| Ernie Otto Corp. v Inland Southeast Thompson Monticello,LLC |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 00273 [91 AD3d 1155] |
| January 19, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Ernie Otto Corporation, Appellant, v Inland Southeast ThompsonMonticello, LLC, Respondent. |
—[*1] Segel, Goldman, Mazzotta & Siegel, P.C., Albany (Jeffrey A. Siegel of counsel), forrespondent.
McCarthy, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Sackett, J.), entered September 9,2010 in Sullivan County, which, among other things, granted defendant's cross motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint.
In January 1997, defendant, then owner of Monticello Mall, entered into a lease agreementwith plaintiff to rent space within the mall for a greeting card store. The lease contained arestrictive covenant that prohibited defendant from renting "[d]uring the term of this [l]ease. . . to another [t]enant dedicated primarily to the sale of greeting cards." The leasedefined such tenant as one with "more than thirty-six (36) feet of rack for the sale of greetingcards." At the time plaintiff signed the lease, however, defendant was already renting to Kim'sMountain Gifts Corporation.[FN1]Kim's and defendant entered into a lease in 1993, four years prior [*2]to plaintiff's lease taking effect. The lease agreement with Kim'sgave Kim's the right to sell, among other things, greeting cards and did not restrict that right inany way. In 2000, Kim's doubled in size, increasing its rack space for greeting cards from 30 feetto between 120 and 150 feet. Plaintiff did not commence this action until 2004, when Kim'srenewed its lease, increased its rack size another 20 feet, and entered into a contract withHallmark to carry its products.
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment against defendant, seeking a permanent injunctionand enforcement of the restrictive covenant. Defendant cross-moved for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint. Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion, granted defendant's crossmotion for summary judgment, dismissed plaintiff's complaint, and awarded defendant counselfees. Plaintiff appeals.[FN2]
Supreme Court did not err in awarding defendant summary judgment. "[T]he law favors 'freeand unencumbered use of real property, and covenants restricting use are strictly construedagainst those seeking to enforce them' " (Van Schaick v Trustees of Union Coll., 285AD2d 859, 860 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 607 [2001], quoting Witter v Taggart,78 NY2d 234, 237 [1991]; accord Deverv DeVito, 84 AD3d 1539, 1542 [2011], lv dismissed 18 NY3d 864 [2012]; see Bear Mtn. Books v Woodbury Common Partners,232 AD2d 595, 595-596 [1996]). "Moreover, courts will enforce such restraints only where theparty seeking enforcement establishes their application by clear and convincing evidence"(Dever v DeVito, 84 AD3d at 1542 [citations omitted]). "[W]here the language used in arestrictive covenant is equally susceptible of two interpretations, the less restrictive interpretationmust be adopted" (Ludwig vChautauqua Shores Improvement Assn., 5 AD3d 1119, 1120 [2004], lv denied 3NY3d 601 [2004]; see Bear Mtn. Books v Woodbury Common Partners, 232 AD2d at596).
The restrictive covenant at issue provides that "[d]uring the term of this [l]ease, [defendant]will not rent to another [t]enant dedicated primarily to the sale of greeting cards." Plaintiff hadthe burden of showing that the language "to another [t]enant" applied not only to new tenants, butalso included tenants under lease with defendant prior to plaintiff executing its lease. The lessrestrictive interpretation of the language at issue here limits the covenant's application to futuretenants only. Any other reading would force defendant to breach its agreement with Kim's, whichwas under no obligation to limit its sale of greeting cards under the terms of its lease. Thus,defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Supreme Court also properly found that the covenant did not apply to Kim's. A "restrictivecovenant cannot be enforced against a competing tenant whose lease predates the covenant'sexecution" (Fratelli's Pizza & Rest.Corp. v Kayzee Realty Corp., 74 AD3d 481, 481 [2010]). There is no dispute that thelease that Kim's had predated plaintiff's lease by four years. Plaintiff, however, contends that theexpansion by Kim's in 2000 amounted to a new lease agreement between the parties and, thus,put Kim's on notice of the restrictive covenant. We find this argument unavailing. Mereamendments to a preexisting tenant's lease, that do not materially affect the rights of the partiesunder it or otherwise work to annul the prior agreement, [*3]donot constitute a new agreement (seeL'Art de Jewel Ltd. v Hudson Sheraton Corp., LLC, 46 AD3d 418, 420 [2007]). WhenKim's executed the 2000 amendment to the original lease, the only material terms altered werethe square footage and base rent. Because none of the substantive terms of the agreementchanged, specifically the items that Kim's was permitted to sell, the amendment did not constitutea new lease agreement (see id.).
As the prevailing party, defendant was properly awarded counsel fees consistent with theagreement between the parties. If either party commences an action against the other, the rider toplaintiff's lease provides that "the prevailing party in such action shall be entitled to all expensesincurred therein including reasonable attorney's fees." Because plaintiff's claim was dismissedand summary judgment was properly awarded to defendant, Supreme Court did not err in findingthat defendant was the prevailing party.
Spain, J.P., Malone Jr., Stein and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,with costs.
Footnote 1: Kim's Mountain GiftsCorporation and owner Kim Hine were originally named defendants to this action. In a separatedecision, affirmed by this Court, the action was dismissed against these defendants for plaintiff'sfailure to comply with discovery demands (53 AD3d 924, 925-926 [2008], lv dismissed11 NY3d 827 [2008]).
Footnote 2: Defendant sold Monticello Mallin 2007 and the lease agreement that Kim's had with Monticello Mall ended in 2009. Becauseneither Kim's nor defendant has any current interest in the property, plaintiff's request for apermanent injunction is moot.