| People v Mabry |
| 2020 NY Slip Op 03540 [184 AD3d 867] |
| June 24, 2020 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Nathaniel Mabry, Appellant. |
Janet E. Sabel, New York, NY (Denise Fabiano of counsel), for appellant.
Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill,Sharon Y. Brodt, and Aurora Alvarez-Calderon of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (John B.Latella, J.), rendered April 14, 2015, convicting him of burglary in the second degree (twocounts), criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (two counts), criminalpossession of stolen property in the fifth degree (three counts), and possession of burglar's tools,upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial(Steven W. Paynter, J.), after a hearing (Arthur J. Cooperman, J.H.O.), of those branches of thedefendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence, identification testimony,and his statement to law enforcement officials.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
On April 12, 2013, at 10:22 a.m., the police received a radio transmission of a burglary inprogress in Queens County. The police proceeded to the subject location. Approximately twominutes after the initial radio transmission, another transmission was received stating that thecomplainant saw the perpetrator, whom the complainant described as a black male wearing ablack hat and carrying a backpack, exit from the complainant's house and flee eastbound on abicycle. Approximately two minutes later, the police observed the defendant, who matched thatdescription, riding a bicycle approximately five blocks from the complainant's house.
Upon stopping the police vehicle and activating its lights and sirens, police officers exitedthe vehicle and ran toward the defendant. The defendant turned his bicycle around and fled. Oneof the officers pursued the defendant in the police vehicle. The defendant's bicycle got wedgedbetween a parked car and the police vehicle, at which time the defendant fell off the bicycle.
Approximately one minute later, the complainant arrived at the scene and yelled, "that's him,that's him." Subsequent to the complainant's identification, the defendant was placed under arrest.The complainant informed the police that the defendant had broken into his house. The policerecovered the defendant's backpack on the street at the location of the defendant's arrest, inside ofwhich were items belonging to the complainant and others, including, inter alia, three laptops,jewelry, and two passports. At the police station house, the defendant spontaneously stated, "I'mdone, I'm done."
The defendant was charged with burglary in the second degree (two counts), criminalpossession of stolen property in the fourth degree (two counts), criminal possession of stolenproperty in the fifth degree (three counts), and possession of burglar's tools. After a hearing, theSupreme Court denied those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion where were to suppressphysical evidence, identification testimony, and the statement the defendant made to lawenforcement officials. The defendant pleaded guilty to all the charges in the indictment and butretained his right to appeal. He was thereafter adjudicated and sentenced as a persistent violentfelony offender predicated upon a 1999 conviction of burglary in the second degree and a 2009conviction of attempted burglary in the second degree.
We agree with the Supreme Court's denial of that branch of the defendant's motion whichwas to suppress physical evidence. As an initial matter, contrary to the People's contention, thedefendant's arguments on appeal that the police lacked reasonable suspicion and probable causeto stop and arrest him and that the warrantless search of his backpack incident to his arrest wasillegal are preserved for appellate review (see People v Houston, 143 AD3d 737, 738 [2016]; People v Palmer, 84 AD3d 1414,1414 [2011]).
The police had reasonable suspicion to pursue and stop the defendant based on thedescription of the perpetrator which matched the defendant's appearance, the close proximity tothe crime scene, and the short passage of time between the commission of the crime and theobservation of the defendant (see Peoplev Currie, 131 AD3d 1265, 1265 [2015]; People v Palmer, 84 AD3d at 1414).The police also had probable cause to arrest the defendant based on the complainant'sspontaneous identification near the crime scene shortly after the police stopped the defendant(see People v Daye, 194 AD2d 339, 339-340 [1993]; see generally People v DeBour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]).
Moreover, we find that the police were justified in searching the defendant's backpackincident to his arrest. "Under the State Constitution, to justify a warrantless search incident toarrest, the People must satisfy two separate requirements. The first imposes spatial and temporallimitations to ensure that the search is not significantly divorced in time or place from the arrest.The second, and equally important, predicate requires the People to demonstrate the presence ofexigent circumstances" (People vJimenez, 22 NY3d 717, 721-722 [2014] [citations and internal quotation marksomitted]).
"Exigent circumstances may be established by a showing that the search was necessary toensure the safety of the public or the arresting officer, or that it was necessary to prevent thedestruction or concealment of evidence" (People v Houston, 143 AD3d at 739; seePeople v Jimenez, 22 NY3d at 722). "[E]ven a bag within the immediate control orgrabbable area of a suspect at the time of his [or her] arrest may not be subjected to a warrantlesssearch incident to the arrest, unless the circumstances leading to the arrest support a reasonablebelief that the suspect may gain possession of a weapon or be able to destroy evidence located inthe bag" (People v Jimenez, 22 NY3d at 722 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seePeople v Gokey, 60 NY2d 309, 311 [1983]). A container may not be searched for a weaponor evidence if it is apparent that it is so securely fastened that the person arrested cannot quicklyreach its contents, or the person arrested makes unmistakably clear that he or she will not seek toreach the contents, or the container is so small that it could not contain a weapon or evidence ofthe crime (see People v Smith, 59 NY2d 454, 458-459 [1983]). "While an officer neednot affirmatively testify as to safety concerns to establish exigency, such apprehension must beobjectively reasonable" (People v Jimenez, 22 NY3d at 723; see People v Dunbar, 183 AD3d1263 [2020]; People v Diaz,107 AD3d 401, 402 [2013]). Notably, "[t]he crime for which there is probable cause to makethe arrest may itself provide the requisite exigency" (People v Jimenez, 22 NY3d at 722)."Exigency may also derive from circumstances other than the nature of the offense"(id.).
Applying these principles here, contrary to the defendant's contention and the determinationof our colleague in the dissent, the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, as well as thereasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, established that: (1) the defendant's arrestand the police search of the backpack were in close temporal proximity of each other, and (2) thesearch was justified by exigent circumstances.
According to the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing, after being chased by thepolice, the defendant fell off his bicycle onto the street. When the complainant arrived oneminute later and identified the defendant, the defendant was standing up and had not yet beenhandcuffed. Immediately after the complainant's identification, the defendant was placed underarrest. Approximately two minutes after the defendant's arrest, the police searched the subjectbackpack which was "on the street, at the location of the arrest." These facts show that the arrestand search of the backpack were for all practical purposes conducted at the same time and in thesame place (see People v Smith, 59 NY2d at 459). Additionally, at the time of the arrest,the backpack, which was "on the street, at the location of the arrest," could have been accessed bythe defendant and had not yet been reduced to the exclusive control of the police.
Additionally, the circumstances support a reasonable belief that the search of the backpackwas necessary to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the public. The police respondedto and arrested the defendant for a burglary, a violent crime. In addition, the defendant was notcooperative with the police. Indeed, the defendant was arrested at the conclusion of a policechase, following his flight from the police on a bicycle. Moreover, the setting of the defendant'sarrest and search of the backpack was a public street. These circumstances gave rise to objectiveand legitimate reasons for the search of the backpack (see People v Harris, 174 AD3d 185 [2019]).
The defendant's reliance on Arizona v Gant (556 US 332 [2009]) and People vJimenez (22 NY3d at 717) is misplaced. The facts of those two cases are distinguishablefrom the facts of this case. In Arizona v Gant (556 US at 335), a police officer searchedthe defendant's car after the defendant was locked in the back of a patrol car, having already beenhandcuffed and arrested for driving with a suspended license. While searching the defendant'scar, the officer discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat (see id.). TheUnited States Supreme Court agreed with the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court that a searchincident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement did not apply sincethe defendant could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of thesearch (see id.).
In People v Jimenez (22 NY3d at 723-724), other than a police officer's perceptionthat a large purse that was removed from the defendant's shoulder appeared to be heavy, therewere no circumstances supporting a reasonable belief that the purse contained weapon ordestructible evidence, and nothing connected the defendant or the codefendant to the burglaryreport at the building in the lobby of which the defendant was arrested for trespass.
Moreover, contrary to his contention, the defendant was not deprived of his right to theeffective assistance of counsel at the suppression hearing when defense counsel rested on therecord instead of making a closing argument at the suppression hearing (see People v Rodriguez, 134 AD3d512, 513 [2015]; cf. People vJohnson, 37 AD3d 363 [2007]). " 'A defendant is not denied effective assistanceof trial counsel merely because counsel does not make a motion or argument that has little or nochance of success' " (People vAdelman, 36 AD3d 926, 928 [2007], quoting People v Stultz, 2 NY3d 277, 287 [2004]; see People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143,152 [2005]). For this same reason, the defendant's counsel was not ineffective because he failedto challenge the constitutionality of the 2009 conviction used to support the defendant'sadjudication as a persistent violent felony offender.
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Austin and Iannacci,JJ., concur.
Leventhal, J., dissents, and votes to remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Queens County,for a new determination of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were tosuppress physical evidence and his statement to law enforcement officials in accordanceherewith, and thereafter a report to this Court advising of the new determination, and to hold theappeal in abeyance in the interim, with the following memorandum: I respectfully dissentbecause I believe that the warrantless search of the defendant's backpack incident to arrest wasnot justified.
At the outset, I agree with my learned colleagues that, contrary to the People's argument, thedefendant's contentions challenging the warrantless search of his backpack are preserved forappellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Houston, 143 AD3d 737, 738 [2016]; People v Palmer, 84 AD3d 1414,1414 [2011]).
"The protections embodied in article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitutionserve to shield citizens from warrantless intrusions on their privacy interests, including theirpersonal effects" (People v Jimenez,22 NY3d 717, 719 [2014]; see People v Gokey, 60 NY2d 309, 312 [1983])." 'All warrantless searches presumptively are unreasonable per se,' and, thus, '[w]here awarrant has not been obtained, it is the People who have the burden of overcoming' thispresumption of unreasonableness" (People v Anderson, 142 AD3d 713, 714 [2016], quoting Peoplev Hodge, 44 NY2d 553, 557 [1978]; see People v Jimenez, 22 NY3d at 719;People v Gokey, 60 NY2d at 312).
"Under the State Constitution, to justify a warrantless search incident to arrest, the Peoplemust satisfy two separate requirements" (People v Jimenez, 22 NY3d at 721). "The firstimposes spatial and temporal limitations to ensure that the search is 'not significantly divorced intime or place from the arrest' " (id., quoting People v Smith, 59 NY2d454, 458 [1983]; see People v Gokey, 60 NY2d at 312).
"The second, and equally important, predicate requires the People to demonstrate thepresence of exigent circumstances" (People v Jimenez, 22 NY3d at 722; see People vGokey, 60 NY2d at 312, 313; People v Smith, 59 NY2d at 458). "The Court ofAppeals has recognized two interests underlying the exigency requirement: 'the safety of thepublic and the arresting officer; and the protection of evidence from destruction orconcealment' " (People v Anderson, 142 AD3d at 714, quoting People vGokey, 60 NY2d at 312; see People v Jimenez, 22 NY3d at 722). "[E]ven a bag'within the immediate control or "grabbable area" of a suspect at the time of his [or her] arrestmay not be subjected to a warrantless search incident to the arrest, unless the circumstancesleading to the arrest support a reasonable belief that the suspect may gain possession of a weaponor be able to destroy evidence located in the bag' " (People v Jimenez, 22 NY3dat 722, quoting People v Gokey, 60 NY2d at 311). "While an officer need notaffirmatively testify as to safety concerns to establish exigency, such apprehension must beobjectively reasonable" (People v Jimenez, 22 NY3d at 723; see People v Batista,88 NY2d 650, 654 [1996]; People v Moore, 32 NY2d 67, 72 [1973]).
In my view, the People failed to satisfy either requirement. Briefly, a certain police officer,who was the only witness at the suppression hearing, testified that the defendant, who was ridinga bicycle, had been carrying a black backpack when that officer first saw him. After thedefendant was apprehended, having fallen off his bike that "got wedged" between a parked carand the unmarked police car that the officer was driving, but at a time when the defendant wasnot yet in handcuffs, the complainant arrived at the location. There were approximately five orsix police officers, some in uniform, around the defendant. The complainant screamed, "that'shim, that's him," and the defendant was placed under arrest. The officer recovered the backpackand various items—including laptops, a bag of jewelry, a birth certificate, and a socialsecurity card, as well as a screwdriver, a "Smith tool," and gloves—that were inside thebackpack. Asked, "[n]ow when did you actually recover all of this property, or observe it for thefirst time," the officer answered, "I observed it for the first time on the street at the location of thearrest location."
There was no testimony at the suppression hearing regarding where the defendant was inrelation to the backpack once he was apprehended. That is, the record does not demonstratewhether the defendant was still carrying the backpack after having fallen off the bike or, if hewas not carrying it, how far it was from him at the time. Further, there was no testimony as to thedegree to which the defendant was immobilized. It bears noting that there were approximatelyfive or six police officers present; further, the record supports the reasonable inference that thedefendant had been handcuffed after the complainant identified him. As in People v Hernandez (40 AD3d777, 779 [2007]), "because there was no testimony as to the degree to which the defendantwas immobilized, or how far away the defendant was from the [backpack], it cannot even bedetermined whether the [backpack] was in the defendant's immediate control or 'grabbablearea.' " On this record, it was not shown that the backpack was in the defendant'simmediate control or "grabbable area." Thus, the People failed to meet their burden.
Moreover, the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing failed to establish the presence ofexigent circumstances. Although the police had received information pertaining to a burglary inprogress at the complainant's home, and burglary in the second degree is a class C violent felony(see Penal Law §§ 70.02 [1] [b]; 140.25), there is no evidence that thedefendant was armed. The officer did not testify to any circumstances indicating the presence oruse of a weapon. The officer did not testify that he feared for officer safety, public safety, or forthe integrity of any destructible evidence. Even though the defendant had turned his bike aroundand fled from officers who had first tried to apprehend him, there is no indication that once thedefendant had been apprehended, he was uncooperative, resistant, or aggressive. Before thedefendant was placed under arrest, there were approximately five or six police officers aroundhim. Further, a reasonable inference may be drawn that the defendant was handcuffed before thebackpack was searched. Unlike in People v Alvarado (126 AD3d 803 [2015]), where this Court statedthat "[f]or compelling reasons, including the safety of the officers or the public, a search notsignificantly divorced in time or place from the arrest may be conducted even though the arrestedperson has been subdued and his [or her] closed container is within the exclusive control of thepolice" (id. at 804 [internal quotation marks omitted] [circumstances supportedreasonable belief that backpack contained weapon]), here, no exigent circumstances werepresent. On this record, the circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable belief that thedefendant's backpack contained either a weapon or destructible evidence. Absent the requisiteexigency, the warrantless search of his backpack incident to arrest was not justified (seePeople v Jimenez, 22 NY3d at 722-723; People v Grimes, 175 AD3d 712, 713 [2019]; People v Geddes-Kelly, 163 AD3d716, 717 [2018]; People v Anderson, 142 AD3d at 715).
In my opinion, the appropriate corrective action here would be to remit the matter to theSupreme Court, Queens County, for a new determination of those branches of the defendant'somnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and his statement to law enforcementofficials in accordance herewith, and thereafter a report to this Court advising of the newdetermination, and to hold the appeal in abeyance in the interim. The People argued, at thesuppression hearing, and they argue now, on appeal, that even if the backpack search was notjustified as incident to arrest, the property found in the backpack inevitably would have beendiscovered at the police station house. The hearing court did not decide that issue. It merely heldthat the contents of the backpack were admissible as having been recovered incident to arrest."[B]ecause the Supreme Court did not decide that [inevitable discovery] issue adversely to thedefendant, this Court is precluded from reviewing that issue on the defendant's appeal" (People v Chazbani, 144 AD3d836, 837-838 [2016]; see CPL 470.15 [1]; People v Ingram, 18 NY3d 948, 949 [2012]; People vLaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470 [1998]). As this Court explained in Chazbani, "where. . . the alternative issue raised by the People on appeal has not been determined bythe trial court, and the resolution of that issue could affect the determination of the suppressionmotion, we deem it appropriate to hold the defendant's appeal in abeyance and remit the matterfor consideration of the alternative issue" (People v Chazbani, 144 AD3d at 839). That iswhat should happen here.