| People v Benitez |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 50353(U) [75 Misc 3d 1204(A)] |
| Decided on May 6, 2022 |
| District Court Of Suffolk County, First District |
| Sachs, J. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on May 6, 2022
The People of theState of New York, Plaintiff, against Kelvin J. Bonilla Benitez, Defendant. |
Docket No. CR-015235-21SU
Raymond A. Tierney
District Attorney of Suffolk County
MeredithCapobianco, of Counsel
District Court Bureau
400 Carleton Avenue
CentralIslip, NY 11722
Alla Richards, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
25 Candee Avenue
Sayville, NY11782
Eric Sachs, J.
Upon the following papers numbered 1 to X read on these motions to reargue Notice of Motion/xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and supporting papers X Notice of CrossMotion and supporting papers; Answering Affidavits and supporting papers X ;Replying Affidavits and supporting papers X ;Filed papers; Other Exhibits X;Certificate(s) of Compliance X
(and after hearing counsel in support of and opposed to the motion) it is,ORDERED that thismotion to reargue by the defendant with respect to the defendant's motion to dismiss for analleged violation of his statutory speedy trial rights is GRANTED.
On May 31, 2021, the defendant was charged with Driving While Intoxicated in violation ofNew York State Vehicle and Traffic Law ["VTL"] section 1192.3, an unclassified misdemeanor,and Unlicensed Operator in violation of VTL section 509.1, an infraction.
Pursuant to CPL section 30.30(1)(b), the People were required to make an effectivestatement of their readiness for trial within 90 days of the commencement date of the withincriminal action, taking into account all excludable time periods. The within criminal action was[*2]commenced on May 31, 2021. The People filed a Certificateof Compliance/Statement of Readiness [hereinafter "CoC" and "SoR"] on November 15,2021.
On December 16, 2021, the defendant moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument on speedytrial grounds. In a decision dated February 15, 2022, this Court denied the motion to dismiss, andmade the following speedy trial calculation:
During the defendant's arraignment on May 31, 2021, he was represented by arraignmentcounsel and the matter was adjourned to June 10, 2021. (Def.'s Aff. at ¶ 4). The defendantappeared with retained counsel on June 10, 2021 and the matter was adjourned to July 16, 2021.The defendant has conceded that the time from June 10, 2021 through July 16, 2021 ischargeable to him. (See Def.'s Aff. at � 4; Def.'s Mot. to Reargue at � 4).
On July 16, 2021, the defendant's counsel submitted a written request for an adjournment,and the matter was put over until September 14, 2021. Thereafter, the People's filing of the CoCon November 15, 2021 served to stop the running of speedy trial time. (See People vGiordano, 56 NY2d 524 [1982]; People v Brothers, 50 NY2d 413 [1980];CPL 245.50[1], [3]). The People have conceded that the 62-day period from September 14, 2021until the November 15, 2021 filing of their CoC is chargeable to them. (See People's Aff.in Opp. at � 12).
In its February 15, 2022 order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the Courtconcluded that the People had only utilized a maximum of 72 days of speedy trial time. In soholding, the Court (1) assumed without deciding that the time from May 31, 2021 until June 10,2021 was chargeable to the People (10 days), (2) deemed the time from June 10, 2021 until July16, 2021 to be excludable, (3) deemed the time from July 16, 2021 through September 14, 2021to be excludable, as defense counsel had requested an adjournment on July 16, 2021, and (4)deemed the time from September 14, 2021 until November 15, 2021 was chargeable to thePeople (62 days).
Presently before the Court is the defendant's March 28, 2022 motion to reargue the Court'sdenial of the defendant's motion to dismiss.
In general, a motion for leave to reargue or to renew is addressed to the sound discretion ofthe court. (See HSBC Bank USA, NA v Halls, 98 AD3d 718, 950 NYS2d 172,174 [2d Dep't 2012]). A motion for renewal "shall be based upon new facts not offered on theprior motion that would change the prior determination" [CPLR 2221 [e][2]]. A motion forreargument must be "based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehendedby the court in determining the prior motion, but shall not include any matters of fact not offeredon the prior motion." [CPLR 2221[d][2]].[FN1]
In support of the defendant's motion to reargue, the defendant contends that the Court'mistakenly overlooked' the written request submitted to the court by defendant's counsel,i.e., the July 16, 2021 email in which defendant's counsel stated that she was not able toappear virtually, [*3]and requested an adjournment, but expresslystated "no waivers." (Def.'s Mot. to Reargue at ¶ 7 & Ex. A). In opposition, the Peopleargue that the 60-day time period, from July 16, 2021 until September 14, 2021, is neverthelessexcludable from the 90 day speedy trial clock under CPL § 30.30(4)(b), since the defendantrequested the adjournment.
CPL § 30.30(1)(b) states that, aside from certain enumerated exceptions, "...a motionmade pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section 170.30...must be granted where thePeople are not ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein adefendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor."
CPL § 30.30(4)(b) expressly lists the periods of time that must be excluded from thespeedy trial calculation, among which are "continuance[s]... [made] at the request of, or with theconsent of, the defendant or his or her counsel." (See CPL § 30.30(4)(b) ["Incomputing the time within which the people must be ready for trial pursuant to subdivisions oneand two of this section, the following periods must be excluded: (b) the period of delay resultingfrom a continuance granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant orhis or her counsel"]).
It is well-established law that adjournments made at the request of the defendant's counselare excludable pursuant to the plain language of CPL § 30.30(4)(b). See People vMartinez, 186 AD3d 1530, 130 NYS3d 828 [2d Dep't 2020] ["delay occasioned byadjournments at the request of or with the consent of the defense" are excludable under CPL30.30(4)(b)]. Accord, People v Barnes, 160 AD3d 890, 890, 75 NYS3d229, 231 [2d Dep't 2018] [adjournment granted at the request or with the consent of thedefendant excludable] and People v Hall, 61 AD2d 1050, 1051 [2d Dep't 1978][adjournments requested by the defendant are not chargeable to the prosecution]. In so holding,courts have reasoned that "CPL 30.30(4)(b)[,] which provides for exclusion based on defenseconsent to adjournments, operates on the premise that defendant waived the delay in theproceedings by requesting or consenting to these adjournments." People v Knight,140 Misc 2d 1075, 1076, 532 NYS2d 485, 486—87 [Sup Ct 1988] [citing Peoplev Worley, 66 NY2d 523 at 527, 498 NYS2d 116 [1985]].
Courts have applied this rule even where the People have not yet made a statement ofreadiness for trial. See, e.g., People v Delacruz, 241 AD2d 328,660 NYS2d 7 [1st Dep't 1997] [reversing trial court's charge of time of adjournment requested bydefendant's counsel to People; holding exclusion for adjournments requested by defendant'scounsel "is free standing and applies irrespective of whether the People, previously or on the dateof the request, answered ready"]. Accord, People v Cambridge, 230 AD2d649 [1st Dep't 1996] [where the defense triggered one of the statutory exclusions, the People'sunreadiness was irrelevant]; People v Gerstel, 134 AD2d 218, 520 NYS2d 451,452 [2d Dep't 1987] [determining 11-day adjournment for vacation requested by the defendant'scounsel was excludable, even where People had not yet announced readiness]; andPeople v Meierdiercks, 68 NY2d 613, 614 [1986] [rejecting argument that theperiod of adjournment should not be excludable since adjournments did not prevent the Peoplefrom seeking indictments].
However, courts have further noted that CPL 30.30's exclusion is based on the premise thatthe defense consented to the waiver. People v Knight, 140 Misc 2d 1075, 1076,532 NYS2d 485, 486—87 [Sup Ct 1988] ["CPL 30.30(4)(b)[,] which provides forexclusion based on defense consent to adjournments, operates on the premise that defendantwaived the delay in the [*4]proceedings by requesting orconsenting to these adjournments"].
In this case, although the adjournment was requested by the defendant's counsel, defendant'scounsel also expressly stated "no waivers." In light of the fact that the defendant's counselexpressly withheld consent to waiver, this Court holds that the time is not excludable.
Moreover, in determining whether the time requested for an adjournment is excludable,courts have, in certain circumstances, deemed excludable only the actual time requested by theparty seeking an adjournment. See also People v Boumoussa, 104 AD3d 863,863, 961 NYS2d 297, 297—98 [2d Dep't 2013] [any period of adjournment requested bythe People in excess of that actually requested by the People post-readiness is excluded]. In suchcases, courts have reasoned that the defendant should not be charged with delay caused by courtcongestion or scheduling conflicts, particularly where the People are not prevented fromdeclaring readiness during the pre-readiness period. See People v Yannarilli, 191AD3d 1327, 1329, 141 NYS3d 593 [4th Dep't 2021] ["In general, 'the People should be chargedwith pre-readiness delays caused by court congestion," and that rule 'is premised on the idea thatsuch delays do not inhibit the People from declaring readiness in writing, through an off-calendarstatement'" (citing People v Barden, 27 NY3d 553, 556, 36 NYS3d 80[2016])].
This rule arguably applies equally to pre-readiness adjournments requested by the defendant:the defendant should not be penalized for delay caused by court congestion or schedulingconflicts prior to the People's readiness announcement, because the People have the option todeclare readiness off-calendar. See, e.g., People v Yannarilli, 191AD3d 1327, 1329, 141 NYS3d 593 [4th Dep't 2021] [deeming only 7-day adjournment requestedby defendant's counsel excludable, where court adjourned matter for 29 days due to schedulingconflicts and "calendar congestion"]. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the time isexcludable because the adjournment was requested by the defendant's counsel, this Court deemsonly the actual time the defendant's counsel in fact requested, i.e., the 33-day extension,from July 16, 2021 until August 18, 2021,[FN2]to be excludable. Therefore, the Court finds that the People are chargeable with 27 days fromAugust 18, 2021 until September 14, 2021, and, as discussed above, 62 days from September 14,2021 until the November 15, 2021. Consequently, the People are chargeable with 89 days.
In light of this calculation, the Court must next decide the question whether the ten-dayperiod from May 31, 2021 until June 10, 2021, in which the Court adjourned the proceedings toallow the defendant to retain counsel, is excludable. It is axiomatic that "the period during whichthe defendant is without counsel through no fault of the court" is excludable [CPL 30.30(4)(f)].Pursuant to this section, courts have generally excluded the time from arraignment until the nextcourt appearance where the defendant sought to retain counsel after arraignment. See,e.g., People v Joseph, 47 Misc 3d 265, 270, 999 NYS2d 320, 325 [CrimCt, NY Cnty 2014] [time period from arraignment until next appearance excludable whereadjournment was for the [*5]purpose of permitting defendant toretain counsel].
Here, however, it is unclear from the papers submitted whether the defendant was "withoutcounsel" during this time period. See, e.g., People v Masellis, 140Misc 2d 1024, 532 NYS2d 465 [Crim Ct, NY Cnty 1988] [Legal Aid attorney not relieved by thecourt during period from arraignment to next court appearance, thus time period not excludable].Neither party has submitted the minutes from the March 31, 2021 court appearance. The Peoplehave the burden of establishing their entitlement to a statutory exclusion for the period of delay.(See People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 590 NYS2d 9 [1992] ["[]it is the People'sburden to ensure, in the first instance, that the record of the proceedings at which theadjournment was actually granted is sufficiently clear to enable the court considering thesubsequent CPL 30.30 motion to make an informed decision as to whether the People should becharged."). Without the minutes, the People have not established that the 10-day period fromMay 31 until June 10, 2021 is excludable. In addition, the People have conceded that the "casewas adjourned to June 10, 2021 without waivers." People's Aff. in Opp. at ¶ 4(emphasis added). Consequently, the Court deems the 10-day period from May 31, 2021 untilJune 10, 2021 to be chargeable to the People.
In sum, the People are chargeable with the period from May 31, 2021 until June 10, 2021 (10days), the period from August 18, 2021 until September 14, 2021 (27 days), and the period fromSeptember 14, 2021 until the November 15, 2021 (62 days). Thus, the People are chargeable witha total of 99 days, which is in excess of the statutorily-required 90 days.
By reason of the foregoing, the defendant's motion to reargue his motion to dismiss theaccusatory instrument for alleged violation of the defendant's speedy trial rights isGRANTED.
Dated: May 6, 2022HON. ERIC SACHS J.D.C.
Footnote 1:While it is unclear whetherCPLR 2221 is applicable in criminal cases (see People v DeFreitas, 48 Misc 3d569 [Crim Ct NY County 2015]), it is well-recognized law that "courts have 'inherent power' tocorrect their own mistakes." People v Williams, 73 Misc 3d 1209(A), 154 NYS3d217 [NY Crim Ct 2021]. Thus, courts have held that "reargument" is available, regardless of theapplicability of CPLR 2221 to criminal proceedings (see People v Godbold, 117 AD3d 565, 566 [1st Dep't 2014].
Footnote 2:The Court's unavailability for the27-day period from August 18, 2021 until September 14, 2021, prior to the People's statement ofreadiness, is not chargeable to the defendant. See People v Yannarilli, 191 AD3d1327, 141 NYS3d 593 [4th Dep't 2021] ["we conclude that the one-week adjournment ischargeable to defendant because defense counsel requested it, but defense counsel'saccommodation of the court's schedule was chargeable to the People"].