| Matter of Kuznia v Adams |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03369 [106 AD3d 1227] |
| May 9, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Kathleen Kuznia, Petitioner, v JohnAdams, as Director of the Saratoga County Probation Department, et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Girvin & Ferlazzo, PC, Albany (Jeffrey D. Honeywell of counsel), forrespondents.
Egan Jr., J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court byorder of the Supreme Court, entered in Saratoga County) to review a determination ofrespondent Saratoga County Administrator which terminated petitioner's employment.
Petitioner began her employment with the Saratoga County Probation Department in1979 and, in 2004, was named as the Department's deputy director. In November 2009,Paul Viscusi, then the Department's director, suffered a heart attack and, shortlythereafter, elected to retire. As a result, between the time of Viscusi's heart attack inNovember 2009 and the appointment in August 2010 of his successor, respondent JohnAdams, petitioner effectively was in charge of the Department.
Prior to serving as the Department's deputy director, petitioner consistently receivedpositive performance evaluations.[FN1]In March 2010, however, petitioner received a "letter of [*2]counseling" from the then administrator of respondentSaratoga County raising a number of concerns regarding petitioner's leadership,supervisory and time-management skills. In addition to citing petitioner's "lack ofattention" to the preparation and logging of "time sensitive" reports, the administratorquestioned petitioner's participation in the decision to assign a probation officer with"little [adult] probation experience" to supervise the Intensive DWI Internship Programin July 2009 and criticized petitioner's "inadequate supervision and training" of thisindividual—a failure that purportedly was "compounded by [petitioner's] eventualdirective [that such individual not] seek the assistance of other probation officers" in theDepartment. Petitioner was encouraged to "immediately make every effort to improve[her] management skills" and was warned that her failure to do so could result in a lossof employment.
In October 2010, petitioner received a second counseling notification—thistime in the form of a memorandum from Adams—citing, among other things, herfailure to timely submit various state-mandated reports and surveys to the Department'soversight agency. Concerns regarding petitioner's performance subsequently came to ahead in January 2011, when it was discovered that three of the files assigned to the DWIprobation officer were missing—one of which involved an active probationer whohad not been supervised in any capacity since July 2009.[FN2]Adams immediately conducted an audit of the approximately 140 files assigned to suchprobation officer, which resulted in the discovery of additional deficiencies andomissions.[FN3]As a result, petitioner was charged in March 2011 with incompetence and suspendedwithout pay. Following a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75, the HearingOfficer issued a 50-page decision, wherein he sustained the bulk of the specifications andrecommended petitioner's "dismissal from service [as] the only viable solution."
Respondent Saratoga County Administrator thereafter adopted the Hearing Officer'srecommendation, found petitioner guilty of the overall charge of incompetence andterminated her employment. In response, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78proceeding seeking, among other things, reinstatement as deputy director of theDepartment and back pay. Supreme Court subsequently transferred the proceeding to thisCourt pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g).
We confirm. "[T]he standard of review to be applied in reviewing an administrativedetermination made pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75 is whether thedetermination is supported by substantial evidence" in the record as a whole (Matter of Lory v County ofWashington, 77 AD3d 1265, 1266 [2010]; see Matter of James v HoosickFalls Cent. School Dist., 93 AD3d [*3]1131,1132-1133 [2012]; Matter ofCovert v Schuyler County, 78 AD3d 1309, 1310 [2010], lv denied 16NY3d 706 [2011]). Credibility determinations lie "solely within the province of theHearing Officer" (Matter ofPerryman v Village of Saranac Lake, 64 AD3d 830, 835 [2009]) and, to thatend, "this Court may neither substitute its own judgment for that of the Hearing Officernor weigh the evidence presented" (Matter of Lory v County of Washington, 77AD3d at 1267; see Matter of Covert v Schuyler County, 78 AD3d at 1310; Matter of Sindoni v County ofTioga, 67 AD3d 1183, 1184 [2009]). Notably, "a finding of incompetence. . . only requires evidence of some dereliction or neglect of duty"(Matter of Branam v Simons, 300 AD2d 973, 974 [2002]; accord Matter of Dickinson v NewYork State Unified Ct. Sys., 99 AD3d 569, 570 [2012]; Matter of Phillips v Le Page, 4AD3d 704, 705 [2004]).
Here, the first two specifications charged petitioner with incompetence based upon,among other things, her failure to (1) report and/or appreciate the significance of thethree missing case files, (2) monitor the caseload assigned to the DWI probation officerand/or discover the documented deficiencies contained therein, and (3) adequately trainand/or supervise this probation officer—despite being warned in March 2010 ofthe urgent need to do so. At the hearing, Adams testified—in detail and at greatlength—regarding petitioner's failure to immediately apprise him of the missingcase files, the public safety implications of having a probationer go unsupervised for anapproximately 18-month period and petitioner's overall failure to supervise the probationofficer overseeing the DWI program. Specifically, Adams testified that had petitionerundertaken a "meaningful review" of the files assigned to this probation officer,petitioner should have discovered—given her background, training andexperience—the regulatory violations contained therein, namely, the insufficientnumber of personal or collateral contacts with respect to certain identified probationers(see 9 NYCRR 351.4), the failure to report subsequent arrests of certainprobationers to the relevant court within the prescribed time period (see 9NYCRR 352.6 [a] [3] [ii][FN4]) and the failure to enter probationer information in a particular database in a timelyfashion (see 9 NYCRR 348.2).[FN5]According to Adams, petitioner never advised him that probationers were not being seenor that the required reports were not being filed; instead, petitioner merely indicated thatthe probation officer in [*4]question was "behind on hispaperwork."
In addition to the foregoing, there was abundant testimony regarding the overall lackof training and supervision supplied by petitioner to the probation officer in charge of theDWI program. Viscusi agreed that the caseload inherited by this probation officer "[was]a mess," but it was his expectation that petitioner would "dig in[ ]" and work with theprobation officer in order to "straighten everything out." Petitioner similarlyacknowledged that the approximately 140 files at issue "were in absoluteshambles"—a situation precipitated in no small measure by the fact that, accordingto petitioner, the individual previously assigned to this caseload falsified entries on asubstantial number of the files at issue. However, despite being aware of the status of thiscaseload, the subject probation officer's lack of experience in supervising adultprobationers and, more to the point, the prior deficiencies noted in her supervision andtraining of this individual, petitioner made no real effort to remedy the situation.
In this regard, the newly assigned probation officer, who could recall attending onlythe basic training program, testified that petitioner did not undertake a case-by-casereview of the files assigned to him, he and petitioner did not meet on a regular basis todiscuss his caseload and petitioner generally adopted a "get to them when you can"attitude relative to the required quarterly reports. Additionally, the probation officerstated that during the relevant time period, petitioner did not provide any negativefeedback or constructive criticism regarding his performance; to the contrary, theperformance evaluation completed by petitioner in June 2010 ranked this probationofficer's overall performance as "[m]eritorious"—a rating that, according toAdams, clearly was "not founded in reality" given the documented deficiencies. Suchtestimony, in our view, demonstrates petitioner's overall neglect of her supervisoryresponsibilities and, as such, constitutes substantial evidence to support the finding ofincompetence as to the first two specifications.
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the third specification chargingpetitioner with incompetence based upon her supervision of the Department's JuvenileJustice Unit. Simply put, the testimony offered by Adams and others regarding, amongother things, petitioner's failure to timely advise and train her staff with respect toupdated intake proceedings relative to Family Ct Act article 7 petitions and/or properlyimplement a required youth assessment screening instrument constitutes further neglectof her responsibilities and is sufficient to sustain the finding of incompetence.
As to the issue of penalty, it is well settled that this Court will set aside the penaltyimposed "only if it is so disproportionate as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness"(Matter of Sindoni v County of Tioga, 67 AD3d at 1184 [internal quotationmarks and citation omitted]; seeMatter of McKenzie v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of Albany, 100 AD3d1096, 1098 [2012]). Here, the record reflects that although petitioner twice waswarned regarding serious and specific deficiencies in her job performance, she continuedto exercise poor professional judgment with respect to, among other things, themanagement, training and supervision of the probation officer in charge of the DWIprogram. The record further illustrates that petitioner's neglect of herduties—particularly with respect to her failure to implement certain policies and/orcomply with mandated reporting requirements—not only created what Adamsaptly described as "a huge public safety issue," but also exposed the County to liability.Thus, notwithstanding petitioner's many years of service and her prior positiveperformance evaluations, we do not find the penalty of termination to be shocking to thisCourt's sense of fairness (see Matter of Covert v Schuyler County, 78 AD3d at1311; Matter of Lory v County of Washington, 77 AD3d at 1268; [*5]Matter of Sindoni v County of Tioga, 67 AD3d at1184-1185; Matter of Monahanv Delaware-Chenango-Madison-Otsego Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 27 AD3d995, 996 [2006]). Petitioner's remaining contentions, to the extent not specificallyaddressed, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.
Peters, P.J., Rose and Stein, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Footnote 1: According to Viscusi,written performance evaluations ceased after 2004 because the then administrator ofrespondent Saratoga County preferred to personally conduct yearly evaluations in hisoffice.
Footnote 2: Adams testified that thisdiscovery was particularly troubling, as probationers assigned to the DWI program hadan 80% recidivism rate and, therefore, posed a significant risk to public safety.
Footnote 3: This probation officerwas counseled, given additional training and reassigned to a new supervisor, whoconducted a case-by-case review of the probation officer's files and assisted him inprioritizing the work to be accomplished. As a result of these efforts, all of the "majorissues" with such files were resolved within three months.
Footnote 4: Pursuant to the citedregulation, upon discovering that a probationer under its supervision had been arrestedfor a crime, i.e., a felony or a misdemeanor offense, the Department was required to"notify the proper court(s) and provide a brief description of the alleged crime(s) and thestatus of the case, no later than seven business days upon learning of an arrest from anysource" (9 NYCRR 352.6 [a] [3] [ii]). Such information, in turn, was to "be recorded ineither a Court Notification Report or a Violation of Probation Petition and Report" (9NYCRR 352.6 [a] [3] [ii]). According to Viscusi, the Department did not file therequired documents with respect to "misdemeanor cases"—purportedly because ajudge instructed it not to do so.
Footnote 5: Contrary to petitioner'sassertion, the failure to enter such information constituted a continuing violation and,hence, the specific entries challenged by petitioner are not barred by the applicablestatute of limitations (see Civil Service Law § 75 [4]; Matter of Covertv Schuyler County, 78 AD3d at 1311).