Layden v Plante
2012 NY Slip Op 09126 [101 AD3d 1540]
December 27, 2012
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 6, 2013


Dianne A. Layden et al., Appellants, v Angela Plante et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]LaFave, Wein & Frament, PLLC, Guilderland (Robert F. Axisa of counsel), forappellants.

Epstein, Gialleonardo & Rayhill, Latham (Jeffrey T. Culkin of counsel), for Angela Plante,respondent.

Thorn, Gershon, Tymann & Bonnanni, LLP, Albany (Maureen Bonanni of counsel), forDeborah W. Greenfield, respondent.

Garry, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Devine, J.), entered September 19,2011 in Albany County, which, among other things, granted defendants' motions for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff Dianne A. Layden (hereinafter plaintiff) participated in a training session withdefendant Angela Plante, a certified personal trainer, at No Limits Fitness, a fitness center ownedby defendant Deborah W. Greenfield. Plaintiff advised the trainer before the session that she hada history of back problems and a herniated disc. The trainer then instructed plaintiff in a programof weight-lifting moves that plaintiff performed under her supervision. Two days later, plaintiffused the trainer's written instructions to repeat the program without supervision. Whileperforming a maneuver called a Smith squat, plaintiff experienced lower back pain, andultimately thereafter underwent surgery to correct two herniated discs with fragments. Plaintiffand her husband, derivatively, commenced this personal injury action alleging that the injury toher back was caused by the trainer's improper supervision and instruction, by Greenfield'snegligence in failing to provide a safe place and properly trained staff, and also upon the doctrine[*2]of respondeat superior based on the trainer's acts as an agentor employee. Defendants each moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court granted themotions and dismissed the complaint, based upon plaintiff's assumption of the risk. Plaintiffsappeal.

The doctrine of assumption of risk provides that a person who voluntarily participates inrecreational or athletic activities is deemed to consent to the "commonly appreciated risk[s]"inherent in that activity (Anand vKapoor, 15 NY3d 946, 948 [2010]; see Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d471, 484 [1997]). However, a participant does not assume risks resulting from "a dangerouscondition over and above the usual dangers inherent in the activity" (Myers v Friends of Shenendehowa Crew,Inc., 31 AD3d 853, 854 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Custodi v Town of Amherst, 20NY3d 83, 87-88 [2012]). As application of the doctrine undermines the principles ofcomparative causation, it "must be closely circumscribed" and has therefore been limited to applyonly "in the context of pursuits both unusually risky and beneficial that the defendant has insome nonculpable way enabled" (Trupia v Lake George Cent. School Dist., 14 NY3d 392, 395, 396[2010] [emphasis added]; see Shay vContento, 92 AD3d 994, 995 [2012]).

Initially, noting that assumption of risk has been applied to the use of exercise apparatus, wereject plaintiffs' contention that the doctrine does not apply to the noncompetitive fitness activityin which plaintiff was engaged (see Marcano v City of New York, 99 NY2d 548, 549[2002]). Further, plaintiff's own testimony established that she had previously participated inweight-lifting exercise programs—including a prior program designed by thetrainer—and that she knew that back injuries are an inherent risk of such activities.Accordingly, we find that defendants met their initial burden on summary judgment to establishon a prima facie basis that plaintiff knew of the risks, appreciated their nature and voluntarilyassumed them (see Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d at 484-485; Papa vRusso, 279 AD2d 744, 745 [2001], lv denied 99 NY2d 507 [2003]).

However, noting that "[t]he application of the doctrine of assumption of risk is generally aquestion of fact to be resolved by a jury" (McGrath v Shenendehowa Cent. School Dist., 76 AD3d 755, 757[2010]; see Pantalone v Talcott, 52AD3d 1148, 1149 [2008]), we find triable issues of fact presented as to whether the trainer'sactions "unreasonably heightened the risks to which [plaintiff] was exposed" beyond thoseusually inherent in weight-lifting (Myers v Friends of Shenendehowa Crew, Inc., 31AD3d at 856). Plaintiffs presented the affidavits of two personal training experts who opined thatthe Smith squat, even when properly performed, is contraindicated for a person with a herniateddisc as it causes "direct vertical loading of the spinal column" and places "extreme stress" on thelower back, and thus should not have been recommended for plaintiff. The experts furtheraverred that safe performance of the maneuver requires keeping the back straight, and that thetrainer erred in instructing plaintiff to "stick her butt out" during the exercise. The traineracknowledged that she gave plaintiff this instruction but explained that she meant that plaintiffshould move her body backward while keeping her back straight.[FN1]The trainer further testified that whether the Smith squat is dangerous for a person with a backinjury "depends on the form" used by the exerciser and acknowledged that, although she knewplaintiff had a herniated disc, she did not warn plaintiff that the exercise posed any risk [*3]to her back. Based on this testimony, plaintiffs raised triable issuesof fact as to whether the trainer's direction to perform the Smith squat, her allegedly improperinstructions, or both, served to unreasonably increase the risk to which plaintiff was exposed (see Corica v Rocking Horse Ranch,Inc., 84 AD3d 1566, 1568 [2011]; Myers v Friends of Shenendehowa Crew,Inc., 31 AD3d at 856; Mathis v New York Health Club, 261 AD2d 345, 346 [1999];compare Lee v Maloney, 270 AD2d 689, 691 [2000]).

As an alternate ground for affirmance, Greenfield contends that there is no evidence that shebreached a duty that proximately caused plaintiff's injury (see generally Derdiarian v FelixContr. Corp., 51 NY2d 308, 315 [1980]). Plaintiffs do not assert that plaintiff's injuryresulted from faulty equipment or any other property defect at the fitness center, and althoughone of plaintiffs' experts described multiple alleged inadequacies in the fitness center's safetyprocedures, there was no showing that these caused or contributed to plaintiff's injury. Instead,both experts averred without equivocation that the trainer caused the injury by instructingplaintiff to perform the Smith squat despite her back condition. Thus, no direct negligence wasshown, and Greenfield may be held liable only if the trainer's negligence may be imputed under atheory of respondeat superior. As to this doctrine, Greenfield contends that there is no derivativeliability because the trainer was an independent contractor rather than an employee (see Rackowski v Realty USA, 82AD3d 1475, 1476-1477 [2011]; Birch v McGhee, 79 AD3d 1296, 1297-1298 [2010]). Thisdetermination requires analysis of the extent of the fitness center's power to regulate the mannerin which the trainer performed her work, and the parties' conflicting evidence poses factualquestions as to this issue, barring summary determination (see Roberts v El-Hajal, 23 AD3d 733, 733 [2005]; Meyer v Martin, 16 AD3d 632,633-634 [2005]; Mason v Spendiff, 238 AD2d 780, 781 [1997]; compare Harjes v Parisio, 1 AD3d680, 681-682 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 508 [2004]).

Finally, we find the release that Greenfield proffers to be unenforceable. An agreement thatseeks to release a defendant from the consequences of his or her own negligence must "plainlyand precisely" state that it extends this far (Rigney v Ichabod Crane Cent. School Dist., 59 AD3d 842, 843[2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Lago v Krollage, 78 NY2d95, 99-100 [1991]; Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102, 110 [1979]). The release at issue heremakes no unequivocal reference to any negligence or fault of the fitness center employees oragents, but merely enumerates activities on plaintiff's part that will not lead to liability,and then provides in general terms that the fitness center is not liable for "any claims, demands,injuries, damages or actions" resulting from use of the facility. This release does not barplaintiffs' claim (see Rigney v Ichabod Crane Cent. School Dist., 59 AD3d at 843; Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d349, 349-350 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 712 [2005]; Alexander v Kendall Cent.School Dist., 221 AD2d 898, 899 [1995]).[FN2]

Kavanagh and Stein, JJ., concur.

Mercure, J.P. (dissenting). Because we conclude that plaintiff Dianne A. Layden (hereinafterplaintiff) assumed the risk of aggravating her prior back injury while weight-lifting at a gym, werespectfully dissent. The doctrine of primary assumption of risk provides that a voluntaryparticipant "engaging in a sport or recreational activity . . . consents to thosecommonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sportgenerally and flow from such participation" (Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d 471,484 [1997]; accord Anand vKapoor, 15 NY3d 946, 947-948 [2010]; see Bukowski v Clarkson Univ., 19 NY3d 353, 356 [2012]). Thedoctrine limits the scope of the duty owed to a voluntary participant—"[u]nder this theory,a plaintiff who freely accepts a known risk 'commensurately negates any duty on the part of thedefendant to safeguard him or her from the risk' " (Custodi v Town of Amherst, 20 NY3d 83, 87 [2012], quoting Trupia v Lake George Cent. SchoolDist., 14 NY3d 392, 395 [2010]). While "participants are not deemed to have assumedrisks resulting from the reckless or intentional conduct of others, or risks that are concealed orunreasonably enhanced," the duty of care that is owed is simply " 'to make the conditions as safeas they appear to be' " (Custodi v Town of Amherst, 20 NY3d at 88, quoting Turcottev Fell, 68 NY2d 432, 439 [1986]).

As we have previously acknowledged, " '[e]xtensive and unrestricted application of thedoctrine of primary assumption of the risk to tort cases generally represents a throwback to theformer doctrine of contributory negligence' " abolished by CPLR 1411 (Trupia v Lake George Cent. SchoolDist., 62 AD3d 67, 69 [2009], affd 14 NY3d 392 [2010], quoting Pelzer v Transel El. & Elec. Inc., 41AD3d 379, 381 [2007]). Thus, the primary assumption of risk "doctrine 'must be closelycircumscribed if it is not seriously to undermine and displace the principles of comparativecausation' " (Custodi v Town of Amherst, 20 NY3d at 89, quoting Trupia v LakeGeorge Cent. School Dist., 14 NY3d at 395). Nevertheless, the doctrine is not limited toorganized sporting events or competitions, as plaintiffs assert; rather, the doctrine, if otherwiseapplicable, encompasses noncompetitive fitness or exercise activity (see Marcano v City ofNew York, 99 NY2d 548, 549 [2002]; Feeney v Manhattan Sports Club, 227 AD2d293, 294 [1996]; but see Corrigan v Musclemakers, Inc., 258 AD2d 861, 862-863[1999]). Most recently, the Court of Appeals has explained that "application of assumption of therisk should be limited to cases appropriate for absolution of duty"—i.e., " 'case[s] in whichthe defendant[s] solely by reason of having sponsored or otherwise supported some risk-ladenbut socially valuable voluntary activity ha[ve] been called to account in damages' " (Custodi vTown of Amherst, 20 NY3d at 89, quoting Trupia v Lake George Cent. School Dist.,14 NY3d at 396). The Court noted that in its prior cases applying the doctrine, the defendant"sponsored or otherwise supported" the activity, or it "occurred in a designated athletic orrecreational venue" (Custodi v Town of Amherst, 20 NY3d at 88).

Among those prior cases were two in which students were injured while attending martialarts classes (see id., citing Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d at 486-488).As in this case, the plaintiffs' noncompetitive, noncontact exercise activity took place atdesignated venues and the plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the supervision—in onecase, a 15-year old student was left in charge of the class—as well as the quality of theinstruction and the particular exercises that they were directed to perform (see Morgan v Stateof New York, 90 NY2d at 481, 486-488). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals concluded thatthe plaintiffs had assumed the risk of falling while tumbling and performing floor exercises(id. at 487-488). In explaining the justification for application of the doctrine, the Courtexplained that "[t]he primary means of improving one's sporting prowess and the inherentmotivation behind participation in sports is to improve one's skills by undertaking andovercoming new challenges and obstacles" (id. at 487).[*4]

Here, plaintiff was experienced with weight-lifting andhad been a member of No Limits Fitness, the fitness center owned by defendant Deborah W.Greenfield, for nine months prior to the accident. She first hired defendant Angela Plante, acertified personal trainer, to design an exercise program in March 2007, and then performed theexercise program on her own for three months. Thereafter, plaintiff requested that Plante teachher a new program "because [plaintiff] was getting tired of doing the same exercises for threemonths. [She] wanted to learn new exercises." Plaintiff performed the new exercise programduring a single training session with Plante without experiencing any discomfort, but experiencedmild back pain shortly afterwards and for the next day. Although plaintiff had a history of backproblems and was aware that she had a herniated disc, she nevertheless returned to perform theprogram by herself and felt back pain while performing a Smith squat. Plaintiff acknowledgedthat her discomfort was apparent from the first squat, but she continued to do 14 more.

In our view, plaintiff—who was a registered nurse and well aware both of herpreexisting back condition and that weight-lifting could further injure her back—assumedthis commonly appreciated risk (see Anand v Kapoor, 15 NY3d at 948). Given plaintiff'sadmitted awareness of the risk, any assertion that Plante's exercise program unreasonablyenhanced the risk is meritless inasmuch as plaintiff's reliance on Plante to negate the danger offurther injury was not justifiable (see Feeney v Manhattan Sports Club, 227 AD2d at294). Despite the parties' dispute over whether Plante told plaintiff to stop any exercise thatcaused her pain and whether the Smith squat was contraindicated for anyone with a herniateddisc, there is no evidence that Plante or anyone else either urged plaintiff to continue with thatexercise or reassured her that performing it was safe despite her discomfort (cf. Corica v Rocking Horse Ranch,Inc., 84 AD3d 1566, 1568 [2011]; Myers v Friends of Shenendehowa Crew, Inc., 31 AD3d 853,854-856 [2006]; Mathis v New York Health Club, 261 AD2d 345, 346 [1999]). Nor isthere any evidence that plaintiff was encouraged to stop performing the previous program thatPlante had designed and that plaintiff had safely used for three months. Rather, plaintiff simplygrew "tired" of the previous program and, despite her awareness of the risk, sought to "improve[her weight-lifting] skills by undertaking and overcoming new challenges and obstacles"(Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d at 487). Under these circumstances, the doctrineof primary assumption of risk bars recovery as a matter of law.

Malone Jr., J., concurs. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, byreversing so much thereof as granted defendants' motions for summary judgment; motionsdenied; and, as so modified, affirmed.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: The trainer's written instructionsinclude the direction to "stick butt out," but do not mention keeping the back straight.

Footnote 2: As the release does not exemptdefendants from liability for their own negligence, General Obligations Law § 5-326 doesnot apply (see Rigney v Ichabod Crane Cent. School Dist., 59 AD3d at 843 n).


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