| Matter of Ratzker v Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller (N.Y.State & Local Retirement Sys.) |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03543 [106 AD3d 1321] |
| May 16, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Marilyn Ratzker,Petitioner, v Office of the New York State Comptroller (New York State andLocal Retirement System), Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (William E. Storrs of counsel), forrespondent.
Stein, J.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of theSupreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of the Comptrollerwhich denied petitioner's application for, among other things, additional service credit inthe calculation of her retirement benefits.
Petitioner was hired as a temporary special education paraprofessional with the SouthHuntington School District in 1985. In or about 1989, she became a permanent employeeand remained in that capacity until her retirement in 2010. Petitioner registered as amember of respondent, New York State and Local Retirement System, in June 2004 andsubsequently applied for premembership employment service credit for her work at theschool district. Respondent determined that petitioner was eligible to purchase 12.40years of service credit for her employment with the school district through June 2004 forthe sum of approximately $9,000, plus interest. Petitioner paid such amount, despite herobjection to the manner in which respondent had calculated her premembership servicecredit and the cost thereof. She thereafter sought a hearing and redetermination, claiming,among other things, that she should have [*2]receivedcredit for working full time for certain years prior to 1996[FN*] and that the amount she was required to pay to purchase her premembership servicecredit—including the interest portion thereof—was in error. The HearingOfficer found that petitioner had failed to sustain her burden of proving that respondentincorrectly calculated her premembership service credit or that she overpaid for the costof purchasing such credit, and concluded that her application should be denied. TheComptroller made one supplemental finding of fact, but otherwise adopted the HearingOfficer's determination. This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.
We confirm. The Comptroller is vested with the exclusive authority to determineapplications regarding retirement benefits, including service credit (seeRetirement and Social Security Law § 74 [b]), and such determinations must beconfirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Muccia vDiNapoli, 69 AD3d 1291, 1292 [2010]; Matter of Carabello v DiNapoli, 51 AD3d 1361, 1362[2008]; Matter of DeLuca vNew York State & Local Employees' Retirement Sys., 48 AD3d 876, 877[2008]; Matter of Siepierski vNew York State & Local Retirement Sys., 46 AD3d 1316, 1318 [2007]). Here,petitioner claims that respondent erred in calculating her premembership service creditbecause, among other things, it did not give her full credit for those years prior to 1996,when she claims she worked full time. Notably, petitioner bears the burden ofestablishing her entitlement to the additional service credit (see Matter of McMorrow vHevesi, 6 AD3d 925, 926 [2004]).
Public employers are required to provide a certified document to respondent to allowfor retirement benefit determinations to be made based upon service, salary anddeduction records (see 2 NYCRR 315.3 [b]). Such document must include,among other things, the number of days worked; a full day worked is considered "anyday on which the employee performs paid service for at least the standard number ofhours required for the position in which such service is rendered" (2 NYCRR 315.3 [b][4] [ii]). The employer is authorized to determine the standard number of hours thatconstitute a full workday (see 2 NYCRR 315.3 [b] [4] [ii]). When less than a fullday is worked, the employee is entitled to prorated credit (see 2 NYCRR 315.3[b] [4] [iii]). Here, petitioner received one year of service credit for each year she workedfor the school district from 1996 until 2004, based upon the certified employment recordsprovided to respondent by the school district. However, due to the absence of recordsreflecting the number of days worked by petitioner for the years prior to 1996,respondent calculated the days she worked by, as pertinent here, dividing the amount thatpetitioner was paid each month by her [*3]hourly pay rateand then dividing that figure by seven hours, the standard workday as reported by theschool district.
Petitioner testified that she worked the same number of hours—specifically,6½ hours each day—and was considered full time from 1989 until herretirement in 2010. Thus, she claimed that she should have received one year of servicecredit for each of the disputed years. However, respondent's Assistant Director ofMember and Employer Services testified that respondent calculated petitioner's servicecredit by using the certified employment information supplied by the school district,including the number of hours constituting a full workday. Although the parties'respective experts both utilized similar methods of computing petitioner's service creditfor the years in which the school district did not supply the actual number of daysworked, their divergent conclusions resulted from the fact that petitioner claimed that the6½ hours she worked daily represented a full day of work, while respondent reliedon the school district's report that the standard workday consisted of seven hours.Inasmuch as the determination that petitioner was not entitled to full-time service creditduring the period in question was based upon the certified employment data provided bythe school district, we conclude that such determination was supported by substantialevidence.
We also reject petitioner's claim that respondent incorrectly calculated the cost ofpurchasing her premembership service credit. Pursuant to Retirement and Social SecurityLaw § 609 (b) (2), a member must pay for services that predate the date of entryinto respondent, the amount he or she would have been required to contribute at the timethe service was rendered—in this case, three percent of the wagesearned—plus interest at the rate of five percent. Petitioner asserts that she was onlyrequired to make a three percent contribution for her premembership service credit for atotal of 10 years. Since she had accrued 5.65 years of membership credit at the time thatshe purchased the past service, she contends that she should only have been required topurchase an additional 4.35 years of premembership service credit. While Retirement andSocial Security Law § 902 provides that an eligible employee who has 10 or moreyears of credited service is no longer required to make a three percent contribution(see Retirement and Social Security Law § 902 [b] [1]), it explicitly statesthat "[n]othing in this subdivision shall affect the obligation of an eligible employee topay such amounts as may be required by . . . [section 609] . . .for service rendered prior to such employee's date of membership" (Retirement andSocial Security Law § 902 [b] [3]). Accordingly, based upon the plain reading ofthe statute, we discern no error in the determination that petitioner was required topurchase all of her premembership service, including those years that extended beyond10 years of service. We similarly conclude that petitioner was required to pay fivepercent interest on her contribution amount (see Retirement and Social SecurityLaw § 609 [b] [2]; Matterof Henry v State of New York, 15 AD3d 764, 765 [2005], lv denied 4NY3d 711 [2005]).
Finally, while petitioner correctly notes—and respondentconcedes—that the Hearing Officer made a factual error by finding that the recordcontained no evidence that she had filed an application for disability retirement benefits,respondent had not yet issued a determination on that application at the time of theHearing Officer's determination in this proceeding. Therefore, any challenge concerningthe result of such application was premature and is not properly before us in the instantproceeding. Petitioner's remaining contentions have been considered and are unavailing.
Lahtinen, J.P., Spain and Garry, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Footnote *: In her correspondenceto respondent before the hearing, petitioner claimed that she should have receivedfull-time credit for the years 1990 through 1995. However, at the hearing, petitioner'sexpert calculated that she should have received full-time credit for the years 1991through 1995, and petitioner claimed that her service credit for these years wasmiscalculated by a total of .95 years. Additionally, petitioner's expert determined that, forthe years 1986, 1987 and 1990—while she worked part time—her servicecredit was miscalculated by a total of .17 years. Based upon new information provided bythe school district, respondent credited petitioner with an additional .40 years. Whencombined with those .40 years of corrected credit, petitioner's total claim of additionalpremembership service credit was 1.52 years.