Matter of Black v New York State Tax Appeals Trib.
2022 NY Slip Op 04200 [206 AD3d 1482]
June 30, 2022
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 3, 2022


[*1]
 In the Matter of Christopher Black, Petitioner,
v
NewYork State Tax Appeals Tribunal et al., Respondents.

Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Albany (Henry M. Greenberg of counsel), for petitioner.

Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Owen Demuth of counsel), for Commissioner ofTaxation and Finance, respondent.

Reynolds Fitzgerald, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Courtpursuant to Tax Law § 2016) to review a determination of respondent Tax AppealsTribunal sustaining two notices of deficiency of employee withholding taxes againstpetitioner.

Petitioner began his career in 1986 as a journeyman carpenter for Nastasi & Associates.In 1994, petitioner formed New England Construction Company (hereinafter NECC), a drywall,acoustical ceilings and millwork construction company. Petitioner's purpose, in part, in formingNECC was to have the corporation certified as a minority business enterprise to gain access tostate contracts with minority access goals. Thereafter, petitioner and the owners of Nastasi& Associates arranged for petitioner to take over Nastasi & Associates' minoritysubcontracts. At all relevant times, petitioner was president and a 51% shareholder of NECC,with the remaining shares belonging to family members and owners of Nastasi &Associates. According to petitioner, in 2005, Anthony Nastasi (hereinafter Nastasi) took over thefinancial affairs and management of NECC. Additionally, NECC and Nastasi & Associatesentered into an agreement providing that, upon Nastasi's written demand, petitioner wouldimmediately resign as president of NECC. Commencing in 2012, NECC began to encounter taxliabilities, including issues regarding employee withholding taxes. In 2015, Nastasi ultimatelyterminated petitioner pursuant to the terms of the 2005 agreement, purchased petitioner's sharesof NECC and became its sole owner.

In December 2015, respondent Department of Taxation and Finance issued petitioner, for theperiods ending December 2014, March 2015 and June 2015, three notices of deficiency foroutstanding withholding taxes owed by NECC and sought to hold petitioner personally liable forthe outstanding taxes owed. Petitioner thereafter filed a petition with the Department seeking tochallenge the notices of deficiency and to absolve himself of liability on the grounds that, underTax Law § 685 (g), he was not a "responsible person" of NECC.[FN1] Following a hearing, anAdministrative Law Judge, among other things, sustained the notice for the period endingDecember 2014 and partially sustained the notice for the period ending March 2015.[FN2] Upon administrative appeal,respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal found that, based upon various factors, petitioner was aresponsible person on behalf of NECC (see Tax Law § 685 [g], [n]) anddetermined that he was personally liable. Additionally, the Tribunal found that petitioner's failureto pay the withholding taxes was willful. Lastly, the Tribunal held that it was not obligated todefer to the IRS's parallel determination as the Department may conduct its own examination andreach its own factual conclusions. Petitioner then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceedingchallenging the Tribunal's determination.

As an initial matter, we disagree with petitioner's contention that the Tribunal's determinationwas irrational in light of the IRS's determination absolving petitioner of liability as a responsibleperson for purposes of NECC's federal withholding tax liabilities. Although there is no disputethat 26 USC §§ 6671 (b) and 6672 (a) are parallel statutes with Tax Law§ 685 (g) and (n), and that both the state and federal statutes require a showing thatthe taxpayer has actual authority in order to be a person responsible for collecting and remittingthe corporation's withholding taxes, the Tribunal's determination was not based upon anerroneous legal standard contrary to that found under federal law, but upon the Tribunal'snumerous factual findings based on the extensive record before it.

Turning to the merits, "[i]n cases where, as here, the issues argued before the Tribunalinvolved the specific application of broad statutory terms in a proceeding in which the agencyadministering the statute must determine it initially, this Court accords deference to theTribunal's interpretation of the statute[ ] at issue and will not disturb the Tribunal's determinationif it has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence" (Matter of Gans v New York State TaxAppeals Trib., 194 AD3d 1209, 1210 [2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets andcitations omitted]; see Matter of Parikhv Schmidt, 200 AD3d 1237, 1239 [2021]; Matter of Toronto Dominion Holdings [U.S.A.], Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. ofthe State of N.Y., 162 AD3d 1255, 1257 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 907[2018]).[FN3] In view of theforegoing, the Tribunal neither incorrectly interpreted Tax Law § 685 (g), norapplied an improper test in determining who is a responsible person. We confirm.

As relevant here, "[a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over thetax imposed by [Tax Law article 22] who willfully fails to collect such tax or truthfully accountfor and pay over such tax or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat the tax or thepayment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equalto the sum of . . . the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or notaccounted for and paid over" (Tax Law § 685 [g]). "For purposes of subsection[ ](g), . . . the term person includes an individual, corporation, partnership or limitedliability company or an officer or employee of any corporation . . . who as suchofficer, employee, manager or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which theviolation occurs" (Tax Law § 685 [n]).

In determining whether petitioner was a responsible person for the time periods in question,the test is a factual one to be determined after consideration of a myriad of factors, including"whether the petitioner signed the tax return, derived a substantial part of his [or her] incomefrom the corporation, or had the right to hire and fire employees. While no one factor iscontrolling, all must be considered" (Matter of Malkin v Tully, 65 AD2d 228, 231 [1978][citations omitted]; see Matter of Menik v Roth, 280 AD2d 702, 702-703 [2001];Matter of Risoli v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 237 AD2d 675, 676 [1997];Matter of Basch v New York State Tax Commn., 134 AD2d 786, 787 [1987]).Notwithstanding evidence that could support a contrary determination, it is undisputed thatpetitioner was president, the majority shareholder, had check signing authority, was involved indaily field operations and derived a substantial part of his income from NECC. Additionally,petitioner intentionally held himself out to third parties, as well as to the Division of Taxationitself, as the contact person and responsible person for New York taxes by signing state taxreturns and checks accompanying the returns, executing a sales tax certificate of authority listinghimself as the corporation's responsible person, filling out the Division's "Responsible PersonQuestionnaire," and maintaining communication with the Department. Accordingly, respondent'sdetermination that petitioner is a responsible person has a rational basis, is supported bysubstantial evidence and must be upheld (see Matter of Menik v Roth, 280 AD2d at 703;Matter of Risoli v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 237 AD2d at 677; Matterof Basch v New York State Tax Commn., 134 AD2d at 788). Although petitioner providedevidence that Nastasi exerted control over NECC's financial responsibilities, we may not disturbthe Tribunal's determination despite the existence of evidence in the record to support a contraryconclusion (see Matter of Fuchsberg& Fuchsberg v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 13 AD3d 831, 834 [2004];Matter of Menik v Roth, 280 AD2d at 703).

Petitioner also contends that the Tribunal erred in finding a willful failure on his part becausehe was powerless to direct payment of the taxes, as Nastasi was in complete financial control ofNECC and directed what bills should be paid. "Willfulness . . . may be found whenthe act, default, or conduct is consciously and voluntarily done with knowledge that as a result,trust funds belonging to the [g]overnment will not be paid over but will be used for otherpurposes. Something more than accidental nonpayment is all that is required" (Matter ofHopper v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 224 AD2d 733, 738 [1996] [internalquotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 88 NY2d 808 [1996]).Although petitioner might not have initially known that the taxes were not paid due to Nastasiwriting and directing the checks that petitioner should sign, it is undisputed that petitionerbecame aware of the tax liabilities from employees of the corporation and the Department, yetfailed to take affirmative steps to ensure payment. Despite Nastasi's repeated representations thathe would obtain credit to pay off the tax liability, petitioner himself did not seek to obtainfinancing to pay the taxes, nor did he attempt to correct Nastasi's mismanagement in failing tocollect and remit the taxes (see Kalb v United States, 505 F2d 506, 511 [2d Cir 1974],cert denied 421 US 979 [1975]; Gold v United States, 506 F Supp 473, 479 [EDNY 1981], affd 671 F2d 492 [2d Cir 1981]). Instead, petitioner disregarded Nastasi'smismanagement and continued delegating to Nastasi the responsibility of remitting payment ofthe taxes to the Department (see Matter of Risoli v Commissioner of Taxation &Fin., 237 AD2d at 677; Matter of Wolfstich v New York State Tax Commn., 106AD2d 745, 747 [1984]; Matter of Ragonesi v New York State Tax Commn., 88 AD2d707, 708 [1982]). To the extent that petitioner's remaining arguments in support of annulment areproperly before us, they have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.

Egan Jr., J.P., and Ceresia, J., concur.

Lynch, J. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent and would annul the determination ofrespondent Tax Appeals Tribunal holding petitioner responsible for the tax liability of thecorporation New England Construction Company (hereinafter NECC). At the outset, it must beacknowledged that petitioner, by his own account, engaged in a highly inappropriate scheme offalsely holding himself out as NECC's financial decision-maker for purposes of retaining itsstatus as a minority-owned business enterprise (hereinafter MBE) (see generallyExecutive Law § 310 [1], [7] [a], [b], [c]; 5 NYCRR 144.2 [a], [b] [1]). Suchbehavior violated the MBE requirements (see Executive Law § 310 [1], [7][b], [c]). Nevertheless, there are regulatory provisions to address such a scenario (see 5NYCRR 144.4 [a]), and the question before this Court is not the appropriateness of petitioner'sconduct, but the propriety of the Tribunal's determination that he should be held personally liablefor the corporation's tax liability. In our view, the Tribunal erred in concluding that he shouldbe.

Under state tax law, a person may be held personally liable for the tax liability of a businessif, as relevant here, he or she is (1) "required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over thetax imposed" and (2) "willfully fails to collect such tax or truthfully account for and pay oversuch tax" (Tax Law § 685 [g]). A person responsible for "collect[ing], truthfullyaccount[ing] for, and pay[ing] over the tax" (Tax Law § 685 [g]) includes, inpertinent part, "an officer or employee of any corporation . . . who . . .is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs" (Tax Law§ 685 [n]). The federal tax code contains a nearly identical provision as it relates toholding an individual personally liable for the federal tax liability of a business (see 26USC § 6672 [a]), and defines a responsible "person" in virtually the same manner asTax Law § 685 (n) (see 26 USC § 6671 [b]). Given that TaxLaw § 685 (g) and 26 USC § 6672 are parallel statutes, the terms setforth therein must be construed in conformity unless a different meaning is clearly required(see Tax Law § 607 [a]; Matter of Friedsam v State Tax Commn.,64 NY2d 76, 80 [1984]; Matter of Levin v Gallman, 42 NY2d 32, 33-34 [1977];Matter of Baum v State Tax Commn., 89 AD2d 646, 647 [1982], lv denied 57NY2d 607 [1982]). While this rule does not preclude the state and federal taxing authorities fromcoming to different conclusions on an identical set of facts, it does require the state authority toapply the same standard as the federal authority when construing the meaning of responsibleperson under Tax Law § 685 (g), as there is no clear indication that the Legislatureintended the term to have a different meaning from how it is used in 26 USC § 6672(a).

Several factors are relevant in determining whether an individual is a person responsible forpaying the tax under 26 USC § 6671 (b), including, among other things, whetherthe individual "(1) is an officer or member of the board of directors, (2) owns shares or possessesan entrepreneurial stake in the company, (3) is active in the management of day-to-day affairs ofthe company, (4) has the ability to hire and fire employees, (5) makes decisions regarding which,when and in what order outstanding debts or taxes will be paid, (6) exercises control over dailybank accounts and disbursement records, and (7) has check-signing authority" (Vinick vUnited States, 205 F3d 1, 7 [1st Cir 2000]; see Fiataruolo v United States, 8 F3d 930,939 [2d Cir 1993]). Although no single factor is determinative and the "totality of thecircumstances" must be considered (Vinick v United States, 205 F3d at 8 [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]), the "core question 'is whether the individual hassignificant control over the enterprise's finances' " (Fiataruolo v United States, 8F3d at 939 [emphasis added and emphasis omitted], quoting Hochstein v United States,900 F2d 543, 547 [2d Cir 1990]). This test "is meant to encompass all those connected closelyenough with the business to prevent the tax default from occurring" (Fiataruolo v UnitedStates, 8 F3d at 939 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]), but it "is notmeant to ensnare those who have merely technical authority or titular designation"(id.).

Turning to that analysis, the record demonstrates that Anthony Nastasi (hereinafter Nastasi),rather than petitioner, was the person who had significant control over NECC's finances duringthe tax years in question. To that end, the record contains an exhibit—which was enteredinto evidence at the hearing—memorializing a December 2005 agreement betweenpetitioner and Nastasi & Associates, Inc. In that agreement, petitioner effectively cededcontrol of the business to Nastasi, agreeing that, upon Nastasi's written demand, he would resignas president of NECC and sell 95% of his stock shares to Nastasi for the nominal sum of onedollar per share. During the administrative hearing, petitioner explained that Nastasi took controlof the business around that time and petitioner mainly became responsible for field operations.Petitioner maintained that Nastasi was responsible for "[e]verything inside the office as far aspayments and all the liabilities and distributions as far as checks and taxes." Two other witnesseswho worked with NECC during the relevant time frame corroborated that contention, explainingthat Nastasi decided what tax liabilities to pay on behalf of the corporation and that petitioner didnot have any authority in that regard.

Also received into evidence at the hearing was the appeals protest petitioner filed in thefederal tax proceeding. That submission included two affidavits from Nastasi in which he averredthat petitioner "handled the operating activities of NECC[ ], but did not handle the financialresponsibilities and the decisions of NECC[ ]." Nastasi further explained that petitioner had"signature authority on the bank accounts only to enable him to handle items related to runningthe operations of [the business; h]is authority did not include payment of . . .accrued liabilities, tax obligations, or anything beyond the company's general operations."Notably, Nastasi admitted that, during his tenure as director of the corporation, he "exercisedcontrol over the financial policies of [NECC]," including "authorizing payments for taxobligations . . . and accrued liabilities." Based on that information, the InternalRevenue Service determined that petitioner was not personally liable for the corporation's failureto make trust fund payments.

Rather than analyzing petitioner's control over the company's finances, the Tribunal framedthe issue as "whether petitioner presented facts showing that [he] lacked control and authorityover the affairs of [NECC]" (emphasis added), ultimately finding that petitioner was aresponsible person insofar as he: (1) held himself out as an officer and the majority shareholderof the business; (2) managed the field operations; (3) had check-signing authority; (4) filed taxreturns on behalf of the business; and (5) had a considerable interest in the company. The"affairs" of a business is a far broader concept than the "finances" of a business. Although thefactors cited by the Tribunal are certainly relevant to the finance analysis, titular authority isinsufficient and the Tribunal's characterization of the question before it raises uncertainty as towhether it applied the correct standard. Indeed, the Tribunal did not make any specific findingsthat petitioner had "significant control over the enterprise's finances"—the "core"component of the inquiry (Fiataruolo v United States, 8 F3d at 939 [internal quotationmarks, emphasis and citation omitted]). In the absence of any such consideration, the Tribunal'sdetermination that petitioner was a responsible person within the meaning of Tax Law§ 685 (g) cannot be sustained.

Turning to the issue of willfulness, "the test is whether the act, default, or conduct isconsciously and voluntarily done with knowledge that as a result, trust funds belonging to the[g]overnment will not be paid over but will be used for other purposes" (Matter of Levin vGallman, 42 NY2d at 34). Concluding that petitioner acted willfully in failing to remit therequired taxes, the Tribunal relied on a series of cases holding that an individual "cannot absolve[himself or herself of liability] merely by disregarding [his or her] duty and leaving it to someoneelse to discharge" (Matter of Ragonesi v New York State Tax Commn., 88 AD2d 707,708 [1982]; see Matter of Levin v Gallman, 42 NY2d at 34; Matter of Risoli vCommissioner of Taxation & Fin., 237 AD2d 675, 677 [1997]; Matter of Capocciav New York State Tax Commn., 105 AD2d 528, 529 [1984]). Using this reasoning, theTribunal found that petitioner's "continued reliance on another[, i.e., Nastasi,] to pay withholdingtax constituted a reckless disregard of his duty to act," satisfying the willfulness requirement.

The Tribunal is correct that a responsible person will not be absolved of his or her duty topay withholding taxes simply by delegating that authority to another individual. However, thecases it relied on to support that proposition are factually distinguishable. In each case, theresponsible person retained actual authority over the payment of the taxes at the time the taxliability was incurred (see e.g. Matter of Levin v Gallman, 42 NY2d at 34; Matter ofRisoli v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 237 AD2d at 677; Matter of Ragonesi vNew York State Tax Commn., 88 AD2d at 708). Here, by comparison, petitioner cededcontrol to Nastasi nine years before the subject tax liability came to fruition. As defined above,willfulness requires a showing that the delegation of control was done with knowledge that thetrust funds would not be paid to the state. There is nothing in the record to indicate that NECCwas not paying withholding taxes in 2005. Moreover, as the Administrative Law Judgerecognized, the 2005 agreement gave Nastasi "carte blanche over the finances of thecorporation." The operative point is that petitioner had no actual authority to compel Nastasi tomake the required payments once he learned that NECC was in default. We recognize that the2005 agreement was "one of [petitioner's] own making," as the Tribunal observed, and thewisdom of that agreement is not the issue. However, the Tribunal's determination that"petitioner's continued reliance" on Nastasi constituted willfulness is not rational, for by thatpoint petitioner had no authority to intervene. In other words, this is not a "continued reliance"situation. For the foregoing reasons, we would annul the Tribunal's determination.

Aarons, J., concurs. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, andpetition dismissed.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:In proceedings before the IRS,the IRS Appeals Office forwarded written correspondence to petitioner advising him that itdetermined that petitioner should be relieved of liability for certain trust fund recovery penaltiesassessed for the period December 31, 2012 through June 30, 2015 as it found that he was not a"responsible person" of NECC as defined under 26 USC § 6672 (a).

Footnote 2:Based upon Nastasi's terminationof petitioner in February 2015, and the sale of petitioner's shares of stock to Nastasi in May 2015,the Administrative Law Judge cancelled the third notice of deficiency for the period ending June2015.

Footnote 3:We disagree with petitioner'sassertion that, in finding petitioner had not demonstrated he lacked "authority and control" ratherthan "actual authority," the Tribunal employed a fallacious standard, and, as such, substantialevidence analysis does not apply.


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