People v Maggio
2022 NY Slip Op 06262 [210 AD3d 798]
November 9, 2022
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 4, 2023


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Appellant,
v
Christopher Maggio, Respondent.

Raymond A. Tierney, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Alfred J. Croce and ThomasC. Costello of counsel), for appellant.

Barket Epstein Kearon Aldea & LoTurco, LLP, Garden City, NY (Donna Aldeaand Danielle Muscatello of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the People from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (TimothyP. Mazzei, J.), dated March 22, 2021, which granted, without a hearing, the defendant'smotion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate a judgment of the same court (James Hudson,J.) rendered April 6, 2010, convicting him of driving while intoxicated in violation ofVehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3), upon his plea of guilty, and imposingsentence.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, the defendant's motion pursuant toCPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment rendered April 6, 2010 is denied, and the judgment isreinstated.

On March 3, 2010, the defendant appeared before the Supreme Court and entered aplea of guilty to driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1192 (3). The court informed the defendant that, as a condition of hisplea, the court was "obligated to revoke [his] privilege to operate a motor vehicle." Thedefendant then admitted that, on August 21, 2009, he consumed alcoholic beveragesbefore operating a motor vehicle on a public highway in Suffolk County, and theconsumption of those beverages rendered him intoxicated. On April 6, 2010, thedefendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement, and the sentenceincluded a one-year revocation of his driver license.

On September 25, 2012, the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles(hereinafter DMV) adopted a regulation governing applications for relicensing followinga license revocation made by persons with multiple alcohol-related or drug-relateddriving convictions. By letter dated November 7, 2012, a representative of the DMVinformed the defendant that, pursuant to that regulation, his application to reinstate hisdriver license following the one-year revocation had been denied since he had "three orfour alcohol- or drug-related driving convictions or incidents" (15 NYCRR 136.5 [b][2]), in addition to "one or more serious driving offenses" (id.), within the 25years preceding the date of the instant offense (see id. § 136.5 [a][3]). The letter further advised the defendant that he could seek reconsideration of theDMV's determination on the basis of any "unusual, extenuating and compellingcircumstances" that may exist in his case (id. § 136.5[d]).

[*2] In September 2020, the defendantmoved pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment rendered April 6, 2010, on theground that he was not made aware that entering a plea of guilty could result in thepermanent revocation of his driver license and, thus, his right to due process had beenviolated. In an order dated March 22, 2021, the Supreme Court granted the defendant'smotion to vacate the judgment of conviction and dismissed the accusatory instrument inthe interest of justice. The People appeal.

CPL 440.10 (1) (h) permits a court to vacate a judgment of conviction on the groundthat "[t]he judgment was obtained in violation of a right of the defendant under theconstitution of this state or of the United States." A plea of guilty will be upheld as validif it was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently (see People vFiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536, 543 [1993]; People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 666[1988]; People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 17 [1983]).

The Supreme Court erred in granting the defendant's motion to vacate the judgmentof conviction on the ground that his plea of guilty was not entered knowingly,voluntarily, and intelligently. The subject regulation that led to the denial of thedefendant's application for relicensing did not exist at the time he entered his plea ofguilty, and it would have been impossible for the court to inform the defendant ofconsequences flowing therefrom (see People v DiTore, 209 AD3d 665 [2d Dept 2022]; People v Wheaton, 49 Misc 3d378, 379 [Seneca County Ct 2015]). " 'The defendant's grievance lies withthe enactment and enforcement of the new regulation, not the manner of hisconviction' " (People v DiTore, 209 AD3d at 667, quoting People vWheaton, 49 Misc 3d at 379).

In any event, contrary to the defendant's contention, the DMV's denial of hisapplication for relicensing did not deprive him of the benefit of his plea agreement(see e.g. People v Varnum, 291 AD2d 724, 725 [2002]). In rejecting amultifaceted challenge to the subject regulation, the Court of Appeals observed that theVehicle and Traffic Law "contemplates that the Commissioner [of the DMV] will haveexclusive authority over post-revocation relicensing, and that those relicensingdeterminations will be discretionary" (Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 29NY3d 202, 220 [2017]). Since an offender is not "entitled to relicensingunder the Vehicle and Traffic Law upon expiration of the statutory revocation period"(id. at 219), the Supreme Court's imposition of a one-year license revocation inthis case carried with it no guarantee that the defendant's driver license would bereinstated at the end of that one-year period. The subsequent adoption of the subjectregulation had the effect of "formalizing" the Commissioner's discretion (id. at220) by providing that relicensing applications by certain repeat offenders "shall" bedenied (15 NYCRR 136.5 [b] [2]) in the absence of any "unusual, extenuating andcompelling circumstances" (id. at 136.5 [d]). While that may have increased thelikelihood that the defendant's relicensing application would be denied, it does not alterour analysis, since the defendant had no enforceable expectation that his driver licensewould be reinstated in the first place.

Contrary to the defendant's further contention, his unawareness that, as aconsequence of his entering a plea of guilty, his driver license might never be reinstateddid not prevent his plea from being knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. To the extentthat the potentially permanent license revocation authorized under the subject regulationis a consequence of the defendant's instant plea of guilty at all (see People v Avital, 64 Misc3d 483, 485 [East Fishkill Just Ct 2019] [denial of relicensing under 15 NYCRR136.5 results not from any particular conviction, but from the applicant's "completedriving history"]), it is, as the defendant acknowledges, a collateral consequence of hisplea (see People v Peque,22 NY3d 168, 185 [2013], citing People v Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 403 [1995]).The defendant contends, and the Supreme Court concluded in the order appealed from,that the effective lifetime suspension of his license to drive is a consequence that,although collateral, is "of such great importance to him that he would have made adifferent decision had that consequence been disclosed" (People v Peque, 22NY3d at 192, quoting People vGravino, 14 NY3d 546, 559 [2010]). We disagree.

In People v Gravino (14 NY3d at 555-558), where the defendant was notadvised at the time of her entering a plea of guilty that she would be required to registeras a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (hereinafter SORA), the Courtof Appeals held that SORA [*3]registration was acollateral consequence of the defendant's plea of guilty, not a direct consequence, andtherefore her plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent despite her unawareness of theregistration requirement at the time of her plea. In the companion case of People vEllsworth, where the defendant entered a plea of guilty to course of sexual conductagainst a child in the second degree, the Court held that a condition of the defendant's10-year period of probation forbidding him from associating with any child under the ageof 18, including his own children, was a collateral consequence of the defendant's plea ofguilty, not a direct consequence, and his unawareness of that condition did not preventhis plea from being knowing, voluntary, and intelligent (see id. at 551-553,558-559). The Court of Appeals recognized in Gravino that "[t]here may be casesin which a defendant can show that he [or she] pleaded guilty in ignorance of aconsequence that, although collateral for purposes of due process, was of such greatimportance to him [or her] that he [or she] would have made a different decision had thatconsequence been disclosed" (id. at 559). The Court concluded, however, that"neither of the cases before us fits this description, and indeed such cases will be rare"(id.).

Subsequently, in People vHarnett (16 NY3d 200 [2011]), the Court of Appeals addressed a defendant'sargument that his plea of guilty was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because hewas not warned that, as a "detained sex offender," he was potentially subject to the SexOffender Management and Treatment Act (hereinafter SOMTA), under which, aftercompleting his prison term, he could be "committed to a secure treatment facility. . . until such time as he . . . no longer require[d] confinement"(id. at 204, quoting Mental Hygiene Law §§ 10.03 [g]; 10.07[f]). After concluding that SOMTA confinement, like SORA registration, was acollateral consequence of a conviction, the Court considered whether the possibility ofSOMTA confinement was "of such great importance" that fundamental fairnessnonetheless required that the defendant be warned of that consequence upon entering aplea of guilty (People v Harnett, 16 NY3d at 207, quoting People vGravino, 14 NY3d at 559). The Court held that, although, under certaincircumstances, and where a defendant can show that "the prospect of SOMTAconfinement was realistic enough," he or she may be able to demonstrate that a plea ofguilty entered without awareness of that consequence was not knowing, voluntary, andintelligent, as a general matter, a warning about SOMTA-related consequences is notrequired, and the absence of such a warning does not "automatically invalidate [a] guiltyplea" (People v Harnett, 16 NY3d at 203, 207).

By contrast, in People v Peque (22 NY3d at 176), the Court of Appeals heldthat, although deportation from the United States is a collateral consequence of acriminal conviction, "due process compels a trial court to apprise a defendant that, if thedefendant is not an American citizen, he or she may be deported as a consequence of aguilty plea to a felony." The Court explained that "deportation is a plea consequence ofsuch tremendous importance, grave impact and frequent occurrence that a defendant isentitled to notice that it may ensue from a plea" (id.). A plurality of the Courtdistinguished the circumstances of Peque from those of Gravino andHarnett, reasoning that "[u]nlike SORA registration, SOMTA confinement orother collateral consequences, the deportation process deprives the defendant of anexceptional degree of physical liberty by first detaining and then forcibly removing thedefendant from the country" (id. at 192). The Peque plurality considered awarning necessary, even though deportation is "technically on the collateral side of thedirect/collateral divide," because deportation "constitutes a uniquely devastatingdeprivation of liberty" (id. at 192, 193). Thus, a majority of the Court held that"deportation constitutes such a substantial and unique consequence of a plea that it mustbe mentioned by the trial court to a defendant as a matter of fundamental fairness"(id.).

Thus, the Court of Appeals has clearly indicated that a consequence of a convictionmust represent an exceptionally severe liberty deprivation in order to fall within thenarrow category of collateral consequences of which a defendant must be advised at thetime of entering the plea. Given that SORA registration, a condition of probationseparating a defendant from his or her children, and even the prospect of indefinite civilconfinement pursuant to SOMTA are not considered sufficiently onerous to require that adefendant be advised of such consequences at the time of his or her plea, we cannotconclude that the permanent loss of a driver license fits into that category. Although theprivilege of having a driver license may be of value and importance to many defendants,its loss cannot be considered a devastating deprivation of liberty that can be equated with[*4]deportation, or deemed more severe than SORAregistration, denial of contact with one's children, or SOMTA confinement. Thus, even ifthe subject regulation had existed at the time of the defendant's entering a plea of guilty,the fact that his conviction could contribute to a decision by the DMV to deny reissuanceof a driver license at the end of the revocation period does not present the "rare" case inwhich the defendant's plea cannot be deemed knowing, voluntary and intelligent unlesshe was advised of that consequence at the time of his plea (id. at 192; seePeople v Gravino, 14 NY3d at 559).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion pursuantto CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction. Brathwaite Nelson, J.P., Rivera,Zayas and Genovesi, JJ., concur.


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