| People v Witherow |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 01691 [203 AD3d 1595] |
| March 11, 2022 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v David J. Witherow, Appellant. (Appeal No.1.) |
Cara A. Waldman, Fairport, for defendant-appellant.
James B. Ritts, District Attorney, Canandaigua (V. Christopher Eaggleston of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Ontario County Court (Michael M. Mohun, A.J.), renderedMarch 30, 2018. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of assault in the firstdegree and assault in the second degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is affirmed.
Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon hisplea of guilty, of assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10 [3]) and assault inthe second degree (§ 120.05 [6]), arising from an incident in which he attacked hiswife and a second victim. In appeal No. 2, defendant appeals from an order directing him to payrestitution and reparation to the second victim.
Contrary to defendant's contention with respect to both appeals, the plea colloquy establishesthat he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the right to appeal (see People v Mess, 186 AD3d1069, 1069 [4th Dept 2020]; seegenerally People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545, 564 [2019], cert denied 589 US&mdash, 140 S Ct 2634 [2020]). Moreover, "the lack of a written waiver 'is of no momentwhere, as here, the oral waiver was adequate' " (People v Thomas, 178 AD3d 1461, 1461 [4th Dept 2019], lvdenied 35 NY3d 945 [2020]). Defendant's valid waiver of the right to appeal precludes ourreview of his challenge in appeal No. 1 to the severity of the incarceration component of hissentence (see People v Lopez, 6NY3d 248, 255 [2006]).
Defendant contends in appeal No. 2 that County Court erred by ordering an amount ofrestitution or reparation in excess of the statutory cap for the second victim's past lost earningsbecause that form of loss does not fall within the exception to the statutory cap pursuant to PenalLaw § 60.27 (5) (b). Initially, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant's contentionis not a challenge to the legality of the sentence (see People v Graves, 163 AD3d 16, 24 [4th Dept 2018], lvdenied 35 NY3d 970 [2020]), we nevertheless conclude that review of defendant's contentionis not foreclosed by his waiver of the right to appeal because the amount of restitution andreparation, including any amount in excess of the statutory cap, was not included in the terms ofthe plea agreement (see People vFontaine, 144 AD3d 1658, 1659 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 997[2017]; cf. People v Brown, 37NY3d 940, 941 [2021 plurality]; seealso People v Parker, 196 AD3d 970, 971 [3d Dept 2021]; People v Isaacs, 71 AD3d 1161,1161 [2d Dept 2010]).
On the merits, we agree with defendant, and we therefore modify the order accordingly." 'As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point inany case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaningthereof' " (People v Golo, 26NY3d 358, 361 [2015]; see Peoplev Pabon, 28 NY3d 147, 152 [2016]). "[W]hen the statutory language is clear andunambiguous, it should be construed so as to give [*2]effect tothe plain meaning of the words used" (People v Jones, 26 NY3d 730, 733 [2016] [internal quotation marksomitted]; see Pabon, 28 NY3d at 152). With respect to the statutory language at issue inthis case, "Penal Law § 60.27 (1) addresses the related concepts of restitution andreparation, allowing a court to order a defendant to 'make restitution of the fruits of his or heroffense or reparation for the actual out-of-pocket loss caused thereby' " (People vHorne, 97 NY2d 404, 410 [2002]). Penal Law § 60.27 (5) (a) provides, inrelevant part, that "[e]xcept upon consent of the defendant or as provided in paragraph (b) of thissubdivision, or as a condition of probation or conditional discharge as provided in [Penal Law§ 65.10 (2) (g)], the amount of restitution or reparation required by the court shallnot exceed [$15,000] in the case of a conviction for a felony" (see Horne, 97 NY2d at414). In turn, Penal Law § 60.27 (5) (b) provides that "[t]he court in its discretionmay impose restitution or reparation in excess of the [subject statutory cap] amount[ ]. . . , provided however that the amount in excess must be limited to the return ofthe victim's property, including money, or the equivalent value thereof; and reimbursement formedical expenses actually incurred by the victim prior to sentencing as a result of the offensecommitted by the defendant" (see Horne, 97 NY2d at 414).
Here, defendant does not dispute that the court properly imposed restitution and reparation,including past lost earnings, up to the statutory cap of $15,000 (see Penal Law§ 60.27 [5] [a]; People vDenno, 56 AD3d 902, 903-904 [3d Dept 2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 757 [2009]),as well as $12,520.09 in excess of the statutory cap for the second victim's qualifying propertyloss and medical expenses (see § 60.27 [5] [b]; Horne, 97 NY2d at414; People v Grant, 185 AD3d608, 609-610 [2d Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1045 [2020]; People v Ayers, 45 AD3d 1290,1291 [4th Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 808 [2008]). Defendant correctly contends,however, that the court erred in imposing restitution and reparation in excess of the statutory capfor the second victim's past lost earnings because, under the plain meaning of the statute, thatform of loss does not fall within the exception to the statutory cap pursuant to Penal Law§ 60.27 (5) (b) (see Grant, 185 AD3d at 609). In particular, contrary to thecourt's determination, inasmuch as past lost earnings are wages, salary, or other income that thesecond victim could have, but did not, earn (see Black's Law Dictionary [11th ed 2019],lost earnings), the excess amount ordered as restitution and reparation for that loss does notconstitute reimbursement for "the return of the [second] victim's property" orequivalent thereof (§ 60.27 [5] [b] [emphasis added]; cf. Horne, 97 NY2d at414; Ayers, 45 AD3d at 1291; see generally Grant, 185 AD3d at 609).
We note that the legislative history largely supports this reading of the statute. "[A]lthoughthe strongest indication of the statute's meaning is in its plain language, the legislative history ofan enactment may also be relevant and is not to be ignored, even if words be clear" (People v Badji, 36 NY3d 393, 399[2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the legislative history shows that, while theoriginal proposal sought total repeal of the statutory cap, the language granting a court discretionto exceed the statutory cap, but simultaneously limiting the imposition of excess restitution andreparation to the named items, was added as a compromise necessary to obtain legislativeapproval (see Attorney General's Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 468 at 14).Consistent with its plain meaning as discussed above, the limiting language was understood atthe time of enactment as permitting restitution and reparation in excess of the statutory cap asreimbursement for property taken or stolen from the victim, i.e., property once in the victim'spossession, and for medical expenses actually incurred by the victim prior to sentencing as aresult of the crime (see id. at 16; see also Budget Report on Bills, Bill Jacket, L1983, ch 468 at 11; Executive Chamber Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 468 at 18).
All concur except Carni, J., who is not participating. Present—Peradotto, J.P., Carni,Lindley, Winslow and Bannister, JJ.