appellant.

Miriam E. Rocah, District Attorney, White Plains, NY (Raffaelina Gianfrancesco andWilliam C. Milaccio of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Larry J.Schwartz, J.), rendered December 12, 2018, convicting him of assault in the first degree, robberyin the first degree, gang assault in the second degree, and robbery in the second degree, upon ajury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing,of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, byvacating the conviction of assault in the first degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, anddismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that thepolice had probable cause to arrest him based upon a radio broadcast of a motor vehicle accidentwith a possible robbery and assault in progress, their observations of the defendant and thecodefendant holding the complainant down with the codefendant cocking his arm as if to strikethe complainant, the complainant's statement identifying the defendant as one of the individualswho assaulted and robbed him, and their observations of blood on the defendant's clothing (see People v Mabry, 184 AD3d867 [2020]; People v Sanders, 239 AD2d 528 [1997]; People v Jones, 234AD2d 1002 [1996]; People v Pascual, 173 AD2d 746 [1991]). The court also properlydenied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress the clothing he waswearing at the time of his arrest. The testimony adduced at the suppression hearing establishedthat the clothing was properly seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine (see People vBrown, 96 NY2d 80 [2001]; Peoplev Oden, 150 AD3d 1269, 1270 [2017]; People v Tutora, 116 AD2d 607, 608[1986]). Additionally, there is no merit to the defendant's contention that the police violated hisconstitutional rights when they forcibly removed his clothing. The testimony established that themanner in which the defendant's clothing was seized was predicated upon his refusal to complywith their request that he remove his clothing.

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial because the complainant couldnot understand the court interpreter is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]). Although defense counsel made a motion to strike the complainant's testimony, after theSupreme Court questioned the complainant as to whether he could understand the courtinterpreter and the complainant unequivocally answered "yes," defense counsel withdrew thatmotion [*2]to strike and made no mistral motion (see People v Hunt, 137 AD3d1163 [2016]; People v Noel, 156 AD2d 592 [1989]). The defendant's relatedcontention that his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was violated because thecomplainant could not understand the court interpreter is unpreserved for appellate reviewbecause he made no objection on that ground (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Stewart, 57 AD3d 581[2008]; People v Eisemann, 248 AD2d 484 [1998]). In any event, the complainantanswered unequivocally that he did understand the interpreter. Furthermore, the recordestablishes that the court imposed no limits as to the length or scope of defense counsel'scross-examination of the complainant (see People v Wright, 160 AD3d 667 [2018]; People vDunbar, 145 AD2d 501 [1988]).

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial based on a witness'sunnoticed identification of the defendant as a perpetrator during that witness's testimony. "[T]hedecision to declare a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, which is in thebest position to determine if this drastic remedy is truly necessary to protect the defendant's rightto a fair trial" (People v Wakefield, 212 AD2d 649, 649 [1995]; see People v Tullock, 148 AD3d1061 [2017]). Here, the prosecutor elicited the identification from the witness upon agood-faith belief that the witness had made no previous identification of the defendant as theperpetrator (see People v Williams,58 AD3d 771 [2009]; People vGoodwine, 46 AD3d 702 [2007]). During cross-examination, when the witness gaveequivocal testimony as to whether she had in fact made a prior identification, the court struck thewitness's testimony. Thus, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying thedefendant's motion for a mistrial, where the unnoticed identification was elicited inadvertently,and the court struck the testimony from the record and directed the jury to disregard the witness'stestimony (see People v Tullock,148 AD3d 1061 [2017]; People v Hakmoun, 232 AD2d 243 [1996]; People vBrown, 136 AD2d 1 [1988]).

The defendant's contention that there was legally insufficient evidence to support theconvictions is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event,viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes,60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guiltbeyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independentreview of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342[2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses,hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383 [2004];People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we aresatisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero 7 NY3d 633[2006]).

The defendant's contention that the counts of assault in the first degree under count 1 of theindictment (Penal Law § 120.10 [4]) and robbery in the first degree under count 2of the indictment (Penal Law § 160.15 [1]) were multiplicitous is unpreserved forappellate review (see People v Cruz, 96 NY2d 857 [2001]; People v Campbell, 120 AD3d 827[2014]; People v Smalls, 81 AD3d860 [2011]; People v Clymer,26 AD3d 443 [2006]). Nevertheless, under the circumstances presented here, we review thiscontention in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.

"An indictment is multiplicitous when two separate counts charge the same crime"(People v Saunders, 290 AD2d 461, 463 [2002]; see People v Senisi, 196 AD2d376, 382 [1994]). "Multiplicity does not exist where each count requires proof of an additionalfact that the other does not" or where "a conviction on one count would not be inconsistent withacquittal on the other" (People v Saunders, 290 AD2d at 463 [internal quotation marksomitted]). "If an indictment is multiplicitous it creates the risk that a defendant will be punishedfor, or stigmatized with a conviction of, more crimes than he actually committed" (People v Alonzo, 16 NY3d 267,269 [2011]). Here, the record reflects that the jury charges regarding the count of assault in thefirst degree and the count of robbery in the first degree were essentially identical since one cannotcommit robbery in the first degree under Penal Law § 160.15 (1) withoutsimultaneously committing assault in the first degree under Penal Law § 120.10 (4)(see People v Smalls, 81 AD3d at 861). As such, those charges were multiplicitous(see id.). Although the dismissal of the multiplicitous count will not affect the duration ofthe defendant's sentence of imprisonment, it is nevertheless appropriate in this case to dismiss thecount charging assault in the first degree in consideration of the stigma attached to the redundantconvictions (see People v Alonzo, 16 NY3d at 269; People v Campbell, 120AD3d at 827-828; [*3]People v Smalls, 81 AD3d at 861;People v Aarons, 296 AD2d 508 [2002]).

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in failing to conduct a hearing todetermine the amount of restitution is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Creekmur, 137 AD3d1052 [2016]; People vWinslow, 100 AD3d 1031 [2012]; People v Golgoski, 40 AD3d 1138 [2007]) and, in any event,without merit (see People v Baxter,102 AD3d 805 [2013]; People vHarris, 72 AD3d 1110 [2010]; People v Baez, 52 AD3d 840 [2008]). Austin, J.P., Miller, LaSalleand Barros, JJ., concur.


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